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3 Introduction 
 During the Arab Spring, four of the world’s most recalcitrant dictators—Zine 
el Abadine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Muammar Gaddafi  of Libya, Ali Abdullah Saleh 
of Yemen, and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt—fell aft er decades in power. Each lost 
power aft er unparalleled levels of social protest—and sometimes armed 
confl ict—called for an end to their tough regimes. Th e “Arab Spring” is what 
many international commentators are calling the cascading popular democ-
racy movements that began in Tunisia, inspired Egypt, and consequently ani-
mated other movements across the region. Several autocrats have had to 
dismiss their cabinets. Discontent has cascaded over transnational networks 
of family and friends to Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen. Several coun-
tries remain in crisis, and in most of these countries it is not clear if the popular 
demand for change will result in new sustainable political institutions. Social 
protests in the Arab world have spread across North Africa and the Middle 
East, largely because digital media allowed communities to realize that they 
shared grievances and because they nurtured transportable strategies for mo-
bilizing against dictators. But the early months of the Arab Spring were not 
about traditional political actors such as unions, political parties, or radical 
fundamentalists. Th ese protests drew out networks of people, many of whom 
had not been as successful at political organization before: young entrepre-
neurs, government workers, women’s groups, and the urban middle class. 
 Ben Ali ruled Tunisia for 20 years, Mubarak reigned in Egypt for 30 years, 
and Gaddafi  held Libya in a tight grip for 40 years. Yet their bravest challengers 
were 20- and 30-year-olds without ideological baggage, violent intentions, or 
clear leadership. Th e groups that initiated and sustained protests had few 
meaningful experiences with public deliberation or voting and litt le experi-
ence with successful protests. However, these young activists were politically 
disciplined, pragmatic, and collaborative. Where do young people who grow 
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up in entrenched authoritarian regimes develop political aspirations? How do 
they learn about political life in other countries where faith and freedom co-
exist? 
 Th e internet, mobile phones, and social networking applications have 
transformed politics across North Africa and the Middle East. By contextual-
izing and periodizing the past decade of Arab media systems and information 
infrastructure development, we can understand how, why, and to what eff ect 
this transformation occurred. Th e contemporary political uses of digital media 
and information-communication technologies did not erupt in a vacuum. 
Local and international civil society actors learned to leverage social media 
while autocratic regimes nurtured information management strategies to con-
trol and co-opt these social movements. Digital media use by multiple polit-
ical actors and interests continue to shape emerging Arab media systems. 
 Where is social change possible through new communication networks? 
How have social movements operated across global contexts since the growth 
of digital media? Since the third wave of democratization, there are few regions 
with developing societies that remain non-democratic. Th ese include the 
post-Soviet sphere, some cases in East and Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, 
and the Arab Middle East and North Africa. All of these regions have also 
consistently experienced economic liberalization and adoption of new infor-
mation infrastructure, both of which have further globalized their societies’ 
interactions with the rest of the world. Of the four regions with persistently 
non-democratic regimes, the Arab World has the largest number, with the 
greatest diversity in political culture, media systems, and socioeconomic 
makeup. What has made possible the rapid mobilization and collective protest 
action we have witnessed recently? In what ways have ICTs become integrated 
across the Arab World into the daily lives of its constituents? What role have 
regimes played in controlling, facilitating, or co-opting new information infra-
structures? Last, what role did existing media systems, particularly broadcast 
networks, serve in connecting and transporting local images and discourses to 
the rest of the world? 
 Civil Society Online 
 Civil society actors have fl ourished online, largely because much of the inter-
net’s infrastructure is independent of state control. Civil society is oft en 
defi ned as a self-generating and self-supporting community of people who 
Introduct ion   5 
share a normative order and volunteer to organize political, economic, or cul-
tural activities that are independent of the state ( Diamond  1994 ). Civil so-
ciety groups are a crucial part of all democracies, concerned with public aff airs 
yet autonomous from state bureaucracies so that government policy itself—
and government corruption—fall within their purview. Civil society is consti-
tuted by a plurality of groups representing diverse perspectives and promoting 
those perspectives through communications media and cultural institutions. 
Moreover, a key tenet of the shared normative order is that no one group can 
claim to represent the whole of society, and that society is best served by a 
multitude of groups that contribute in diff erent ways to the dissemination and 
exchange of information about public policy options and national develop-
ment goals ( Diamond  1994 ). 
 Th e importance of the internet for contemporary Arab civil society actors 
can be att ributed to two factors: fi rst, many groups were pushed online because 
other forms of political communication were inaccessible. Television com-
mercials for advertising to the public were prohibitively expensive and regu-
lated by the state. Radio commercials and newspaper ads were still beyond the 
budgets of most small civic groups and also similarly regulated by the state. 
Th e well-monitored broadcast media were a means by which the state and 
mainstream political parties regulated discourse. Second, the internet allowed 
for content to be hosted on servers beyond the control of state censors and 
aff orded anonymity to those who advanced political criticism. During times 
of crisis, when physical spaces for public conversation and debate closed 
down, the internet provided virtual spaces for political communication. 
 Over the last decade, civil society organizations have been pulled online 
because of the internet’s expanding user base and changing demographics of 
the internet-using population. In part, this was a function of falling costs: in 
the year 2000, the average resident of Cairo would have spent a quarter of his 
or her daily income on an hour of internet access at a cyber cafe. By 2010, 
around 5 percent of the average daily income would buy an hour of access at 
an internet access point (Howard and World Information Access Project 
2007). In Egypt, civil society leaders have used the internet to reach out to 
foreign and domestic publics, build linkages with like-minded groups, raise 
funds from group membership, activate support in times of crisis, and provide 
social services. Th ey also use the internet as a tool for critiquing the govern-
ment and off ering policy alternatives. 
 Even though a relatively small portion of the general population in 
these countries has internet access, the portion that is online is politically 
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significant. Internet users are very often a developing country’s wealthy 
and educated elites. They tend to be younger and live in capital cities and 
urban areas, and they tend to be among the most politically active. So the 
clients for civil society organizations, whether those organizations are 
faith-based, service oriented, or policy focused, are also potential mem-
bers and supporters of civic agendas. The proliferation of consumer elec-
tronics has made it possible for civic leaders to reach new audiences, but 
this trend has also empowered local civil society “startups” to launch both 
small, permanent civic organizations and local, issue-specific campaigns. 
For example, online civil society was vibrant but constrained in Egypt, but 
growing and co-opted in Saudi Arabia. 
 Comparing Experiences across the Arab Spring 
 A focused, comparative analysis must take care to defi ne the cases that are in 
the comparative set and to explain why some are out. In this cross-case, event-
driven analysis, we look at the role of digital media in popular movements for 
democracy that have posed signifi cant challenges to authoritarian rule in 
North Africa and the Middle East since early 2011. Indeed, we argue that the 
comparative method is the best approach to understanding the diverse, but 
still shared, experiences that Arab communities in the region have had with 
digital media and political change. 
 Activists around the world saw the creative ways in which protesters in 
North Africa and the Middle East used digital media, and other researchers 
have posited links between that region and subsequent protests in Spain, the 
United Kingdom, China, and elsewhere, including the global “Occupy” move-
ment. So it is plausible that activist strategies and inspirations resonated 
beyond North Africa and the Middle East. But for the purpose of this compar-
ative work we exclude these cases and focus on the Arab countries in North 
Africa and the Middle East.  Tables  I.1 and  I.2 identify the countries studied in 
forthcoming chapters, with details about social movement activities. Th ey are 
organized by their political outcomes. 
 Within these countries are a common set of languages, similar if not shared 
media systems, consistently authoritarian regimes, and rapidly increasing 
levels of technology diff usion. Palestinian frustration was directed at Israel, 
not the territorial government. Qatar had no major protests, but the govern-
ment made concessions preemptively. Th e political opposition in Iran did 
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mobilize during the Arab Spring, but with less success than achieved during 
election protests in the summer of 2009. Despite the obvious diversity of 
these countries, three att ributes make all 23 countries a useful comparison set: 
most of the countries have been slow to democratize, compared to the rest of 
the developing world; most of these countries have more rapid rates of tech-
nology diff usion than the rest of the world; and social elites in nearly all these 
countries use technologies to censor political culture and manage information 
fl ows in ways not oft en tolerated in the rest of the developing world, but with 
varying sophistication and success. 
 Furthermore, there are several modular political phenomena across na-
tions with signifi cant Arab populations: political action is largely based on 
the emulation of successful examples from others. Th is occurs through policy 
imitation and coordination among several Arab countries, especially with 
regard to telecommunications standards, technology-led economic develop-
ment, and internet censorship. For several decades, interior ministers of Arab 
countries have held an annual conference to discuss successful ways of se-
curing their regimes, and in recent years their agenda has extended to the best 
ways of handling media and internet censorship. But such imitation also oc-
curs among communities of social elites and the leadership of democratiza-
tion movements. As will be demonstrated in the chapters ahead, ruling elites 
learn about and imitate the successful strategies of their autocratic neighbors. 
At the same time, successful democratization strategies are sometimes trans-
ported into the collective action strategies of movements in other countries. 
Th rough regionalized processes of elite learning and defection, Arab coun-
tries seem to democratize in similar ways, not necessarily following the rec-
ipes for democratization that have been followed in other regions and at 
other time periods. Across many Arab countries, democratization move-
ments appear to be learning to use information-communication technologies 
from each other, linking up to share experiences, and transporting successful 
organizational strategies. Yet these modular political phenomena are not just 
found among social movements: state bureaucracies learn censorship strat-
egies from each other, political parties in Arab countries learn how to use 
ICT’s from sympathetic parties in other countries, and part-time and full-
time journalists learn new online research and publishing strategies from 
each other. 
 Second, many Arab countries have shared technology diff usion patt erns 
and similar systems of political communication, which are together distinct 
from those in other developing countries. Holding economic wealth constant, 
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Arab countries have among the highest rates of technology adoption in the 
developing world. Moreover, many Arab governments have responded to the 
new information technologies in consistent ways: censorship strategies have 
been developed with similar objectives of cultural control, internet service 
providers are held legally responsible for the content that fl ows over their net-
works, and government agencies work aggressively to support (oft en 
“Islamic”) cultural content online. Th ere are, of course, interesting diff erences 
among the countries that may account for why digital media were important 
for political mobilization in some places and not others. Some of these coun-
tries have signifi cant fuel economies, others do not (rentier states have long 
been shown to easily subsidize massive welfare and state security organiza-
tions to serve regime interests). Some have high levels of digital media use, 
others do not. Th e character of authoritarian regimes also varies, with con-
stitutional monarchies, secular regimes, and states with so litt le capacity to 
govern that they are not even very good at being authoritarian. 
 Causality and Context 
 In a sense, all methods are comparative. Research that involves large 
numbers of cases oft en involves statistical manipulations that are designed 
to reduce the number of explanatory variables while expanding the popula-
tion of cases explained. Even individual country case studies involve some 
general comparisons to neighboring countries or earlier time periods, or 
involve sett ing the particular case into sharp relief against global trends. We 
do not believe it is useful to compare the Arab Spring to the French Revolu-
tion or Russian Revolution. Instead, we seek to compare social movement 
activities and political outcomes within the region, within the current tem-
poralities of technological and technocratic change. In comparative com-
munication research, our goal is to examine media systems, technology 
diff usion patt erns, the political economy of news, journalism cultures, and 
technology and telecommunications policy (including engineering stan-
dards and intellectual property law). Th e goal of this book is not a general 
introduction to the Arab Spring, and readers looking for such an introduc-
tion might turn to the collection of essays printed by the Council on For-
eign Relations or Marc Lynch’s well-considered  Th e Arab Uprising ( Council 
on Foreign Relations  2011 ;  Lynch  2012 ). Our book takes a focused look at 
the role of digital media during the Arab Spring. But making digital media 
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the entry point for an investigation of the causes of the Arab Spring does not 
mean that we are only interested in the internet, or mobile phones. In fact, 
studying the media has come to mean understanding a wide range of tech-
nological aff ordances, telecommunications policies, and cultures of use. 
Our defi nition of digital media is a deliberately extensive one: digital media 
consist of (a) the information infrastructure and tools used to produce and 
distribute content that has individual value but refl ects shared values; 
(b) the content that takes the digital form of personal messages, news, and 
ideas, that becomes cultural products; and (c) the people, organizations, 
and industries that produce and consume both the tools and the content 
( Howard and Parks  2012 ). 
 Th e tendency among pundits and the popular press is either to make strong 
arguments about how digital media “caused” the Arab Spring or to dismiss 
even the possibility of such a causal role with passing reference to the diffi  culty 
of agreeing on what causality means. Some argue that information technol-
ogies may have had a role but that there were more important  singular factors 
at play. We believe—and this is the reason for this study—that it makes more 
sense to look for combinations of causal factors. Sometimes researchers call 
these conjoined causal explanations, and they allow for both the preservation 
of some nuance specifi c to particular cases and the ability to generalize about 
a causal recipe that may be transportable to other cases. Our goal is not one 
explanation but a few parsimonious explanations that cover the most cases in 
the most sensible ways. We are less interested in the philosophical debate 
about the nature of causality and more interested in the social consequences 
of technology use that can be observed by studying a few cases in deep ways. 
We seek to understand the context of political mobilization in a relatively 
small set of countries in recent years, and we have relatively nuanced research 
questions. We do not seek to understand whether technology diff usion causes 
democratization, because there are some obvious diff erences in country con-
texts and a range of political outcomes from the Arab Spring. But when did 
digital media become an important means of social mobilization, and when 
did digital media use have political consequences? In other words, when were 
digital media one of the conjoined causal combinations of factors that 
explained political outcomes, and when were they irrelevant? It may be that 
the causal combinations vary by country but that the one consistent compo-
nent is digital media. We address this specifi c question at length in the conclu-
sion, but aft er developing our framework and perspective in the preceding 
chapters. 
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 Outline of the Book 
 Our argument proceeds by reviewing what we already know about digital 
media and social change.  Chapter  1 sets the stage for the Arab Spring and pro-
vides a narrative that connects online with offl  ine actions, describes practices 
of technology use and digital storytelling that have diff used across the region, 
and demonstrates how key political events had technological components and 
how important technological interventions had political consequences. We 
also provide a sequence of events during the Arab Spring, highlighting the 
signifi cant moments at which digital media had a role in the evolution of the 
revolutions. Th e goal of this chapter is not to provide the defi nitive history of 
these events but to off er a “media history” of the events. Understanding the 
timeline of events through the lens of digital media is an important fi rst step, 
and in subsequent chapters we refer to this timeline to demonstrate the larger 
mechanics of protest organization, regime response, and the political economy 
of news. 
 Chapter  2 privileges the stories of civic leaders, bold activists, and regular 
citizens who risked much to contest authoritarian rule in their respective 
countries. Th is chapter celebrates the creative work of small groups of tech-
savvy protesters who managed to have a signifi cant impact on the opportunity 
structure for opposition leaders. But it also critiques their work, identifying 
some of their failures, uncertain successes, and problematic outcomes. 
 Chapter  3 works to tell the longer history of digital media and dissent. 
Many of the countries in this region are notable for not having, in decades, a 
large public mobilization for democratic change. But these countries have all 
had political activists and opposition groups. Th e Arab Spring was not their 
fi rst att empt at mobilization, nor was it their fi rst att empt to use digital media 
to awaken public sentiments. But in the spirit of technologically based innova-
tion, many of these contemporary successes were beta versions of past failures 
and lessons learned. Th e Arab Spring may have been their most successful ef-
fort to date to use digital media to rally public support, but this chapter serves 
to set the context preceding the events of early 2011—especially also to high-
light how strategies and challenges may evolve in the future. 
 Subsequently,  Chapter  4 investigates the response of authoritarian regimes. 
During the heady weeks of protest, authoritarian governments responded 
sometimes with concessions, and then sometimes with violent crackdowns. 
But every single government that faced public protest, regardless of regime 
type, had some kind of digital-response strategy. Th ere was a range of 
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 responses, some more sophisticated than others, and we explore which, to 
what eff ect, and why. 
 Chapter  5 is about Al Jazeera and the changing political economy of news 
in the region. Social media and consumer electronics have wrought havoc on 
news markets, and indeed the relationship between news consumer and news 
producer is now blurred. Al Jazeera became one of the most innovative news 
agencies during the Arab Spring, using social media to disseminate fresh con-
tent to the rest of the world and bringing feedback from outsiders to desperate 
activists. Th is chapter demonstrates how, at key moments, the social media 
strategy of Al Jazeera not only raised its profi le as a credible news organization 
but also increased its clout as a political actor in the domestic game of opinion 
formation in several parts of the region. 
 Th e fi nal chapter off ers a conservative list of the conclusions we can make 
about the role of digital media in the Arab Spring, bolstered by a fuzzy-set 
analysis of the causes and consequences, successes and failures of national up-
risings. Th e Western news media played up technology use in reporting from 
the region. Bloggers and tech-savvy activists promoted their role in leading 
popular protest, perhaps obscuring the traditional methods and structures of 
protest that were at work. But what are the most reasonable things we can 
conclude by comparing popular protest movements from this moment across 
several countries? In which countries did digital media have a role in the suc-
cess of social movement mobilization, and in which countries were social 
movements successful but not really as a result of technology diff usion? We 
conclude that certain recipes strongly corroborate the technological condi-
tions under which regimes sustained their durability, particularly their level of 
censorship sophistication, as well as the presence of key technology factors 
that assisted the interests of social movements, especially access to mobile 
telephony. 

17
 1 
 Digital Media and the Arab Spring 
 It has been 15 years since the last “wave” of democratization. Between 1989 
and 1995, many remnants of the Soviet Union and failed authoritarian 
regimes in other parts of the world turned themselves into variously func-
tional electoral democracies. By 2010, roughly three in every fi ve states 
held some democratic form (Diamond  2009 ). Certainly there were also 
large, important countries that made few eff orts at democratization, strate-
gically important states run by hereditary rulers, and other states that 
seemed to be slipping, sliding, or teetering on the edge of dictatorship. But 
as a region, North Africa and the Middle East were noticeably devoid of 
popular democracy movements—until the early months of 2011. 
 Between January and April 2011, public demand for political reform cas-
caded from Tunis to Cairo, Sanaa, Amman, and Manama. Th is inspired people 
in Casablanca, Damascus, Tripoli, and dozens of other secondary cities to take 
to the streets to demand change. By May, the political casualties were signifi -
cant: Tunisia’s Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, two of the 
region’s most recalcitrant dictators, were gone; Libya was locked in a civil war; 
and several constitutional monarchs had sacked their cabinets and committ ed 
to constitutional reforms (and some several times over). Governments around 
the region had sought peace by promising their citizens hundreds of billions of 
dollars in new spending measures for infrastructure projects, family and un-
employment benefi ts, free or subsidized food, salary increases for civil ser-
vants and military personnel, tax cuts, aff ordable-housing subsidies, and social 
security programs. Morocco and Saudi Arabia appeared to fend off  serious 
domestic uprisings, but the outcomes for other regimes were far from certain. 
Democratization movements had existed long before technologies such as 
mobile phones and the internet came to these countries. But with these tech-
nologies, people sharing an interest in democracy built extensive networks, 
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created social capital, and organized political action; virtual networks materi-
alized in the streets. Brave citizens made their shared opposition to authori-
tarian rule known, and digital media helped to accelerate the pace of revolution 
and build its constituency. Digital media served as an “information equalizer,” 
so described by Seib, allowing for both the telling of compelling stories and 
the management of all the small communications and logistics tasks that must 
happen in concert if an uprising is to succeed (Seib  2008 ). 
 Th ere are many ways to tell the story of political change. But one of the 
most consistent narratives from civil society leaders has been that the internet, 
mobile phones, and applications such as Facebook, Twitt er, and other social 
media made the diff erence, this time. Digital media provided the important 
new tools that allowed social movements to accomplish political goals that 
had previously been unachievable. And judging by the reactions of dictators 
and other desperate political elites, digital media have become an important 
part of a modern counterinsurgency strategy. Looking back over the last few 
months, what concrete things can we say about the role of digital media in 
political uprisings and democratization during the Arab Spring? What do the 
events of that time reveal about the contemporary narrative arc of democrati-
zation? What implications do the events of the Arab Spring bear for our un-
derstanding of how democratization actually works today? 
 Tunisian Origins 
 On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fi re. Th is young 
street vendor had tried in vain to fi ght an inspector’s small fi ne, appealing fi rst 
to the police, then to municipal authorities, and then to the region’s governor. 
At each appeal he had been physically beaten by security offi  cials. Bruised, 
humiliated, and frustrated by an unresponsive bureaucracy and thuggish secu-
rity apparatus, Bouazizi set himself alight in front of the governor’s offi  ce. By 
the time he died in a local hospital on January 4, protests had spread to cities 
throughout the country. It is not enough to say that news of Bouazizi’s tragic 
death traveled quickly, because the state-run media did not cover his death or 
the simmering hatred in the city of Sidi Bouzid. During those angry weeks in 
December, it was through blogs and text messages that Tunisians experienced 
what McAdam has called a “cognitive liberation”; networks of family and 
friends, feeling sympathy for the dying man’s plight, came to realize that they 
shared common grievances (McAdam  1982 ). Th e realization grew as people 
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watched and uploaded YouTube videos about the abusive state, read foreign 
news coverage of political corruption online, and shared jokes about their 
aging dictators over the short messaging services (SMS) of mobile phone net-
works. Th rough communication networks beyond state control, people 
craft ed strategies for action and a collective goal: to depose their despot. 
 For many years, the most direct accusations of political corruption had 
come from the blogosphere ( Jurkiewicz  2010 ). Prett y much the only investi-
gative journalism into questionable policies and government corruption came 
from average citizens using the internet in creative ways. Most famous is the 
graphically simple video of the Tunisian president’s plane arriving and leaving 
Europe’s elite shopping destinations with his wife as the only passenger. Fol-
lowing the online publication of this video, the regime vigorously cracked 
down on YouTube, Facebook, and other online applications. In fact, since 
1995 Tunisia has interfered with digital networks for political reasons more 
times than almost any other state. But a cott age industry of bloggers and activ-
ists took to the internet to produce alternative newscasts, create virtual spaces 
for anonymous conversation about public policy, and commiserate about 
state persecution. Th e critics of Ben Ali, president of Tunisia, dominated vir-
tual spaces, but aft er Bouazizi’s death, these critics began occupying public 
spaces. Shamseddine Abidi, a 29-year-old interior designer, posted regular 
videos and updates to Facebook, and Al Jazeera used the content to carry news 
of events to the world. Images of Bouazizi, hospitalized with burns, passed 
along networks of family and friends, and eventually strangers. An aggressive 
internet campaign called on fellow citizens and unions to set up committ ees to 
support the uprising in Sidi Bouzid. Lawyers and student unions were among 
the fi rst to move into the streets in an organized way. 
 Th e government tried to ban Facebook, Twitt er, and video sites such as 
DailyMotion and YouTube. But within a few days SMS networks were the or-
ganizing tool of choice. Less than 20 percent of the overall population actively 
used social media websites, but almost everyone had access to a mobile phone. 
Outside the country, the hacker communities of Anonymous and Telecomix 
helped to cripple government operations with their “Operation Tunisia” 
denial-of-service att acks, and by building new soft ware to help activists get 
around state fi rewalls. Th e government tried to respond with a counterinsur-
gency strategy against its tech-savvy opponents, jailing a group of known blog-
gers in early January. For the most part, however, the political uprising was 
leaderless in the classical sense—there was no long-standing revolutionary 
fi gurehead, traditional opposition leader, or charismatic speechmaker who 
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radicalized the public. But there were prominent nodes in the digital net-
works, people whose contributions held sway and mobilized turnout. Slim 
Amamou blogged the revolution (and later took a post in the national unity 
government and the Arab World’s fi rst “Pirate Party”). Sami Ben Gharbia, a 
Tunisian exile, monitored online censorship att empts and advertised work-
arounds. “El Général,” a middle-class Tunisian rapper, streamed digital 
“soundtracks for the revolution.” 
 By early January, urgent appeals for help and amateur mobile phone videos 
were streaming across North Africa. Ben Ali’s position seemed precarious. Th ere 
were major protests in Algeria, along with several additional self-immolations 
across the region. Again, the state-run news media covered litt le about events in 
neighboring Tunisia. Th e Algerian government tried to block internet access 
and Facebook use as traffi  c about public outrage next door increased. But with 
all the private submarine cables running to Europe, there was no mandatory 
point of passage for information fl ows that the Algerian government could shut 
down. When that government also became a target for the hackers, Anony-
mous, state information infrastructure suff ered. By the time Ben Ali fl ed Tunisia 
on January 14, active campaigns for civil disobedience against authoritarian rule 
were growing in Jordan, Oman, and Yemen. In other countries, such as Leba-
non, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, minor protests erupted on a range of 
issues and triggered quick concessions or had litt le impact. But even opposition 
leaders in these countries drew direct inspiration from what they were tracking 
in Tunisia. Moreover, opposition leaders across the region were learning the dig-
ital tricks for how to catch their ruling elites off  guard. Compared to Tunisia, 
only Egypt’s civil society, politically active and cautiously observing develop-
ments in Tunisia, was more wired. Th e stories of success in Tunisia, which soon 
became more apparent, helped inspire the largest protests in Cairo in 30 years. 
 Egypt, Inspired 
 In Egypt, almost everyone has access to a mobile phone. Overall, the country 
has the largest internet-using population in the region, second only to that of 
Iran (although Iran is technically not part of the “Arab World”). Th is meant 
that news of Ben Ali’s departure spread rapidly through Egypt’s social strata. 
Th e specifi c news of his departure was covered, reluctantly, by state-run media. 
But the same state-run media had been slow to broadcast news of the protests 
in the region earlier in the month, and parallel protests in Cairo. Like Tunisia, 
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Egypt has long had a large and active online public sphere. It is here that illegal 
political parties, radical fundamentalists, investigative journalists, and disaf-
fected citizens interacted. When the Muslim Brotherhood’s online news ser-
vices were banned in Egypt, they moved their server infrastructure to London 
and kept up their fl ow of online deliberations and political spin. But it was not 
the established parties and unions that converted anti-Mubarak vitriol into 
civil disobedience. It was the campaign to memorialize a murdered blogger. 
 Wael Ghonim, a regional executive at Google, started the Facebook group, 
“We are all Khaled Said,” to keep alive the memory of a young blogger who 
had been beaten to death by police for exposing their corruption. Just as dig-
ital images of Bouazizi in the hospital passed over networks of family and 
friends in Egypt, an image of Khaled’s bruised face, taken as his body lay in a 
city morgue, passed from one mobile phone to another, until thousands had 
seen the picture and were actively developing protest strategies online. And 
just as videos of a young girl dying in the streets of Tehran had inspired hun-
dreds of thousands of people to take to the streets in the summer of 2009, the 
webpage to memorialize Said became a portal for collective commiseration. 
But more than being a digital memorial—Egyptian police have long tor-
mented bloggers—this webpage became a logistical tool and, at least tempo-
rarily, a very strong source of community. Ghonim fast became the country’s 
most prominent Tweeter, linking a massive Egyptian social network writing in 
Arabic with networks of interested English-speaking observers overseas. 
 Th e fi rst occupants of Tahrir Square shared many of the hopes and aspira-
tions of their counterparts in Tunis. Th ey were a community of like-minded in-
dividuals with similar backgrounds: underemployed, educated, eager for change, 
but exhausted by the religious fervor and political ideologies of past decades 
(Bayat  2007 ). Th ey found solidarity through digital media and used their mobile 
phones to call their social networks into the streets. Protests escalated quickly. 
Both government analysts and outsiders were surprised that such a large net-
work of relatively liberal, middle class, peaceful citizens would mobilize against 
Mubarak so rapidly. Th e traditional Islamists, opposition parties, and union or-
ganizations were there, but liberal and civil society voices dominated the digital 
conversation about events and the public stages in squares around Cairo during 
the igniting phases. News and speeches from Mubarak, Obama, and regional 
leaders were streamed live to phones and laptops throughout the square. 
 Mubarak tried to disconnect his citizens from the global information infra-
structure in the last week of January. It was a desperate maneuver with mixed 
impact. A small group of tech-savvy students and civil society leaders had 
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 organized satellite phones and dial-up connections to Israel and Europe, so 
they were able to keep up strong links to the rest of the world. And it appears 
that some of the telecommunications engineers acted slowly on the order to 
choke off  internet access. Th e fi rst large internet service provider was asked to 
shut down on Friday, January 28, but engineers didn’t get to it until Saturday. 
Other providers responded quickly but returned to normal service on Monday. 
Th e amount of bandwidth going into Egypt certainly dropped off  for four days, 
but it was not the information blackout Mubarak had asked for. Taking down 
the nation’s information infrastructure also crippled government agencies. Th e 
people most aff ected were middle-class Egyptians, who were cut off  from inter-
net service at home. Some people stayed there, isolated and uncertain about the 
status of their friends and family. But in the absence of information about the 
crisis, others took to the streets, eager to learn what was going on. 
 A few days later, the Egyptian security services began using Facebook and 
Twitt er as a source of information for a counterinsurgency strategy. Th ey used 
social media alerts to anticipate the movements of individual activists. Th ey 
abducted Ghonim once his Facebook group topped 300,000 people (it is now 
well over 2 million). Digital media helped aff ord not only a cascade of civil 
disobedience across the communities living under Egypt’s unfl appable dic-
tator but it also made for a unique means of civic organization that was 
observed, modifi ed, and replicated around the region. 
 The Digital Contagion of Democracy 
 Digital media brought the details of social mobilization—and success—
against the strongmen of Tunisia and Egypt cascading across the region. 
Although many analysts did not foresee the Arab Spring, there was evidence 
that Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries shared features with others that had 
experienced technology-enabled democratization in recent years (Howard 
 2010 ). As images of Bouazizi in the hospital, burned and bandaged, circulated 
beyond Tunisia, his act of self-immolation inspired similar actions in Algeria, 
Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq. 
 As in Tunisia and Egypt, authorities in Algeria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
and Libya tried to stifl e digital traffi  c about the prospects for domestic political 
change. Th ese governments also actively targeted bloggers for arrest, beatings, 
and harassment. It is clear that digital media have had an important role in 
changing the system of political communication during sensitive moments in 
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regime transition. Images of jubilant protesters in Tunisia and Egypt inspired 
others across the region. Facebook provided an invaluable logistical infrastruc-
ture for the initial stages of protest in each country. Text-messaging systems fed 
people in and outside these countries with information about where the action 
was, where the abuses were, and what the next steps would be. 
 Within a few weeks there were widely circulating online tip sheets on how 
to pull off  a successful protest. Th e  Atlantic Monthly translated and hosted an 
“Activist Action Plan,”  boingboing.net provided guidelines for protecting ano-
nymity online, and Telecomix circulated methods for using landlines to cir-
cumvent state blockages of broadband networks. Th rough Google Earth, 
Bahrain’s Shia population mapped and aggregated photos of the Sunni ruling 
minority’s opulent royal palaces while many people lived in single-room 
houses with 17-member families. Digital media provided both an awareness 
of shared grievances and transportable strategies for action. 
 Prominent human rights blogger Mahmood al-Yousif tweeted during his 
arrest, instantly linking up the existing networks of local democratization ac-
tivists such as @OnlineBahrain with international observers through @Bah-
rainRights. In Libya, the fi rst assertion of a competing political authority came 
online, on a website declaring an alternative government in the form of the 
Interim Transitional National Council. One of Gaddafi ’s senior advisors 
defected by tweeting his resignation and advising Gaddafi  to fl ee. 
 Algerians with the same levels of dissatisfaction over economic prospects 
found in Tunisia and Egypt broke out in protest in much the same way. Salima 
Ghezali, a leading Algerian activist, told Al Jazeera in a phone interview that 
this outbreak of protest was “both very local and very global.” Union-led 
strikes had been common for decades, but protests of this scale had not oc-
curred since 1991. Algerian protesters were not among the most tech-savvy in 
the region, but before the country’s state-run media reported on local protests 
or Mubarak’s resignation, many residents in Algiers had already received the 
inspirational news by SMS. 
 Digital Contexts, Political Consequences 
 Th e range of consequence across Arab regimes and leaders varied widely but 
were nonetheless severe. Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak were removed 
peacefully, while Libya’s Gaddafi  was killed by rebel fi ghters, Yemen’s Saleh fl ed 
his country, and Syria’s Assad has been embatt led in a civil war (see  Figure  1.1 ). 
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Th e Algerian government removed its incongruous 19-year state of emergency. 
Oman’s elected legislature got the authority to pass laws. Sudan’s war criminal 
president promised not to seek reelection. All the oil-rich states committ ed to 
wealth redistribution or the extension of welfare services. 
 But real-world politics is not just what happens offline. A classically 
trained social scientist trying to explain the Arab Spring would point to 
statistics on the youth bulge, declining economic productivity, rising 
wealth concentration, high unemployment, and low quality of life. These 
explanatory factors are often part of the story of social change. It does not 
diminish their important causal contribution to the Arab Spring to also say 
that digital media shaped events and outcomes: digital media were singu-
larly powerful in getting out protest messages, in driving the coverage by 
mainstream broadcasters, in connecting frustrated citizens, and in helping 
them realize that they shared grievances and could act together to do some-
thing about their situation. Indeed, digital media may be among the most 
proximate of causes because the motivations for protest against authori-
tarian rule alone had been insufficient for years. It never makes sense to 
look for simple, solitary causes of revolution. But if the people behind these 
  
 Figure 1.1  Four Dictators—Ben Ali, Saleh, Gaddafi , and Mubarak—before the Arab 
Spring. (AP Photo/Amr Nabil) 
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diverse movements had different reasons to hate their dictators, digital 
media use may be one of the most consistent parts of the uprising narrative 
across countries. 
 Certainly, many journalists have focused on the visible technological tac-
tics that seemed to bring so much success rather than looking at the root 
causes of social discontent. But this does not mean that information technol-
ogies should be excluded from the causal conditions of social discontent. 
Indeed, social discontent is not just a list of grievances. Collective grievances 
gestate, and people have to come to agreement on what those grievances are. 
In the last few years, this gestation process occurred online, particularly in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain. Social discontent took on an organizational form 
and was ultimately translated online into actionable strategies and achievable 
goals. In the last few months, this translation process has occurred over mobile 
phones and social-networking applications, even in countries that are usually 
very good at co-opting or suppressing opposition, such as Syria, Yemen, and 
Saudi Arabia. 
 Indeed, the range of grievances varied signifi cantly from country to coun-
try. Dissent existed in these countries long before the internet. But digital 
media helped turn individualized, localized, and community-specifi c dissent 
into a structured movement with a collective consciousness about both shared 
plights and opportunities for action. It makes more sense to think of conjoined 
causal combinations: the strength of existing opposition movements, the 
ability of the regime to buy off  opposition leaders, and the use of digital media 
to build opposition networks. It may be that causal combinations vary but that 
the one consistent component is digital media. 
 Broadly speaking, the internet has provided a means and a medium for po-
litical resistance across countries. Th ere are several ways in which the new in-
formation infrastructure has had an impact on political communication and 
public opinion formation. Th ese countries, with very diff erent histories and 
very diverse political cultures, have experienced similar changes to their 
systems of political communication since the advent of digital technologies. 
Even though these regimes are very diff erent, we off er propositions about how 
they have opened up in recent years, largely due to the proliferation of digital 
and networked information technologies. In most countries where online 
news use has been surveyed, researchers have found that the number of people 
who use the internet for political news and information peaks in times of crisis 
or during elections but that most of the time only a fraction of active internet 
users regularly consume news. 
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 Understanding This Wave 
 It may be premature to call these events a wave of democratization since po-
litical outcomes are uncertain and sustainable institutions take years, if not 
decades, to build. Yet opposition to authoritarian rule was the consistent col-
lective action goal across the region. Social movement leaders actively sought 
training and advice from the leaders of democratization movements in other 
countries, and rhetorical appeals for civil liberty appeared consistently from 
protest to protest. Either way, what are the phases of this latest “wave” of 
political change? 
 Looking back over the last 15 years, we can safely say that digital media 
has—in diff erent ways—become a necessary and sometimes suffi  cient cause 
of democratization (Howard  2010 ). Looking back over the fi rst three months 
of 2011, there appear to be fi ve phases to the story of digital media and the 
Arab Spring: Th e fi rst is a  preparation phase that involves activists using digital 
media in creative ways to fi nd each other, build solidarity around shared griev-
ances, and identify collective political goals. Th e  ignition phase that follows 
involves some inciting incident, ignored by the mainstream state-controlled 
media, that circulates digitally and enrages the public. Next comes a phase of 
 street protests that are coordinated digitally. A phase of  international buy-in , 
during which digital media are used to draw in international governments, 
global diasporas, and especially overseas news agencies is next. Th is all culmi-
nates in a  climax phase in which the state either cracks down and protesters are 
forced to go home (Bahrain, Iran), rulers concede and meet public demands 
(Egypt, Tunisia), or groups reach a protracted stalemate (Libya, Syria) and a 
fi nal denouement of post-protest information in an ideological war between 
the winners and losers of any resulting social change. 
 Across the region, the buildup to political upheaval involved the erosion of 
regime credibility through investigative research into corrupt practices. For 
most of the constitutional monarchies, military rulers, and strongmen of the 
region, the internet is the only place to fi nd their critics. Blogs, news organiza-
tion websites, Twitt er feeds, and political listservs are where many women 
debate on equal footing with men, where policy alternatives are discussed, and 
where regime secrets are exposed. Th e buildup to the physical occupation of a 
central square is actually a fairly quiet process of proliferating mobile phones 
and internet access. Th e arrival of new digital technologies becomes an occa-
sion for restructuring the way individuals produce and consume content, so 
that when a political crisis is ignited, the new habits of technology use are 
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already in place. Many authoritarian governments use some form of social net-
work strategy to surveil their public—Libya’s Jamahiriya domestic surveil-
lance committ ees involved between 10 and 20 percent of the population 
(Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor  2005 ). As technologies 
such as mobile phones and the internet proliferated and social media websites 
drew more users, individuals began to assert greater control over their own 
social networks. 
 Since 2000, technology proliferation has been particularly rapid in the 
Arab world. Th is has resulted in improved informational literacy, particularly 
in large cities. More people began to get news from overseas and to reconnect 
with friends and family abroad. It is not that Tunisians and Egyptians decided 
to have political protests and turned to digital media for logistical support. 
Th ey were already a relatively wired population who actively maintained their 
social networks with digital media and then turned to the media they knew 
best to organize protest. Digital media became a proximate cause of political 
revolution precisely  because a signifi cant community of users was already com-
fortable using digital media before the crisis began. It may seem that digital 
media use in times of political crisis is new. But for the residents of Tunis, 
Cairo, and other capitals, it is the everydayness of mobile phones that makes 
the technology a proximate cause of revolution. 
 Still, modern democratic activists do get formally trained in working with 
consumer electronics. Recently, the US Congress approved $30 million to the 
US Department of State to train more than 5,000 digital activists around the 
world (Gaouett e and Greeley  2011 ), and the Dutch Foreign Ministry has 
promised another €6 million, while other Western democratic governments 
are following suit. General “how-to” websites have become useful resources 
for activist guides, like “How to Set Up a Dial-up Server.” Th e Alliance of 
Youth Movements developed a timely list of activities that sympathetic publics 
abroad could participate in to help Egyptians connect. Th ere were guides to 
launching a local Facebook protest and sharing images, helping Egyptians dial 
up through Telecomix, redirecting Egyptian ham-radio signals to Twitt er, run-
ning relays to increase activists’ anonymity, or petitioning Vodafone to reopen 
their mobile networks in Egypt. 
 Th e ignition of popular protest is oft en a few specifi c acts of violence, car-
ried out by security services, which are captured and memorialized online but 
ignored in state-run broadcast media. Much thought goes into choosing the 
day for rhetorically useful events. Th ese deliberations happen online. Th ere is 
an incident that is usually not covered by the mainstream broadcast media. 
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But it is covered by participants who generate their own buzz through digital 
media. In Tunisia, the inciting incident was not just Bouazizi’s self-immolation. 
In Egypt it was not just Khaled Said’s death, or the inspiring success of protest 
in Tunisia. It was the participatory creation of news and discussion about these 
events by networks of family, friends, and then strangers when the state-run 
broadcast media did not air coverage of such activism. When Al Jazeera did not 
cover the digital activism in Syria, civic leaders there lobbied to have it covered. 
Al Jazeera produced a long documentary and featured Syrian activist content 
on its website. Consequently, interest in Syria’s opposition movement—both 
within the country and across the region—grew rapidly. 
 Oddly enough, the ignition of social protest in this latest wave of political 
upheaval does not seem to come with recognizable leaders. Charismatic ideo-
logues, labor leaders, religious spokespeople, and eloquent nationalists were 
noticeably absent in the fi rst days of uprisings. For Tunisia, the ignition of 
civic discontent was likely Bouazizi’s suicide. For Egypt, the eruption of col-
lective dissatisfaction was probably the brazen example of Tunisian citizens 
and their ultimate success, inspiration that came over digital networks of 
family and friends from Tunis. For the rest of the region, both countries served 
as examples of success, stories carried by the digital networks of social media 
and Al Jazeera. Eventually, formal political actors and public fi gures joined in. 
 Aft er ignition, the street batt les of political upheaval began, albeit in a 
unique way. Most of the protests in most of the countries analyzed here were 
organized in unexpected ways that made it diffi  cult for states to respond. 
Demonstrators were relatively leaderless and not dominated by unions, exist-
ing political parties, clear political ideologies, or religious fervor. Th e street 
phase of social protest involved a strategic use of Facebook, Twitt er, and other 
sites to identify the times and locations for civic action. Regimes sometimes 
adapted to this kind of planning and used the very same social media sites to 
track who would be mobilizing where or to block particular pages and applica-
tions at chosen moments. Syria has blocked Facebook and Twitt er on and off  
since 2007, but the government opened access in the midst of political pro-
test, possibly as a way of tracking and entrapping activists. 
 Activists were well aware of state-surveillance eff orts, directing each 
other to email, and urging one another not to post sensitive organizational 
details publicly on Facebook and Twitt er. When the Libyan government 
blocked Facebook, activists took to Muslim dating websites and used the 
romantic language of courtship and dates to mask their planning for face-to-
face meetings and protests. When state offi  cials in Syria started spreading 
Digita l  Media and the Arab Spr ing   29 
 misinformation over Twitt er, activists used Google Maps to self-monitor and 
verify trusted sources. More oft en than not, the state simply mismanaged in-
formation technologies in ways that allowed savvy activists to perform crea-
tive workarounds. Mubarak disabled Egypt’s broadband infrastructure but 
left  satellite and landline links alone. Gaddafi  tried to disable his country’s 
mobile phone networks, but with multiple decentralized home-location 
 registers—including a key node in the eastern city of Benghazi—rebels were 
able to reinstate the national registry showing which phone numbers linked 
to which phones. 
 News coverage of events in the region regularly revealed citizens using 
their mobile phone cameras to document events—especially their own par-
ticipation. In Tahrir Square, tank commanders took photos of the crowds and 
shared them on their social networks. Th e occupants of Tahrir Square took 
photos of the tanks, too. When army vehicles were abandoned, people took 
pictures of themselves in the vehicles for their Facebook pages. People who 
were arrested took pictures of themselves in custody. Some Egyptians openly 
speculated that the reason the army did not systematically act against pro-
testers was because soldiers knew they were being constantly photographed 
and were suddenly aware of their socially proximate connection to the occu-
pants of the square. In countries where the army was ordered to respond 
more aggressively, the carnage was still documented. YouTube had to develop 
a special waiver to its usual policy of not publicizing culturally off ensive gore 
to allow the shocking user content being submitt ed by users in the fi eld of 
action to go live. 
 Contemporary political opposition must eventually take the step of seeking 
international buy-in, and this, too, has become a digitally mediated process. 
Domestic turmoil can eventually capture international att ention. Of course, 
the degree to which a popular uprising fi nds an international audience depends 
on the strategic relationship with the West and also on the proximity of social 
media networks. Most technology users do not have the sophistication to 
work around state fi rewalls or keep up anonymous and confi dential communi-
cations online. But in each country, a handful of tech-savvy students and civil 
society leaders do have these skills, and they used them well during the Arab 
Spring. Learning from other democracy activists elsewhere, these information 
brokers used satellite phones, direct landline connections to internet service 
providers (ISPs) in Israel and Europe, and a suite of anonymization soft ware 
tools to supply the international media with pictures of events on the ground, 
even when desperate dictators att empted to shut down national ISPs. 
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 Th e political climax of uprising takes the form of state crackdowns or 
major concessions to popular demands that can include executive turnover. 
Stalemates between protesters and ruling elites can result in protracted bat-
tles. But in each country, the political climax of uprising can also be marked 
by a clumsy att empt by the state to disconnect its own people from digital 
communications networks. Banning access to social media websites, pow-
ering down mobile phone towers, and disconnecting internet exchange 
points in major cities are the desperate strategies an authoritarian govern-
ment uses for reasserting control. And there are serious economic conse-
quences to disconnecting a nation from global information infrastructures, 
even temporarily. Interrupting digital services cost Egypt’s economy at 
least $90 million and damaged the country’s reputation among technology 
fi rms as a stable place for investment. In Tunisia it was activist hackers—
“hacktivists”—who did the most economic damage by taking down the 
stock exchange. 
 Counterinsurgency campaigns have digital components: by the end of 
April, activists in Bahrain, Morocco, and Syria had batt led to dominate their 
country’s Twitt er hashtags, which pro-regime advocates used to push out links 
to photographs of national monuments and soccer statistics. During critical 
moments, it can be diffi  cult to tell whether the regime is shutt ing down mobile 
phone networks or if digital switches are just being jammed from high use by 
overworked systems. In either case, the peak moments of crisis are marked by 
exceptionally poor connectivity—through crushing demand or regime inter-
ference. In many of these telecommunications markets, the outcomes are the 
same: regimes crack down on the largest providers; demand peaks and is 
rerouted to the few small available digital switches. States either crack down 
successfully; protesters and elites reach a stalemate with protracted, digital 
batt les; or rulers concede and meet public demands. 
 Whether the state crackdown sends people home or the protesters send a 
dictator packing, there is a post-protest information war. Once Mubarak left , 
the State Security Investigative Service, Egypt’s security service, did its best to 
destroy its organizational archives, though some records leaked online. Th e 
websites of activists became portals for constant critique of whoever led the 
temporary or transitional government. Losers, whether elites or activists, were 
driven offl  ine and their content became more diffi  cult to fi nd. Outsiders were 
quickly called to task for the side they took or their opinions on the future. 
When US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was booked for a web chat with a 
popular Egyptian website, 6,500 questions were submitt ed in two days. By the 
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time the protests were over, a few of the digerati found that they had become 
newly prominent political fi gures. 
 Traditional media sources have also had an important role in the Arab 
Spring. A key feature of authoritarian rule is that dictators appoint news edi-
tors. During the days of uncertainty in Egypt, Mubarak and his information 
minister, Anas el-Fiqqi, called television anchors personally to berate them 
for unfl att ering coverage. And satellite television has done much to create a 
strong sense of transnational identity in the region. Of the existing news 
media organizations, Al Jazeera was certainly the most infl uential because it 
was the most high-profi le regional source of news. For example, Al Jazeera’s 
Dima Khatib was the most prominent commentator on Tunisia when the 
country erupted, and she served as a key information broker for the revolu-
tion through Twitt er. Al Jazeera had an exceptionally innovative new media 
team that converted its traditional news product for use on social media sites 
and made good use of the existing social networks of its online users. But a 
key aspect of its success was its use of digital media to collect information and 
images from countries where its journalists had been harassed or banned. 
Th ese digital networks gave Al Jazeera’s journalists access to more sources and 
a second life to their news products. Indeed, the actual use of social media has 
become a news peg, with analysts eager to play with the meme of technology-
induced political change. 
 Regime responses vary in sophistication but oft en seem several paces 
behind civil society in terms of technology use. In February, during one of his 
televised speeches, Muammar Gaddafi  lost his train of thought when an aide 
drew his att ention to real-time coverage of his rant. Gaddafi  had simply never 
encountered such instant feedback from a source that could not easily be 
silenced or punished. Now that protests are dying down in Bahrain, the regime 
knows where the security holes in its telecommunications network lie. Saudi 
Arabia has bolstered its server infrastructure so that all traffi  c fl ows through 
internet-exchange points in Riyadh, and online content is monitored closely 
through censorship soft ware and crowd-sourced monitoring. 
 It is a mistake to build a theory of democratization around a particular kind 
of soft ware, a single website, or one piece of hardware. It is also erroneous to 
label these social events Twitt er, Facebook, or Wikileaks Revolutions (Dickin-
son  2011 ; Sullivan  2011 ; Taylor  2011 ). It does not make sense to argue that 
digital media cause civil society leaders or dictators to be more eff ective at 
their work. Technology tools and the social actors who use them, together, 
make or suppress political uprising. 
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 Conclusion: Information Infrastructure 
and Civil Society 
 Digital media have changed the tactics for democratization movements and 
new information and communication technologies played a major role in 
the Arab Spring. We do not know how the new states in North Africa and 
the Middle East will stabilize and whether change will come to the remain-
ing, more recalcitrant authoritarian governments. But the consistent narra-
tive arc of the uprisings in the Arab Spring involved digital media intimately. 
Th e countries that have experienced the most dramatic political protests are 
among the most wired in the region and have large, tech-savvy, civil society 
groups. Th e countries with the most tech-savvy civil society groups, such as 
Tunisia and Egypt, removed their dictators with few casualties, while the 
countries with the weakest technology infrastructure, such as Libya, Syria, 
and Yemen, were locked in protracted civil wars. As Salamey and Pearson 
argue, advancements in communications technology and economic global-
ization have undermined long-standing national authoritarianism in favor 
of Middle Eastern civil rights and civil society movements (Salamey and 
Pearson  2012 ). 
 In times of political crisis, technology fi rms sometimes act constructively 
to either serve the public or capture market share. For example, Google rushed 
its launch of Speak2Tweet, an application that bypassed Mubarak’s att empt to 
block Twitt er use by translating phone messages into text messages. Several 
tech fi rms built dedicated portals to allow in-country users to share content. 
But as Morozov points out, information technologies—and the businesses 
designing them—do not always support democratization movements (Moro-
zov  2011 ). Opposition leaders in countries where political parties are illegal 
sometimes use pseudonyms to avoid government harassment. But doing so 
on Facebook is a violation of the company’s user agreement, and so the com-
pany actually shut down some of the protest-group pages. Supporters eventu-
ally were successful in having the pages reinstated, but these incidents 
demonstrated that businesses such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitt er failed 
to fully appreciate how their users were treating these tools—as public infor-
mation infrastructure and not just as cool new business applications. Alter-
nately, Google has signed the Global Network Initiative—a compact for 
preventing web censorship by authoritarian governments; Facebook’s com-
mitment is less resolute and maintains only an observer status. It might be 
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technically possible to require Facebook users in Western countries to use real 
identities but then to also off er levels of anonymity to people living in dictator-
ships, but no such features or coordinated frameworks exist. 
 It is diffi  cult to say whether the revolutions would or would not have hap-
pened without digital media. We know the region has long had democratic 
activists—they just have not had many successful protests until now. Radio 
and television reaches most people, while only 10–20 percent of the popula-
tion of most countries in the region has easy access to the internet. Yet this 
subset of people is an important one: it is usually a cluster of government 
workers, educated professionals, young entrepreneurs, and urban dwellers. 
Th ese are the networks of people who initiated, coordinated, and sustained 
civil disobedience. We also know that the countries with the lowest levels of 
technology proliferation are among those with the weakest democratization 
movements. Counterfactual scenarios can be intellectually interesting, but the 
overwhelming evidence about what did happen in a concrete set of cases 
should probably not be evaluated equally with hypothetical cases and imag-
ined alternative scenarios. Counterfactuals and thought experiments can be 
fun to work with, but prominence should always be given to the evidence and 
the patt erns in political change for which there are real cases. 
 It may seem premature to think of this as a wave of democratization, since 
several states are still in crisis. Democratization waves are measured in years, 
not months. But like other periods of democratic emergence, the Arab Spring 
had a unique narrative arc, has involved a particular community of nations, 
and has caught most autocrats and analysts by surprise. Digital media are 
important precisely because they had a role in a relatively successful popular 
mobilization against authoritarian rule. Subsequently, civil society leaders in 
other countries used digital media in similar ways. 
 Unlike previous waves of democratization, however, the Arab Spring had 
several unique features. For the amount of political change that has occurred, 
there has been limited loss of life. In Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and 
Tunisia, civil society leaders found that state security services were noticeably 
more reluctant to move in on protesters precisely because most of the pro-
testers had mobile phone cameras. In Bahrain, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and 
Yemen, security services did move on peaceful protests, but good documenta-
tion of police abuse made its way to the international community. 
 For scholars of social movements, collective action, and revolution, there 
are several things about this latest wave of protests that should challenge our 
theories of how such protests work. Th ese movements had an unusually 
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 distributed leadership. Th e fi rst days of protest in each country were organized 
by a core group of literate, middle-class youth who had no particular affi  nities 
to nationalism, party, class struggle, or religious fundamentalism. Along with 
being ideologically mainstream, the core group of organizers did not start 
their mobilization with something we would recognize as broadcast media. 
Radio, television, and newspapers have long been part of the narrative of other 
democratization waves. But here the storyline involves the production and 
consumption of content over social networks, not the broadcast of ideological 
frames from a few demagogues to a less-educated public. 
 Looking over the events of the fi rst months of 2011, we can say more than 
simply that the internet has changed the way political actors communicate 
with each other. Since the beginning of the year, social protests in the Arab 
world have cascaded across North Africa and the Middle East, largely because 
digital media allowed communities to realize shared grievances and nurture 
transportable strategies for mobilizing against dictators. In each country, 
people used digital media to build a political response to a local experience 
with injustice. Th ey were not inspired by Facebook but by the real tragedies 
documented on Facebook. Social media have become the scaff olding upon 
which a functioning civil society can grow, and new information technologies 
aff ord activists freedoms they did not have before: information networks not 
easily controlled by the state and coordination tools that are already em-
bedded in trusted networks of family and friends. 
 One of the most important reasons for seriously considering the role of 
information technology during the Arab Spring is that activists and civic 
leaders themselves say it had a signifi cant impact on their organizational eff ec-
tiveness. Information infrastructure, according to the stories from across the 
region, was put to work in the service of political protest. Indeed, the in-
triguing examples of innovation from the street not only demonstrate how 
activists did things with technologies that neither engineers nor censors could 
have predicted. Th ere is also evidence that the organization of protest, the de-
mographic of protesters, and the strategic maneuvers of civic leaders has 
changed in the digital age. 
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 The Recent History of Digital 
Media and Dissent 
 Information infrastructure provides new structures for collective action. Since 
the commercialization of digital media, information infrastructure has become 
a formative space for nurturing and organizing social action. Such spaces are 
especially important for the public sphere in non-democratic societies because 
they can be the  only public spaces where autonomous—or even anonymous—
discussion can take place. Today, in many authoritarian regimes, public opin-
ion forms online. Yet it is a mistake to think that digital media are important 
simply because they are a new system for quickly delivering content. Th e 
longer history of digital media and dissent in the region reveals that the inter-
net, mobile phones, and social media applications are not just content systems; 
they are referral systems, rating and ranking systems, archiving systems, stan-
dard sett ing systems, deliberative systems, consultative systems, and systems 
for socialization. In varied ways the many technologies we think of as digital 
media are sometimes venues for public participation and sometimes means of 
social control. We identify three periods in which information infrastructure 
has come to provide new structures for collective action. 
 For Western media, the role of information technologies in the Arab Spring 
protests became a common news peg. But such technologies did not arrive 
suddenly the year before, and the perception that a popular uprising might be 
successful did not form suddenly. So if we investigate the role of digital media 
in social change, do we miss the other important, contextual features of each 
country’s domestic politics and international alliances? It would be epistemo-
logically weak to study digital media and expect that our understanding of this 
factor yields a complete understanding of the whole experience. However, 
there are things we miss if we do not study the media seriously, and there are 
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refl exive ways of situating media use in larger historical contexts. In other 
words, digital media provide a useful entry point for understanding how con-
temporary political communication worked in the regimes that collapsed, and 
how they worked in the regimes that survived. Th e system of political commu-
nication within the region did change radically with technology diff usion, but 
this recent history is one of evolution, not revolution. 
 Th e internet was privatized in 1995. In the following fi ve years, the internet 
provided online discussion spaces for political conversations that were not 
happening offl  ine. Between 2000 and 2006, the political internet expanded 
with online and alternative news media, which provided what Habermas 
might recognize as the shared text of a digital public sphere. Since 2007, social 
media have added the additional dimension of allowing individuals to manage 
their own social networks, and to push and fi lter political information along 
these links to family and friends. Prior to the Arab Spring, past cascades did 
not have the benefi t of commercialized communication networks and tech-
nologies, such as social media and mobile telephony, to draw in the wisdom of 
the crowd and smart mob mobilization. In contrast, the Arab Spring is one of 
the most impressive examples where laterally organized collective action pro-
jects were in combat with vertically organized state bureaucracies. 
 Social Movements and Digital Media 
before the Arab Spring 
 Prior to the Arab Spring, some countries in the region had vibrant online civil 
societies where open political conversations took place beyond the control of 
government censors. In some countries, government censorship was very ef-
fective at preventing open political conversations and discouraging the use of 
digital tools for organizing civil society groups independent of the state. By the 
end of 2010, the fi rst group of countries was experiencing a signifi cant digital 
renaissance in how civil society leaders did their work. Protest movements 
that had organized offl  ine years earlier were starting to organize online, score 
political victories, and have an infl uence on public policy. Th ese are also the 
countries where the contagious digital content of political protest spread most 
rapidly and where several dictators ultimately lost power. In contrast, by the 
end of 2010 the second group of countries were experiencing no such renais-
sance, and while there are a few successful examples of civil society leaders 
using digital media for political protest, most of the authoritarian governments 
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in these countries were having to spend more and more resources on digital 
censorship and surveillance to keep ahead of democracy activists. 
 Digital Media and the Civic Revival, 1995–2010 
 Even before their revolutions, Tunisia and Egypt had active blogospheres. 
Oft en the most critical coverage of government abuse was done not by news-
paper reporters, but by average citizens using their access to the internet in 
creative ways. Most famous in Tunisia was the graphically simple video of the 
president’s plane arriving and leaving Europe’s elite shopping destinations 
with his wife as the only passenger, mentioned earlier. Since the online publi-
cation of that video in August 2007, the regime has variously cracked down on 
YouTube, Facebook, and other online applications. In Bahrain, it was  Bahrain-
Online.com that att acked the country’s prime minister for corruption, but by 
2010 every country in the region had an online source for credible informa-
tion about corruption and regime abuse, spaces for political conversation 
independent of state control, and social network feeds that distributed news 
and alternative policy proposals the major news organizations would not 
carry. Some countries had many such online sources. At fi rst, such content was 
hosted on purpose-built websites, oft en with named URLs like  BahrainOn-
line.com . But aft er 2005, a growing amount of critical content was hosted 
through social media services; YouTube, DailyMotion, Facebook, and Twitt er 
became portals through which politicized content could be shared. When a 
regime could not take the criticism, it had to act by blocking access to entire 
services. For Libyans and Syrians, this content was mostly hosted out of coun-
try, though the origin of contributors included both in-country citizens and 
members of widespread diasporas. 
 In Egypt, democracy advocates benefi ted from Cairo’s position not only as 
a cultural hub but also as a media center with a reasonably robust information 
infrastructure. Th e diversity in Egypt’s media content had long been unusual 
in the region, and some have argued that because of this the role of digital 
media in Egypt’s uprising may also be unique and not easily compared to 
other country experiences during the Arab Spring (Khamis  2011 ). It has 
enabled the city’s politically disaff ected but still active youth and others to 
build a vibrant public sphere online. Over the past several years, political 
parties and social movements have become particularly adept at using social 
media to their advantage. Th e Muslim Brotherhood, for example, used the 
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internet to share information, organize supporters, and conduct other activ-
ities that helped it challenge secular authorities. Digital networks are ulti-
mately social networks, so it should not be surprising that the most viral 
political content actually took the form of music with lyrics that directly tar-
geted political leaders (DeLong-Bas ca.  2011 ). 
 In response, the governments of Tunisia and Egypt arrested bloggers, 
tracked online conversations, and shutt ered websites and internet access. In 
2005, Egyptian blogger Abdolkarim Nabil Seliman was arrested and impris-
oned for four years aft er criticizing President Hosni Mubarak and the state’s 
religious institutions. In 2007, a number of bloggers were arrested for orga-
nizing and covering social protests when the Egyptian parliament approved 
controversial constitutional amendments. Many activist Egyptian bloggers, 
some affi  liated with groups such as Kefaya and the April 6 Movement, were 
arrested and faced physical abuse. Egyptian bloggers proved particularly resil-
ient in continuing to publish critical information online, and indeed digital 
media had for several years provided an opinion platform that neither the state 
nor traditional political parties could dominate (Dunn  2010 ; Lim  2012 ). But 
in both Tunisia and Egypt a cott age industry of bloggers and activists used the 
internet to evade government censorship by creating alternative newscasts 
and building spaces online where individuals could publish information crit-
ical of the government without att aching their names to it. Online activists 
and bloggers, digital news organizations, and political party websites form a 
virtual ecology of civil society groups that debate contentious issues. In many 
cases, the boundaries between these organizations are blurred for important 
reasons. For example, banned political parties, such as Egypt’s Muslim Broth-
erhood, had relied on bloggers who maintained servers located outside the 
country and thereby could not be taken offl  ine by the government. 
 Egypt has a number of active political parties, many of which maintain web-
sites and online newslett ers to communicate with supporters and constituents, 
but also with each other. Almost all major parties publish online newspapers, 
such as the New Wafd Party’s  Al Wafd Daily , the National Progressive Unionist 
Party’s  Al-Ahali newspaper, the Arab Democratic Nasserist Party’s  Al-Arabi 
weekly, and the Tomorrow Party’s  Al Ghad weekly. In addition to the discus-
sion spaces fostered by newspapers, party publications like these provide op-
portunities for cross-party political negotiation. Th e Muslim Brotherhood had 
been banned by the government but nonetheless used Arabic and English 
language publications to maintain a presence in online Egyptian politics equal 
to—if not more prominent than—that of many politically sanctioned parties. 
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 Before the Arab Spring, Twitt er had a loyal following of users in Tunisia 
and Egypt living mostly in the largest cities. While records of Twitt er conver-
sations in both countries prior to the revolutions are not available, in most 
parts of the world we know that Twitt er is used by networks of family and 
friends to trade jokes and talk about everyday life. Facebook became a political 
tool because people found it useful for amassing content and building links to 
like-minded individuals. Th e Tunisian government was more active than the 
Egyptian regime in restricting social media. In 2007, for example, it blocked 
YouTube and DailyMotion for an extended period and in 2008 blocked Face-
book for a month. In both cases, observers suspected that the regime was 
reacting to fears that social media were strengthening the bonds of communi-
cation between citizens in ways not easily monitored and managed by the 
state. 
 In the hands of average people, digital media became a means of docu-
menting corruption and regime abuses. But it was also a tool for sharing the 
observations of outsiders. WikiLeaks revealed that the US ambassador to 
Tunisia had reported that more than half of Tunisia’s commercial elites were 
personally related to President Ben Ali (Anderson  2011 ). Th is network was 
known in the country’s diplomatic circles as “the Family,” and the ambassa-
dor’s leaked commentary circulated quickly among regime critiques and 
embarrassed elites. Yet it was not simply that the networks were exposed 
online. Information technologies opened the door to new ways of thinking 
about how to investigate, organize, assemble, and conduct political activities 
that could be immediately conveyed at a global level (DeLong-Bas ca.  2011 ). 
 Digital Media and Civic Repression, 1995–2010 
 Heightened levels of political conversation have had several specifi c conse-
quences for key regimes. Th e topics of political conversation are rarely unique 
to digital media, though discussion of electronic surveillance abound on email 
forums, blogs, and social media feeds. More important, there is a set of polit-
ical issues that seem to arise consistently across the varied political cultures in 
which civil society has begun to discuss public policy online. Th e fi rst topic to 
arise is oft en the balance of power and wealth between ruling elites and the 
rest of the country, or between primary cities, secondary cities, and the coun-
tryside, or among ethnic minorities. Th ese conversations are about the relative 
wealth and impoverishment of some communities and neighborhoods over 
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others. Discussing and documenting wealth disparities is an especially polit-
ical act when the ruling elites are from minority communities, or when the 
social network of family and business interests that controls wealth is unused 
to having its fi nances tracked. In Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria, the online conver-
sation about who controlled what quickly fed the collective sense of disparity. 
 Second, complaints about corruption grew louder and more fully substan-
tiated. Th rough digital media, accusations about graft  or abuse became docu-
mented in video, audio, and text, and these digital narratives were distributed 
over networks of family and friends. In some countries, accusations of offi  cial 
corruption may have occasionally appeared in the newspaper but only when 
the accusations were fully substantiated, regime censors had approved the 
coverage, or the target was modest. But digital media allowed the accusations 
of human rights abuses, misspent funds, and political favoritism to be more 
consistently and systematically documented. Such material became the shared 
text of grievances for regime critics. 
 Th ird, both the growing conversation about wealth disparities and corrup-
tion helped erode the long-held taboo against criticizing leaders directly. 
In Tunisia and Egypt, direct criticism of Ben Ali and Mubarak led to arrest 
and physical intimidation. In Morocco and Jordan, direct criticism of King 
Mohammed VI or King Abdullah was an invitation to the state’s security appa-
ratus to take action against the criticizer, and also a violation of a deep-seated 
cultural norm that royal fi gures were the embodiment of the state and beyond 
reproach. By 2010, it was increasingly possible to identify, in online news 
 coverage and political blogs, a Royal’s responsibility, negligence, or behavior 
relative to policy gaff es. 
 Comparing Media Systems 
 Table  2.1 identifi es important points of comparison and divergence in how 
digital media have diff used in the countries of North Africa and the Middle 
East. As Converse once said of public opinion research, “a sample design 
which extracts unrelated individuals from the whole and assigns the opin-
ion of each an equal weight is a travesty on any ‘realistic’ understanding of 
what the concept of public opinion means” (Converse  1987 ). Today, any 
realistic understanding of public opinion formation in Muslim media 
systems must come from a critical awareness of the limits to survey data but 
also an appreciation that digital-information technologies are providing 
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new opportunity structures for inclusion in the process of public opinion 
formation and measurement. 
 Many scholars have argued that news media are crucial for raising a sense of 
collective identity (Anderson  1983 ). And for a long time, social movement 
theory supposed that revolutions occurred when both the structural opportu-
nities and perceived opportunities for success were necessarily in place. A 
regime had to be demonstrably fragile and the revolutionaries had to believe 
they had a chance of achieving their goals. Kurzman argued that the Iranian 
revolution of 1979 may have been the evidence that perceived opportunities 
can be a suffi  cient cause of popular uprising (Kurzman  1996 ). Diff erent kinds 
of information technology have long supported discourse and activism in the 
Muslim communities of the developing world and have oft en played a role in 
the political development of secular Islamic states. President Jamal ‘Abd al-
Nasir skillfully used the radio to strengthen his popular base in Egypt, with 
emotional appeals that fueled nationalist pride in the 1960s. Iranian revolu-
tionaries used cassett e tapes to spread their political messages among net-
works of students, as have radical Saudi Islamists and Yemeni poets (Fandy 
 1999 ; Miller  2007 ; Sardar  1993 ; Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 
 1994 ). Most of the Arab regimes in North Africa and the Middle East had 
seemed stable and democracy resistant for 40 years (Diamond  2009 ). Th e 
perception that a popular uprising might result in an Arab Spring formed 
online, but it did not form suddenly. 
 In the years leading up to the Arab Spring, the diff usion of digital media, in 
the form of mobile phones, personal computers, and soft ware applications, 
had a signifi cant impact on the systems of political communication in the 
countries where civil society was allowed to use such tools and in the coun-
tries where governments set the terms of technology access. Egypt’s Kefaya 
Movement started online, but it started in 2004. Th at the movement began 
several years prior to the Arab Spring does not undermine the premise that it 
scored multiple political victories using its online strategies, or that it success-
fully organized the inciting incidents in Tahrir Square. Digital media did not 
have, in this way, a “sudden” impact on Egyptian politics. In several countries 
in the region, it took several years for people with political affi  nities to fi nd 
themselves—and each other—online. 
 In almost every country in the region, mobile phone cameras became 
small, personal weapons against authoritarian rule. Th ey were not always used 
as such and the consequences for recording and distributing even fuzzy 
footage of abusive security services were oft en severe. Oft en those who 
 Table 2.1  Th e Comparative Context of Digital Media in North Africa and the Middle East 
  Algeria  Bahrain  Djibouti  Egypt  Iran  Jordan  Kuwait  Lebanon  Libya  Mauritania  Moro
 Demographics 
 Population a  35  0.66  0.85  80  75  6.4  2.6  2.5  6.3  3.3  32 
 Percent 
Muslim a 
 98  81  97  95  100  99  86  60  97  99  100 
 Literacy, b 
 GDP Per 
Capita b 
 $6,950  $35,006  $2,309  $6,000  $10,600  $5,663  $37,849  $15,193  $16,425  $2,093  $4,75
 Political Communi cation 
 Internet 
Users, 2000 c 
 0  6  0  1  0  3  8  8  0  0  0 
 Internet 
Users, 2010 c 
 13  54  8  15  47  27  42  29  5  2  41 
 Mobile Phone 
Subscriptions, 
Percent of 
Inhabitants 
2010 c 
 92  124  19  87  91  107  161  68  172  79  100 
 Do You 
Occasionally 
Use the internet, 
Percent of Total 
Population? d 
 ..  ..  ..  23 
(2010) 
 ..  32 
(2010) 
 71 
(2007) 
 44 
(2010) 
 ..  ..  22 
(2007
 Censorship e 
 Political  N  P  —  N  P  S  S  N  S  —  N 
 Social  N  P  —  N  P  N  P  N  N  —  S 
 Confl ict/
Security 
 N  S  —  N  E  N  S  N  N  —  S 
 Internet Tools  N  E  —  N  P  N  P  N  N  —  S 
 Note : In Saudi Arabia, there are multiple mobile phones per person. For Surveillance, 
N = None, S = Selective, P = Pervasive, E = Extensive. 
 Sources : (a) population, percentage Muslim, and gross domestic product per capita, pur-
chasing power parity in USD in 2009: World Bank, World Development Indicators; (b) per-
centage of population over 15 who can read and write: CIA World Factbook; (c) internet users as 
a percentage of total population in 2000: International Telecommunications Union; (d) Pew 
Global Att itudes  Project; (e) OpenNet Initiative. 
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East 
ritania  Morocco  Oman  Palestinian 
Territories 
 Qatar  Saudi 
Arabia 
 Somalia  Sudan  Syria  Tunisia  UAE  Yemen 
 
 32  2.5  4.3  1.2  25  9.2  31  21  10.3  3.6  24 
 100  88  98  78  97  99  71  93  100  76  99 
 
93  $4,754  $25,301  —  $88,559  $20,400  $600  $2,300  $5,208  $8,536  $48,821  $2,598 
 
 0  4  1  5  1  0  0  0  1  24  0 
 41  48  54  67  27  1  9  20  34  69  10 
 100  166  —  132  188  7  41  58  106  145  46 
 22 
(2007) 
 ..  48 (2007)  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
 
 N  S  —  S  E  —  S  P  P  E  E 
 S  P  —  P  P  —  E  S  P  P  P 
 S  N  —  S  S  —  N  S  S  S  S 
 S  E  —  P  P  —  E  P  P  P  P 
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recorded and distributed mobile phone footage of abusive governments were 
punished more than the perpetrators of abuse. But even in the toughest au-
thoritarian regimes, there are important examples of how mobile phone cam-
eras were used to document the abuse of power and expose injustice to a 
broader network. By 2010, most governments in the region had experienced a 
political controversy of some kind because video evidence they could not con-
trol was being accessed online. Second, Al Jazeera became a functionally inde-
pendent, transnational news medium that generated content even in countries 
where it was unwelcome. Again, governments did not always respond to the 
accusations, criticisms, and embarrassing coverage broadcast by Al Jazeera’s 
cable and website feeds. But Al Jazeera clearly rose as a political actor in the 
region, transforming political discourse by normalizing forms of journalistic 
content and intellectual critique where challenges to political authority were 
not only tolerated but encouraged (Lynch  2006 ). Its markets were not always 
large, but they were tolerated by some governments. 
 Conclusion: Digital Networks as Social Networks 
 Ruling elites oft en try to co-opt civil society groups, and in times of political or 
military crises they can att empt to control the national information infrastruc-
ture. But a defi ning feature of civil society is independence from the authority 
of the state, even in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. And in impor-
tant ways, digital communication networks are also independent of any par-
ticular state authority. What has been the impact of digital media on political 
communication in Arab media systems? How have tools such as mobile 
phones and the internet aff ected the process of forming political identity, par-
ticularly for the young? When do such tools change the opportunity for civic 
action, and when do they simply empower ruling elites to be more eff ective 
censors? 
 All in all, information technologies have become a tool for gradually 
eroding centralized state power. In some countries ruling elites tolerated this 
erosion, thinking that it would not ultimately threaten their control. In other 
countries, ruling elites resisted the use of consumer communication elec-
tronics through regulation and censorship. But as systems of communication 
grew, the years leading up to the Arab Spring were notable for a rising number 
of protests, fomented and organized online but also involving street action. 
Youth leaders seemed surprised at the speed and size of the civic action they 
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could organize on short notice, and they found themselves drawing interna-
tional att ention and sometimes even scoring small political victories. By 2010, 
the enemies of the strongmen of Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen no longer seemed 
like a fragmented bunch. 
 In this book, we analyze the best available micro-level data on technology 
use and changing patt erns of political identity and macro-level data on net-
works of civil society actors. Even though these regimes are very diff erent, we 
off er four propositions about what has changed since the introduction of new 
digital communication technologies. First, we argue that citizens in all four 
countries have been able to greatly increase the level of international news 
content they can access. Second, a growing portion of the public uses social 
networking applications in their communications, independent of direct state 
control. Th ird, civil society actors have fl ourished online, even when the state 
has cracked down domestically. Finally, women and minority movements 
have been drawn into political discourse online in ways not oft en available in 
offl  ine spaces. It is within this context that new forms of social movement or-
ganization emerged. In the next chapter we discuss how the diff usion of digital 
media allowed key civic leaders to develop agile, responsive organizations that 
were eventually able to outmaneuver authoritarian governments. 
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 Information Infrastructure and the 
Organization of Protest 
 One of the most important but rarely explored dimensions of digital media 
and social change is the innovation of new technologies, new applications, and 
new organizational forms in the lead-up to social protest. Successful activists 
are exceptionally creative and catch dictators off  guard. Th is chapter provides 
rich examples of tools and tool kits that civil society leaders now build—
sometimes on their own, sometimes with the help of Western digerati and aid 
agencies—to help organize against political elites. Some of the important in-
novations are cultural: soundtracks to the revolution produced by digital hip-
hop artists from Libya and Algeria inspired young citizens and earned artists 
jail time. Some of this also involves major states or radical fundamentalists, 
who redesign technology in ways not expected by engineers to maintain ideo-
logical hegemony or promote group propaganda. 
 No one could have predicted that Mohammed Bouazizi would play a role in 
unleashing a freedom wave in the Arab world. Yet aft er the young vegetable mer-
chant stepped in front of a municipal building in Tunisia and set himself on fi re in 
protest of the government in December 2010, democratic fervor spread across 
North Africa and the Middle East. Governments in Tunisia and Egypt soon fell, 
civil war broke out in Libya, and protestors took to the streets in Algeria, Morocco, 
Sudan, Syria, and elsewhere. Th e Arab Spring had many sources. One of these was 
social media, which had the power to put a human face on political oppression. 
Bouazizi’s self-immolation was one of several stories told and retold on Facebook, 
Twitt er, and YouTube in ways that inspired dissidents to organize protests, criticize 
their governments, and spread ideas about democracy. Indeed, Facebook became 
the information infrastructure that supported political organizing independent 
not only of the state, but independent of other political parties (Dunn  2010 ). 
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 Tunisia and Egypt’s Tech-Savvy 
Popular Democracy Movement 
 One reason that technology has been an eff ective tool for democracy advo-
cates in Tunisia and Egypt is that both countries have relatively young, tech-
savvy populations. In Tunisia, where the median age is 30, approximately 23 
percent of the 10 million people who live there are under the age of 14. In 
Egypt, where the median age is 24, 33 percent of the country’s 83 million in-
habitants are under 14. Cell phone use is widespread in both countries, with 
93 mobile phone subscribers for every 100 people in Tunisia and 67 mobile 
phones for every 100 people in Egypt. What’s more, in both countries the gov-
ernment has censured the media, giving individuals a strong incentive to turn 
to the internet for credible sources of information. 
 Internet use in both countries is also signifi cant. About 25 percent of the 
population in Tunisia and 10 percent of the population in Egypt has used the 
internet at least once, with much of the use concentrated among young people. 
Some 66 percent of the internet-savvy population in Tunisia, and 70 percent 
in Egypt, is under the age of 34. All of this might explain why many of the 
people who went into the streets in early 2011 to demonstrate were young, 
technologically inclined individuals who blogged, Tweeted, or posted to Face-
book news events as they unfolded. 1 
 In addition to enabling young people to organize, technology has facilitated 
the growing participation of women in political conversations. Forty-one per-
cent of Tunisia’s Facebook population is female; the number is 36 percent for 
Egypt. More than 30 percent of the Egyptian citizens who took part in street 
protests were women (Gallup  2012 ). Women also participated actively in po-
litical conversations over Twitt er, and they were notably present in street gath-
erings in both Tunisia and Egypt. Indeed, through social media, women like 
Esraa Abdel Fatt ah of the Egyptian Democratic Academy became vocal oppo-
nents and thoughtful leaders. Leil-Zahra Mortada’s Facebook album of wom-
en’s involvement in the revolution became a popular site in Egypt. 
 Our unique dataset of Twitt er conversations in Tunisia and Egypt reveals that 
women were quite active during the uprisings. By distinguishing between people 
tweeting in-country from those using the same hashtags (key words) but tweeting 
outside the country, we were able to determine that 30 percent of the people ac-
tively contributing to Twitt er conversations inside Tunisia were women. Women 
made up 33 percent of those actively tweeting inside Egypt during the revolution. 
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 Tunisia—From Oppression to Resistance 
to Spark for the Region 
 By early January, protestors’ appeals for help and clumsily recorded mobile 
phone videos were streaming across North Africa, and protests in Algeria and 
other countries started to crop up. By the time Ben Ali fl ed Tunisia on January 
14, active campaigns for civil disobedience against authoritarian rule were 
growing in Jordan, Oman, and Yemen. In other countries such as Lebanon, 
Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, minor protests erupted on a range of 
issues and triggered quick concessions or had litt le impact. But even in these 
countries, opposition leaders appeared to draw inspiration from what they 
were tracking in Tunisia. Moreover, opposition leaders across the region were 
learning the digital tricks for how to catch ruling elites off  guard. Soon, events 
in Tunisia would help inspire the largest protests in Cairo in 30 years. 
 Social media brought a cascade of messages about freedom and democracy 
across North Africa and the Middle East and helped to raise public expecta-
tions for the success of political uprising. Two kinds of evidence reveal much 
about this cascade: the rhythm of Tweets about political change and the topical 
evolution of blog posts. Th e rhythm of tweets is signifi cant because it gives us a 
window into conversations that took place over the broad digital spectrum. Th e 
vast majority of conversations likely involved using cell phones to send text and 
other types of messages, but there isn’t a good database for studying that infor-
mation. Th ere is, however, a robust set of data for conversations that take place 
over Twitt er, so in a sense Twitt er can serve as a proxy for understanding the 
types of conversations that happened on other forms of digital communication. 
 And what we can see on Twitt er is that a large volume of people—both 
inside each country and across the globe—were following events as they un-
folded. Twitt er seems to have been a key tool in the region for raising expecta-
tions of success and coordinating strategy. Twitt er also seems to have been the 
key medium for spreading immediate news about big political changes from 
country to country in the region. As a group, Twitt er users are probably more 
educated and wealthier than the average person and more likely to be found in 
major cities. Th ey are also, consequently, opinion leaders for whom Twitt er 
served as an important means of carrying on extended conversations about 
the prospects for liberty and the logistics of social action. 
 In total, there were 13,262 Tweets using the hashtag most prominently as-
sociated with Tunisia’s political uprising: #sidibouzid. On average, throughout 
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the study period of January 14 to March 16, 18 percent of tweets about the 
Tunisian uprising came from inside Tunisia, 8 percent from neighboring coun-
tries, and 32 percent from outside the region. Th e remainder off ered no loca-
tion information. Th e day Ben Ali resigned, 2,200 tweets from Algeria, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen concerned the uprising in Tunisia. Many tweets 
involved personal stories of suff ering at the hands of a tough and incompetent 
regime. Some involved links to critical documentaries on YouTube or made 
reference to Facebook groups and news stories that did not paint the regime in 
a fl att ering light. 
 With the earliest available records of Twitt er feeds, there are clear waves of 
political consciousness that connect key events, political sentiment, and pro-
testor turnout. 2 In the case of Tunisia, the number of contributions increased 
steadily between late January and late February. Th e number of people with 
no location information also declined, suggesting that as time passed, Tuni-
sians grew more willing to note publicly that they were tweeting from inside 
Tunisia during the heady days of political change. Th e fl ow of content is 
marked by moments when the service was either overloaded or mobile net-
works were under att ack (or both). Before Ben Ali resigned, more than a thou-
sand people were tweeting each day about political change in Tunisia. 
Immediately aft er his resignation, Twitt er service declined precipitously, with 
activists in the country reporting that security forces were interfering with 
communication networks. When the service returned to normal, Twitt er 
traffi  c peaked again, with a thousand people in Tunisia tweeting daily and 
street protests drawing out tens of thousands. Th is lasted for several weeks, 
until the last vestiges of the ruling elite were removed from power. 
 Just as Twitt er traffi  c peaked with street protests, the topics discussed in the 
Tunisian blogosphere closely tracked with public interest in political freedom. 
 Figure  3.1 tracks four of the most important keywords in the Tunisian blogo-
sphere, in which content is mostly writt en in French. Analysis of the structure 
of content and links in the Tunisian blogosphere between November 2010 
and May 2011 indicates direct parallels between online political conversations 
and offl  ine events. Particularly aft er December 17, 2010, when Bouazizi set 
himself on fi re, the Tunisian blogosphere experienced a spike in the frequency 
of online conversations about revolution and President Ben Ali’s leadership. In 
this way, the volume of digital conversations peaks with the size of street dem-
onstrations, and the content of these conversations directly refl ects public sen-
timents.  Figure  3.1 reveals the rise and fall of certain keywords in the Tunisian 
blogosphere, beginning two months before the popular uprising. 3 
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 Tunisian bloggers had, for several years, been among the most critical op-
ponents of Ben Ali’s regime. By scanning the structure of content and links of 
the Tunisian blogosphere, we can chart the progress of the idea of political 
reform. Many Tunisian bloggers wrote in French and Arabic. Moreover, dis-
tinct keywords and themes regarding economic grievances and democratiza-
tion arose preceding the popular uprising. Among Tunisia’s digerati, economic 
woes and Ben Ali’s leadership are key topics from November to December. 
But with Bouazizi’s death in early January came a spike in conversation about 
his plight and shortly thereaft er a growth in the number of conversations 
about freedom and revolution. Islam, as a political theme, tracks on only a few 
blogs and the interest in economic issues diminishes over time relative to 
themes of freedom and revolution. 
 Talk about revolution continued even aft er Ben Ali fl ed the country because 
his replacement, Mohamed Ghannouchi, was viewed by many as part of the 
old regime. Consequently, the percentage of blog posts with the keywords 
“revolution” and “liberty” peaked aft er Ben Ali had already left  offi  ce. By the 
third week of January, 18 percent of all Tunisian blog posts talked about revo-
lution; 10 percent discussed liberty. Th at week marked the climax of protester 
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 Figure 3.1  Percentage of Tunisian Blogs with Posts on Politics, by Keyword. 
 Note : Figure represents the percentage of all blog posts containing at least one of six 
keywords. Based on data captured through eCairn beginning November 20, 2010. 
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turnout with estimates ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 people in the streets. 
Th e primary topic of political conversation in Tunisian blogs then became 
“revolution” until a public rally of at least 100,000 people on February 27, aft er 
which Ghannouchi was forced to resign. In Tunisia, the blogosphere antici-
pated what happened on the ground by days. Demand online for liberty even-
tually manifested itself in the streets. 
 Th e relative prominence of conversations about freedom among Tunisia’s 
wired middle class is consistent with anecdotal evidence of public sentiment 
during the fi rst few days of the uprising. Journalists and country experts con-
sistently expressed surprise that traditional political ideologies and political 
parties were absent from the protests. Major opposition parties and political 
leaders did not feature as prominently as Bouazizi, and were not particularly 
associated with conversations about liberty or the prospects of revolution. 
And conversations about liberty and freedom were more important than con-
versations about Islam. 
 Protest Narratives Cascade across the Region 
 Around the region, people increasingly tweeted about events occurring in their 
neighborhoods. Stories of success and diffi  culty spread widely and created a 
kind of freedom meme. Th e same meme traveled across the region through 
Facebook and YouTube, as inspiring images were captured by mobile phone 
and transmitt ed. Interestingly, their social media conversations about revolu-
tion underwent a linguistic change in keeping with the rising feelings of national 
and Arabic pride. Prior to the groundswell of support for political change, most 
of the content about protest coming over social media from users in the region 
was in English and French. Aft er the inciting incidents in Tunisia and Egypt, 
most of the content fl owed resolutely in Arabic (Mourtada and Salem  2011 ). In 
addition, Lotan et al.’s analysis of Twitt er contributions (Lotan et al.  2011 ) 
reveals a typology of users based on the frequency and form of communication: 
  
 •  Mainstream media organizations: news and media organizations that have 
both digital and non-digital outlets (e.g., @AJEnglish, @nytimes). 
 •  Mainstream news media organizations: blogs, news portals, or journalistic 
entities that exist solely online (e.g., @Huffi  ngtonPost). 
 •  Non-media organizations: groups, companies, or organizations that are not 
primarily news-oriented (e.g., @Vodafone, @Wikileaks). 
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 •  Mainstream media employees: individuals employed by MSM organiza-
tions, or who regularly work as freelancers for MSM organizations (e.g., @
AndersonCooper). 
 •  Bloggers: individuals who post regularly to an established blog, and who 
appear to identify as a blogger on Twitt er (e.g., @gr33ndata). 
 •  Activists: individuals who self-identify as an activist, who work at an ac-
tivist organization, or who appear to be tweeting purely about activist 
topics to capture the att ention of others (e.g., @Ghonim). 
 •  Digerati: individuals who have worldwide infl uence in social media circles 
and are, thus, widely followed on Twitt er (e.g., @TimOReilly). 
 •  Political actors: individuals who are known primarily for their relationship 
to government (e.g., @Diego_Arria, @JeanMarcAyrault). 
 •  Celebrities: individuals who are famous for reasons unrelated to tech-
nology, politics, or activism (e.g., @Alyssa_Milano). 
 •  Researchers: an individual who is affi  liated with a university or think tank 
and whose expertise is focused on Middle East issues (e.g., @abuardvark). 
 •  Bots: accounts that appears to be an automated service tweeting consistent 
content, usually in extraordinary volumes (e.g., @toptweets).  
 Th e content that was fl owing over Twitt er, for many users in the countries af-
fected by protests, was also of a peculiar kind. Papacharissi and Oliviera call it 
“aff ective news” because so much of the content included links to stories 
tagged by personal content, or personal photos and narrative about events on 
the ground (Papacharissi and Oliveira  2012 ). 
 Here we specifi cally study tweets, rather than simply Twitt er users, because 
they represent a sense of conversation and active dialogue about freedom that 
transcended national boundaries. For example, aft er Egyptians heard that Ben 
Ali had fl ed Tunisia on January 14, Twitt er user and journalist Gigi Ibrahim 
declared that “the Tunisian revolution is being twitt erized  . . . history is being 
writt en by the people #sidibouzid #Tunisia.” Blogger Tarek Shalaby echoed 
with, “we will follow it!” On January 25, journalist Hossam el-Hamalawy 
noted that “tens of thousands r protesting [with] the same chants as the Tuni-
sians.” In the aft ermath of an unexpectedly large turnout in Egypt that day, 
Mahmoud Salem—the blogger and activist also known as “Sandmonkey”—
urged his Twitt er followers to “please remember, it took a month of protests 4 
Tunis revolution 2 succeed. Persistence is everything.” 
 Figure  3.2 demonstrates the rising wave of tweets about events in other 
countries and the prospects of making democratic gains. To produce this 
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graphic, we fi rst selected all the tweets we could confi rm as originating in Alge-
ria, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia or Yemen using geo-data. We then iso-
lated the tweets using hashtags for countries and freedom movements other 
than country of origin. In other words, this fi gure specifi cally displays the rate 
at which people in each country caught and transmitt ed the meme of political 
freedom from other countries. In the two weeks aft er Mubarak’s resignation, 
there was an average of 3,400 tweets a day about the political crisis in Egypt by 
people living in neighboring countries. 
 Figure  3.2 reveals that at the peak of events in Tunisia, there were 2,200 
tweets about Ben Ali’s resignation from outside Tunisia (but within the region). 
In the subsequent months, the hashtags associated with conversations about 
political change in particular countries were oft en used by people in neigh-
boring countries. In other words, people in countries throughout the region 
were drawn into an extended conversation about social uprising. As street pro-
tests arose in Tunisia and Egypt, then Yemen and Bahrain, and eventually Alge-
ria and Morocco, people across the region tweeted in real time about big events. 
Th is is signifi cant because it reveals how the success of demands for political 
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 Figure 3.2  Number of Tweets in the Region Using Hashtags for Neighboring 
Countries. 
 Note : Th ese are the hashtags that came to be associated most prominently with political 
uprisings in Algeria, Egypt, Bahrain, Tunisia, Morocco, and Yemen. Th e hashtags analyzed, in 
order, were “#algeria,” “#egypt,” “#feb14,” “#morocco,” “#sidibouzid,” and “#yemen.” 
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change in Tunisia and Egypt led individuals in other countries to pick up the 
conversation and talk about how it was relevant to their own lives. In other 
words, it helped cascade conversation about freedom across the region. 
 Egypt—The Freedom Meme Spreads 
through Social Networks 
 News of Ben Ali’s departure spread rapidly in Egypt, where almost everyone 
has access to a mobile phone and the internet-using population is the largest 
in the Arab world. State-run media in Egypt, which had been slow to report 
protests in the region and in Cairo, reluctantly covered Ben Ali’s exit. Th e fi rst 
occupants of Cairo’s Tahrir Square shared many of the hopes and aspirations 
of their counterparts in Tunis. Th ey were a community of like-minded indi-
viduals, underemployed, educated, eager for change but not committ ed to 
religious fervor or a specifi c political ideology. Th ey found solidarity through 
social media, and then used their mobile phones to call their social networks 
into the street. In a surprise to both government analysts and outsiders, a large 
network of relatively liberal, middle class, peaceful citizens quickly mobilized 
against Mubarak. Th e traditional Islamists, opposition parties, and union or-
ganizations were in the square too, but liberal and civil society voices domi-
nated the digital conversation about events. 
 Events in Egypt not only helped spark protest movements in neighboring 
countries, they also seeded a global conversation about the politics of free-
dom. Twitt er was used to draw the international community into Egyptian 
events. Real-time conversations about protester turnout, regime response, 
and Mubarak’s political options did not just occur between Egyptians. Else-
where, we have found that as domestic and international pressure for Mubarak 
to resign was building, there was an interesting shift  in the geo-data of people 
tweeting about political change in Egypt. Two weeks prior to his resignation, 
we fi nd that 34 percent of the tweets on the topic of political change in Egypt 
were coming from people who self-identifi ed as being outside the region en-
tirely. But as public engagement with political protest grew in the week prior 
to his resignation, the relative contribution of outsiders dwindled to just 12 
percent: in other words, the vast majority of tweets were coming from people 
who were either in the country or in the region, or had refused to give their 
location information (a common strategy for political protesters). Th e regime’s 
interference with digital networks interrupted online traffi  c on some days. 
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Yet in-country Twitt er traffi  c peaked on the day street protests reached into 
the thousands and then peaked again during the last days of Mubarak’s hold 
on power. Over time, the number of Egyptians in Egypt tweeting about poli-
tics surpassed the number of individuals tweeting from elsewhere in the region. 
 Social Media’s Centrality to Political Conversation 
 Between November 2010 and May 2011, the amount of content produced 
online by major Egyptian political actors increased signifi cantly as they reacted 
to events on the street and adjusted strategy to compete for the affi  nities of 
newly freed Egyptian voters. Some observers have been skeptical of social 
media’s relevance to the evolution of political conversations in Egypt. But we 
fi nd that in Egypt, Facebook and Western news media are central to online 
political discourse. We mapped the digital space in Egypt twice, once in 
November 2010 and a second time in May 2011. What we found was that 
Egypt’s major political actors oft en linked to social networking and news ser-
vices. In fact, major Egyptian political websites were far more likely to link to 
Facebook or Western media sites like CNN than they were to each other. For 
Egyptians, Facebook and other social media are not simply sites used for enter-
tainment or managing their personal lives. Th ese social media are where Egyp-
tians go to practice politics. Political parties have learned this over the past few 
months, and are working hard to put new content online and connect with 
potential supporters—some of whom may be voters in upcoming elections. 
 In November 2010, more than 20 percent of the 928 links going out of 
Egyptian political party websites were to social media sites such as Facebook, 
YouTube, and Twitt er, and to blogging tools or Western news websites such as 
the BBC or CNN. By May 2011, however, this had dropped to 15 percent of 
1,332 outgoing links.  Table  3.1 highlights the number of pages, unique external 
links, and overall size of the websites of major political groups in Egypt, both 
before the revolution and aft er. Groups that were unlicensed by Mubarak’s gov-
ernment are indicated with an asterisk (*). Both the number of pages and the 
volume (in megabytes) are good indicators of the overall size of the website, 
though the fi rst may be a good measure of text content and the second a measure 
of multimedia content. Th e number of unique external links is a good indicator 
of how much a political party connects its ideas and content to larger political 
conversations.  Table  3.1 reveals something about how the structure of political 
content online changed before and aft er the popular uprising in Egypt. 4 
 Table 3.1  Online Structure of Egyptian Political Parties, Before and Aft er 
Revolution 
  Before Revolution  Aft er Revolution 
 Political Party, URL  Pages  Unique 
External 
Links 
 Volume 
(MB) 
 Pages  Unique 
External 
Links 
 Volume 
(MB) 
 April 6 Youth 
Movement,  
6april.org 
 ..  ..  ..  378  8  48 
 Communist 
Party 
of Egypt*, 
cpegypt.tk 
 1,297  248  62  3,379  9  190 
 Egyptian 
Greens, 
 egyptiangreens.com 
 441  2  16  527  2  17 
 Kefaya 
Movement*, 
 harakamasria.org 
 4,372  90  24  4,522  78  25 
 National 
Association for 
Change*, 
 taghyeer.net 
 1,983  2  35  ..  ..  .. 
 National 
Democratic 
Party, ndp.org.eg 
 1,343  11  43  ..  ..  .. 
 New Wafd 
Party, 
 alwafdparty.org 
 78  ..  9  2,015  11  165 
 Progressive 
Nationalist 
Unionist 
Party, 
 al-ahaly.com 
 1,583  12  22  323  7  7 
 Socialist 
Labour Party, 
 el3amal.net 
 304  7  2  615  6  4 
(continued )
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 Th e network structure of Egypt’s online political parties and pressure 
groups, along with the unique external websites originating from a group’s 
homepage, is mapped in  Figures  3.3 and  3.4 . Th e shaded circle around a 
group’s origin node represents the volume of pages within that site (the di-
ameter of each circle directly represents the amount of content, in mega-
bytes, that each site hosts). Comparing the ratio of unique external pages to 
a site’s volume indicates how much any given site is relying on external and 
self-produced content. In the network map of Egypt’s online political sphere, 
each dot represents an external link originating from the political parties’ 
websites. When two dots connect, it is a site that two parties linked to and 
any links position political parties closer together based on the program’s 
algorithm. We can see the clear arrangement around blogs and state-run 
media sites. 
 In May 2011, Western social media and news outlets were still at the center 
of the online Egyptian political network. Th e majority of common links 
between Egypt’s political parties were commercial, Western sites. Th e most 
central of these sites were Facebook, Google, YouTube, CNN, Yahoo!, Blog-
ger, BBC, Flickr, Twitt er, and Wordpress. Notably, none of the websites 
crawled in November 2010 linked to Al Jazeera, and there were only six out-
going links to Al Jazeera when the crawl was repeated in May 2011. 
  Before Revolution  Aft er Revolution 
 Political Party, URL  Pages  Unique 
External 
Links 
 Volume 
(MB) 
 Pages  Unique 
External 
Links 
 Volume 
(MB) 
 Muslim  
Brotherhood 
(Arabic)*, 
 ikhwanonline.com 
 6,123  66  137  7,948  67  459 
 Muslim  
Brotherhood 
(English)*, 
 ikhwanweb.com 
 4,372  896  196  4,579  739  386 
 Note : Groups marked with an asterisk (*) were illegal political parties until recently. MB  refers 
to megabytes of content. 
Table 3.1 (continued)
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 Th e results of the May 2011 network generation show that the same West-
ern media are still present, but are now oriented along the periphery of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s websites. And while links to Western media are found 
on many Egyptian sites, the Muslim Brotherhood provides a surprising 
amount of new content in both its Arabic and English language sites. In terms 
of pages, the Arabic version grew by almost 60 percent, and in terms of size it 
more than tripled. Considering how large the Muslim Brotherhood’s Arabic 
language website is, it is interesting to note how relatively few links it made to 
outside news sources or content from other political actors. Th e tendency to 
have active linking within the community with litt le activity moving outward 
may indicate that the Muslim Brotherhood relies primarily on digital media for 
organizational deliberation. Indeed, this organization had an active commu-
nity of citizen journalists and civic bloggers who were forced to discuss polit-
ical issues online because of the Mubarak regime’s strong offl  ine censorship. 
 Th e National Democratic Party’s website (ndp.org.eg) is no longer in ser-
vice. Th e last publicly available versions of the site were cached in Google’s 
search engine on February 26, 2011. Th ere is no redirect, so it appears that the 
host servers have been taken offl  ine. Th e April 6 Movement, which had a 
  
 Figure 3.3  Pre-Uprising Structure and Content of Egypt’s Online Political Sphere, 
November 2010.  
 Source : Howard, Duff y et al. 2011. 
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 central role in the uprising, barely existed as a standalone URL in November 
2010 because most of its content was not on its own website but almost exclu-
sively on social networking platforms like Facebook and Twitt er. Th e National 
Association for Change and the National Democratic Party ceased to exist 
aft er the uprising. 
 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Changing Online Content 
 Even today, Facebook remains one of the most central nodes in Egyptian net-
works of political information. In November 2010, before the political up-
rising, the websites of major political actors had more links to Facebook and 
other Western media than they had to each other. By May 2011, Facebook was 
still central, but with Mubarak’s departure, the volume of digital content pro-
duced by the Muslim Brotherhood has come to dominate these networks. 
 Th e most signifi cant change in how political parties operate online involves 
two of the websites of the Muslim Brotherhood. In November 2010, these 
  
 Figure 3.4  Post-Uprising Structure and Content of Egypt’s Online Political Sphere, 
May 2011.  
 Source : Howard, Duff y, et al.  2011 
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websites had 10,495 pages, with 962 outgoing links and 333 megabytes of 
content. By May 2011, this had evolved to 12,527 pages, 806 links, and 845 
megabytes of content. In other words, the number of web pages had grown by 
19 percent, the number of outgoing links had diminished by 16 percent, and 
the volume of content had ballooned by 154 percent. 
 Th e Muslim Brotherhood’s presence on English and Arabic websites was 
dominant in Egypt’s online political sphere before the November elections 
began and has grown signifi cantly since then, particularly with respect to con-
tent. Th e Brotherhood’s English site links to much more external content 
than its Arabic site, but it is a smaller site in terms of hosted content. Th is may 
indicate that when seeking to inform their English-speaking audience, the 
Muslim Brotherhood provides more links to external content to build legiti-
macy. It may also indicate that there is more English content than Arabic con-
tent available to link to. Th e Arabic version of the site has fewer external links 
(90 percent fewer) and more hosted content (159 percent more) than the 
English version. 
 Th e Muslim Brotherhood is actively developing its own social media 
sphere, with  ikhwantube.com and  ikhwanbook.com —websites that off er 
much of the functionality of Western namesakes like YouTube and Facebook. 
As regional experts might expect, the Muslim Brotherhood and Communist 
Party of Egypt share a number of links to the same kinds of content. Both 
parties were the major opponents to Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic 
Party. Since the November 2010 elections, both parties have increased the 
amount of content they have online. 
 Streaming Video Made Democratic Aspirations Viral 
 YouTube became a particularly important tool for spreading news and infor-
mation of Egypt’s uprising around the world. Elsewhere, we identifi ed the top 
viral videos as of June 2011(Howard, Duff y et al.  2011 ). While it is diffi  cult to 
measure the precise impact of these videos on audiences, some images of suf-
fering certainly would have spurred protests and heightened moral outrage. 
 Th e fi rst signifi cant Egyptian video went viral on January 25, 2011. Th e 
video depicts thousands of protesters converging on Tahrir Square. Th e im-
ages were captured by an amateur cameraman looking out of a building near 
the main road. Based on the metadata reported on the uploader’s YouTube 
account, the video was distributed by an account registered as located in the 
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United States. Since then, this video has accumulated more than 600,000 
views. Based on tracking of the embed code, it is most likely that the video 
received popular att ention aft er being posted on  AllMania.com , a sports com-
mentary site that experienced a 600 percent increase in traffi  c in January 2011. 
 RussiaToday’s YouTube channel contributed fi ve of the top-20 viral videos, 
totaling 1,200,000 cumulative views. Th ese videos were from citizen journal-
ists and included live footage rebroadcast through the news agency’s outlets. 
Al Jazeera English’s YouTube channel similarly contributed three videos, to-
taling more than 300,000 views. Reuters’s YouTube channel contributed one 
video totaling more than 200,000 views. Between May 16 and 20, 2011, we 
hand coded the most prominent videos loaded into YouTube with the key-
word “Egypt” for author, viewing, and creation date information. 
 We found four major types of content that typifi ed Egyptian viral videos: 
raw protest and mobilization footage; citizen commentary; political punditry; 
and “soundtracks for the revolution.” Raw protest and mobilization footage 
was the most common, totaling nearly 5.5 million views from 23 videos. One 
video featured a detailed 20-minute dialogue between a religious scholar and 
political philosopher about the future of Egypt, totaling 100,000 views. An-
other video featured a homemade video with a young girl’s commentary about 
political events, totaling 275,000 views. But the most popular video, a music 
video, was heralded as a soundtrack to the revolution and served as a rallying 
cry of support for the Egyptian people’s protests. Th is music video, uploaded 
on January 27, was the single most popular viral video for the Egyptian revo-
lution, and it accounted for 25 percent of the top-20 video views. 
 Gender Politics and the Politics of Inclusion 
 Digital information technologies mediate gender politics in unexpected ways. 
In the political economy of media, women are playing more dynamic roles in 
television and fi lm both in front of and behind the camera. But women have, 
in the opinion of some observers, aggressively invaded the new public space 
created by digital media (Mernissi  2004 ). Marcott e, for example, has exam-
ined religious discourse regarding gender and sexuality, where forums have 
been essential spaces to challenge, contest, and even transgress traditional 
norms (Marcott e  2010 ). Some have even observed in very conservative soci-
eties and families, that Muslim women have begun to participate economi-
cally by running their own private online businesses (Ardalan  2002 ). First, 
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digital media are allowing citizens to learn about the status of women and gen-
der relations in other countries. Second, they also allow both men and women 
to debate specifi c gender issues relevant in their own cultures (Stowasser 
 2001 ). Th ird, the arrival of digital media in many Muslim communities and 
households has become an occasion for renegotiating and restructuring gen-
der relationships. Finally, the internet supports women-only online commu-
nities, which have become sites for political conversation away from both 
patriarchal leaders and the public gaze of journalists. Political elites in some 
countries restrict internet access to prevent such cultural learning, discussion, 
and negotiation. 
 Th e introduction of new digital media does not simply provide the oppor-
tunity to redress gender disparities in developing communities; it is providing 
a platform for learning about gender politics. Th ree factors impede learning 
about gender politics in Muslim countries. First, new internet users rarely 
have the ability to conduct sophisticated searches and critically assess the 
content they fi nd. Th is comes with practice, along with coaching from friends 
and family. Second, political elites in some countries actively work to dis-
courage state programs from providing women with media training and ac-
cess, or actively block listservs, blogs, and chat rooms where young Muslims 
can have some discourse on gender issues. Th ird, government regulators 
establish content fi lters that block websites they judge to be antithetical to the 
established edicts of gender relations in their country or according to their 
interpretation of Islam. 
 Th ere is a growing literature about how exposure to digital media has an 
impact on users’ levels of tolerance and empathy (Brundidge and Rice  2009 ; 
Robinson, Neustadtl, and Kestnbaum  2004 ). For many young Muslims, the 
online social networking applications and other content are the media by 
which they learn of life in other countries where faith and freedom can coexist. 
Networked information technologies are, at the very least, partly responsible 
for exposing citizens to liberal cultural values. Certainly some internet users in 
these countries can be radicalized through their internet use, but many will be 
sensitized through the internet. And in the case of Saudi Arabia, it may be the 
broadcast media on state-authorized channels that do more to reinforce con-
servative and Wahabbist interpretations of Islam. In Egypt, the broadcast 
media are certainly used to advance secularist perspectives of the role of faith 
in statecraft . One of the next steps in researching the impact of digital media in 
countries with large Muslim communities will be to investigate the overall 
impact of internet use on tolerance. 
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 Social Networking, Digital and Otherwise 
 For the most part, public opinion in countries with large Muslim communities 
has been a construction of ruling elites and state agencies. By so constraining 
the media diets of citizens, the ability of journalists to investigate popular sen-
timent, and the ability of researchers to survey the public, the boundaries of 
what constituted the “public” have been fundamentally constrained and 
knowledge of “opinion” deliberately kept vague. Today, political parties are 
using the internet to construct political opinion in a diff erent way. By deeply 
integrating digital tools such as mobile phones and the internet into their 
systems of political communication, parties are able to reach and activate 
much larger numbers of people. In this way, the internet is actively used to 
challenge the basic relations of power because political parties use it to amass 
publics that were not previously reachable. Moreover, even where regimes 
allowed offi  cial opposition parties, the political actors who agreed to play by 
the rules of conduct had an easier time controlling broadcast media. Social 
networking applications have provided a new structure for the fl ow of political 
news and information, a structure that does not easily provide political elites 
with informational choke points. Without mandatory points of passage for 
political content and digital hosting services beyond the territorial control of 
these governments, social networking applications have had implications for 
who counts as the political public. 
 In countries where a handful of state agencies own the major media outlets, 
it is possible to defi ne the public through the selection of topics covered in the 
news, through the framing of stories, and through the gender and ethnic repre-
sentation of people who appear as journalists and as characters in news stories. 
It is rare, for example, to have immigrant Bengalis, Pakistanis, and Indians can-
vassed for opinion in the nightly newscasts in Saudi Arabia or the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). Increasingly, the internet has become an alternative informa-
tion source, one that holds content related to those minority voices. 
 But public opinion is not shaped by the internet in the sense that lots 
of citizens fi nd interesting new public policy options online, but in the sense 
that these major media outlets have added the internet to their tool kit for 
measuring—and manipulating—public opinion. Media systems in these four 
countries were designed by the elites to make for easy manipulation by auto-
cratic leaders or the Saudi royal family. Autocrats, by defi nition, work to con-
strain the size and diversity of their publics through media systems that 
distribute limited content to carefully defi ned groups. And it is the political 
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parties, legal or not, that best use the internet to extend the defi nition of who 
the public is, by expanding their membership and increasing the rate of active 
contact. Th e social networking applications that facilitate the passage of polit-
ical content over networks of family and friends provide not simply a com-
peting media system but an alternative structure for distributing information. 
 Conclusions 
 Social media played a crucial role in the political uprisings in Tunisia and 
Egypt. Using original data from multiple social media sources, we can off er 
some concrete conclusions about what that role was. First, social media played 
a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab spring. Second, a spike 
in online revolutionary conversations oft en preceded major events on the 
ground. Th ird, social media helped spread democratic ideas across interna-
tional borders. But perhaps the most powerful evidence that digital media 
matt ered in the Arab Spring comes from activists themselves. 
 Researchers with the  Arab Social Media Report interviewed over a hundred 
protesters from both Tunisia and Egypt. In both countries, Facebook users 
were of the opinion that Facebook had been used primarily to raise awareness 
within their countries about the ongoing civil movements, spread information 
to the world about the movements, and organize activists and actions. Less 
than 15 percent in either country believed Facebook was primarily being used 
for entertainment or social reasons (Noman  2011 ). Surveys of participants in 
Tahrir Square demonstrations reveal that social media in general, and Face-
book in particular, provided new sources of information the regime could not 
easily control and were crucial in shaping how citizens made individual 
decisions about participating in protests, the logistics of protest, and the like-
lihood of success. People learned about the protests primarily through inter-
personal communication using Facebook, phone contact, or face-to-face 
conversation. Controlling for other factors, social media use greatly increased 
the odds that a respondent att ended protests on the fi rst day, and half of those 
surveyed produced and disseminated visuals from the demonstrations, mainly 
through Facebook (Tufekci and Wilson  2012 ). 
 Democratization movements existed in North Africa and the Middle East 
long before technologies such as mobile phones, the internet, and social 
media came to the region. However, with these technologies, people who 
share an interest in democracy learned to build extensive networks, create 
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social capital, and organize political action. In both Tunisia and Egypt, these 
virtual networks materialized in the streets in early 2011 to help bring down 
two long-standing dictators. 
 Anecdotally, we know that social media played an important role at key 
moments in the events of 2011. But what are the big-picture trends in social 
media use that explain why public demand for democratic reform rose now 
and why events unfolded the way they did? Th e previous datasets reveal much 
about the role of diff erent kinds of social media. Th e Tunisian blogosphere 
provided space for open political dialogue about regime corruption and the 
potential for political change. Twitt er relayed stories of successful mobiliza-
tion within and between countries. Facebook functioned as a central node in 
networks of political discontent in Egypt. During the protests, YouTube and 
other video archiving centers allowed citizen journalists, using mobile phone 
cameras and consumer electronics, to broadcast stories that the mainstream 
media could not or did not want to cover. 
 Social media alone did not cause political upheaval in North Africa. But in-
formation technologies—including mobile phones and the internet—altered 
the capacity of citizens and civil society actors to aff ect domestic politics. Social 
media have several kinds of impact on local systems of political communication. 
First, social media provide new opportunities and new tools for social move-
ments to respond to conditions in their countries. It is clear that the ability to 
produce and consume political content, independent of social elites, is impor-
tant because the public sense of shared grievances and potential for change can 
develop rapidly. Second, social media foster transnational links between indi-
viduals and groups. Th is means that network ties form between international 
and local democratization movements, and that compelling stories, told in 
short text messages or long-form video documentaries, circulate around the 
region. Th e inspiration of success in Tunisia was not just a fast-spreading conta-
gion, for civil society leaders in neighboring countries also learned eff ective 
strategies of successful movement organizing through social media. 
 Social movements are traditionally defi ned as collective challenges, based 
on shared purposes, social solidarity, and sustained interactions with elites, 
opponents, and authorities. Th ey support a public claim against target au-
thorities and engage in political action by forming coalitions, organizing 
public meetings and demonstrations, and using the media to highlight their 
claims. Th rough such demonstrations and media use, social movements dis-
play their unity, numbers, and commitment. Social media, social networking 
applications, and consumer electronics have not changed the purpose of 
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social movement organizing—economic opportunity and political voice are 
still the shared goals of social movements. 
 But in North Africa and the Middle East, relatively new youth movements 
have been surprised by the speed, size, and success of protests they have orga-
nized over social networking websites. Over several years they have found 
their political voice online and have held their meetings virtually. Each of the 
dictators in these countries has long had many political enemies, but they 
were a fragmented group of opponents. Now these opponents do more than 
use broadcast media to highlight their claims. Th ey use social media to iden-
tify goals, build solidarity, and organize demonstrations. During the Arab 
Spring, individuals demonstrated their desire for freedom through social 
media, and social media became a critical part of the tool kit used to protest 
for freedom. 
 While several well-placed civic leaders and activists used digital media to 
organize political uprisings and communicate with the world, digital media 
were also used by regimes to respond to insurgencies. It would be a mistake to 
proceed without evaluating the ability of authoritarian regimes to use digital 
tools in their counterinsurgency strategy, so the next chapter evaluates the 
force of response—and degrees of success—that some governments had to 
the surge of popular protest for democracy. 
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 4 
 Authoritarian Responses 
and Consequences 
 Perhaps the best evidence that digital media were an important causal factor in 
the Arab Spring is that dictators treated them as such. Th e months during 
which the Arab Spring took place had the most national blackouts, network 
shutdowns, and tool blockages to date. But just as activists had a longer history 
of using digital media, authoritarian regimes had a history of responding to 
the political communication occurring over digital networks. 
 Long before the Arab Spring, on Friday, June 12, 2009, Iran voted, and 
when voters realized the election had been rigged, many poured into the streets 
in protest. Even then, social media websites such as Twitt er and Facebook and 
SMS messaging were actively used to coordinate the movements of protesters 
and to get images and news out to the international community. Compared to 
protests that occurred the last time elections were stolen, the social movement 
lasted longer, drew in thousands more participants, and produced more wit-
nesses to the brutal regime crackdown. Social media played a role in extending 
the life of civil disobedience. But while the theocratic regime did not fall, there 
were some important outcomes: the ruling mullahs were split in opinion about 
the severity of the crackdown. As part of the response, the regime att empted to 
disable national mobile phone networks. It disconnected the national internet 
information infrastructure for several hours and installed a deep packet inspec-
tion system that signifi cantly slowed traffi  c. Until 2011, few regimes in North 
Africa and the Middle East had systematically disabled national information 
infrastructure in response to a political crisis. 
 Fast-forward six months to the early phase of the Arab Spring: the Tunisian 
and Egyptian regimes had notably diff erent responses to the digital organiza-
tion of protests. Long before the protests in December 2010 and January 
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2011, Tunisian offi  cials had a long, repressive history of monitoring and tar-
geting individuals engaging in online political activism. But during the pro-
tests, the government did not eff ectively control information networks to stop 
the outfl ow of local political conditions or the infl ow of international reactions 
and support. Mobilized and well-informed, protesters benefi ted from the gov-
ernment’s failure to manage sensitive information. Similarly, Egypt’s Mubarak 
also failed to control information networks but in the end made a desperate 
att empt to shut down mobile networks. UK-based Vodafone complied with 
the Egyptian regime’s demands to shut off  mobile phones, which offi  cials then 
used to send orders and misinformation to protesters. But these actions had 
the unintended consequence of increasing protest participation—organizer 
Waleed Rasheed said, “I would like to thank Mubarak so much  . . . he discon-
nected mobile phones on January 27. More people came down to the streets 
on the 28th of January because he disconnected.” 
 Yet authoritarian regimes have come to value digital media too. Security 
services in Bahrain, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria observed how democracy 
advocates were using social media in Egypt and Tunisia, and they developed 
counterinsurgency strategies that allowed for surveilling, misleading, and 
entrapping protesters. New information technologies can be vital tools for 
social control (Aday et al.  2010 ; Howard  2010 ; Morozov  2011 ). 
 So it is not accurate to say that regimes are always disadvantaged by activ-
ists using digital technologies. While Tunisia and Egypt failed to act early and 
eff ectively to control digital networks, Libya and Bahrain did not. Turning off  
the internet was one of Gaddafi ’s fi rst reactions. Before activists and citizens 
could learn about what was happening in neighboring cities, all outside news, 
as well as outcries for support from foreign diasporas, became eff ectively im-
possible to receive. In Bahrain, aft er failing to turn away protesters aft er many 
days of demonstrations, the regime responded by shutt ing off  mobile net-
works early one morning. Shortly thereaft er, the peaceful protesters were fi red 
on with live ammunition. Th is occurred at a time when their ability to coordi-
nate or to seek international support from foreign media was eff ectively 
blocked. In the days that followed, the government used the same social media 
sites protesters used to organize themselves by crowdsourcing the identifi ca-
tions of anonymous participants—or what Al Jazeera reporters have termed “a 
virtual lynch-mob.” 
 Even Tunisian and Egyptian offi  cials tried such surgical methods to punish 
dissenters. It is alleged that Tunisian authorities carried out “phishing” opera-
tions, to steal citizens’ passwords to monitor and remove their content. Sofi ene 
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Chourabi, a journalist and blogger, found himself unable to recover his email 
and Facebook accounts aft er they were hijacked. At the same time, content he 
had posted and pages he administered were deleted. “Here we don’t really 
have internet, we have a national  intra-net ,” said Azyz Amamy, a Tunisian web 
activist. 
 So what was the role of regimes in controlling information networks? How 
did their strategies impede the progress of digital activism, and under what 
circumstances did their eff orts fail, backfi re, or result in other unpredictable 
outcomes? How might understanding the strategies of repressive governments 
inform our understanding of the digital organization of social protest and po-
litical activism? For civil society actors around the world, digital media and 
online social networking applications have changed the way in which dissent 
is organized (Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl  2005 ; Howard  2010 ; Still  2005 ). 
Social movement leaders from around the world use online applications and 
digital content systems to organize collective action, activate local protest net-
works, network with international social movements, and share their political 
perspective with global media systems (Byrne  2007 ; Kloet  2002 ; Shumate 
and Pike  2006 ). 
 In the past, authoritarian regimes easily controlled broadcast media in 
times of political crisis by destroying newsprint supplies, seizing radio and 
television stations, and blocking phone calls. It is certainly more diffi  cult to 
control digital media on a regular basis, but there have been occasions when 
states have disabled a range of marginal to signifi cant portions of their national 
information infrastructure. What situational tendencies cause state powers to 
specifi cally block internet access and disable digital networks? When do 
regimes resort to the more extreme measures of shutt ing off  internet access? 
And when they do not have the capacity to control digital networks, how do 
states respond offl  ine to dissent and criticism? What is the impact of doing so, 
and who is most aff ected? 
 Sophisticated repressive regimes oft en preemptively respond with a digital 
counterinsurgency strategy and oft en prepare for the day they need to batt le 
their citizens either in the streets or in an information war. States such as 
China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are excellent examples. China has invested a 
great deal of eff ort in constructing its virtual fi rewall, Iran has tested and 
implemented its own deep-packet inspection soft ware purchased from Nokia, 
and Saudi Arabia has rerouted its internet cables through state-security servers 
in Riyadh to create a literal information bott leneck. Other countries, such as 
Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, did not have sophisticated long-term investments in 
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managing information infrastructure. But when unexpected political turmoil 
arose, they developed responses that ranged from jailing and beating bloggers 
to more sophisticated strategies such as asking loyalists to identify protesters 
in photos posted on Facebook, creating domestic surveillance programs 
forcing citizens to monitor one another’s activities, and more. In these 
 instances, regimes used activists’ spaces against them. 
 To conclude, we introduce examples and narratives along a spectrum of 
state sophistication with information technology, digital media censorship, 
the co-option of internet and mobile phone service providers, and the surveil-
lance of civil society groups online. We look at the most intriguing examples of 
both clumsy and smart state responses. Egypt responded too late and with a 
strategy too unsophisticated to stop the information fl ow. Saudi Arabia and 
Syria responded very early and with very sophisticated offl  ine and online 
strategies to curb the potential for protest mobilization. Technologies them-
selves do not possess liberatory potential—in important ways, authoritarian 
governments have actively learned new tricks from one another and from 
their mistakes. 
 Decision Paths and Opportunity Structures 
 It is diffi  cult to investigate patt erns of state censorship. Many reports of censor-
ship are essentially self-reported by technology users who assume there is a 
political reason behind their inability to connect to a digital network, whether 
mobile phone networks, gaming networks, or the internet. Sometimes the 
state admits to acts of censorship, which makes it easier to learn why the gov-
ernment has interfered and to what eff ect. At other times the state acts so 
clumsily or breaks the communication link between such large networks that 
many users can report being aff ected. While several researchers have studied 
the broad social impact of censorship, only a few have been able to provide 
evidence about both the shared perception that the state is surveilling its 
public and specifi c incidents of censorship that involve disconnections in dig-
ital networks (Deibert et al.  2008 ; Deibert et al.  2010 ). Drawing from multiple 
sources, however, it is possible to do a comparative analysis of the myriad of 
incidents in which government offi  cials decide to censor their online publics. 
 Th e story of state censorship of information networks is not necessarily spe-
cifi c to non-democratic governments. And not all acts of state censorship are 
easy to describe and classify. One of the fi rst incidents occurred on December 
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29, 1995, when German prosecutors demanded that an internet service pro-
vider (ISP) block 4 million worldwide subscribers from reading sex-related in-
formation on portions of the internet. Th is was the fi rst instance of such drastic 
measures of state censorship, legislation, and regulation of information received 
online. Motivation for the shutdown came from a police investigation into 
child pornography in Bavaria, Germany. Th ough German offi  cials were target-
ing 220,000 German subscribers when they asked for the block, CompuServe, 
the ISP in question, had no mechanism in place to limit just German users at 
the time and thus had to shut down service to all subscribers. In all, Com-
puServe restricted subscriber access to 200 newsgroups specifi cally related to 
the site Usenet. Reaction to the censorship elicited varied responses from com-
munity and civic groups. Th e National Center for Missing and Exploited Chil-
dren, for example, hailed it as a form of “electronic citizenship.” Meanwhile, 
groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation indicated concern and resis-
tance to the notion of state control over individual rights online. Th e most cur-
rent debate over internet censorship in a democratic country is taking place in 
Australia. Since 2008, the Australian Labor Party has pushed for a large-scale 
blocking of blacklisted foreign websites. If the measure passes, Australian inter-
net service providers would be mandated to block such content, though the 
legislation to enact the censorship regulations has not yet been completed. 
 Th ese early and recent incidents of state intervention with internet connec-
tivity have brought forth questions that we still struggle to answer today: Who 
controls internet content? What are the legitimate reasons for state interfer-
ence with digital networks? Over the last 15 years, states (both authoritarian 
and democratic) have become increasingly willing to interfere with the links 
between nodes of digital infrastructure. Th ey do this by shutt ing out particular 
users or shutt ing off  particular servers, by breaking the links to sub-networks 
of digital media, and sometimes even by disconnecting national information 
infrastructure from global networks. Recently, Research in Motion (RIM), 
the company behind the popular BlackBerry smartphone, has been involved 
in a complex issue involving several governments’ requests to obtain bett er 
access to the server nodes in RIM’s service networks. In the spring of 2010, a 
prominent political fi gure in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) used his Black-
Berry’s mobile camera to record himself torturing a Bangladeshi migrant 
worker. Th e video was taken and posted online, causing outrage from human 
rights groups and embarrassing the country’s ruling elites. Th e UAE’s response 
has been to demand that RIM provide dedicated servers within their territory 
so that the regime can monitor traffi  c and disable services as it chooses. 
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 Eventually both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates threatened to 
ban the use of the popular BlackBerry smart phone. Th e UAE threatened to 
block access to text messages, email, and web browsers if RIM did not allow 
government access for security investigations. Th e threat of censorship could 
potentially aff ect more than half a million users of the most popular smart-
phone in the UAE. India followed suit, citing national security as the impetus 
for demanding that RIM stop encrypting data sent through their phones. In-
creasingly, private companies and ISP providers are being caught between 
meeting the security and information needs of their users and obeying imposed 
government regulations. Conceding, at least partially, to governmental pres-
sure rather than risking a complete block, however, is more valuable to mobile 
and internet providers—BlackBerry, for example, is the most popular device 
connecting business elites and managers in these booming economies. 
 Since 1995—the year the National Science Foundation eff ectively priva-
tized the internet (by decommissioning NSFNET and transitioning to several 
commercial networks)—there have been at least 526 occasions in which gov-
ernments intervened in the connections of a digital network. Of these, about 
half were enacted by authoritarian regimes. Th e three countries with the high-
est number of incidents, China, Tunisia, and Turkey, represent both authori-
tarian and democratic regimes. In times of political uncertainty, rigged 
elections, or military incursions, ruling elites are sometimes willing to inter-
fere with information infrastructure as a way of managing crises. In many of 
these cases, the targets (victims) are active domestic civil society movements 
with international linkages. When these movements organize, authoritarian 
governments can react harshly and invasively by blocking access to the global 
internet. Yet at the same time, these authoritarian regimes fi nd that they 
cannot block internet access for extended periods, both because doing so has 
an impact on the national economy and because international political pres-
sure becomes hard to ignore. During the heat of the protests in Tahrir Square, 
Mubarak demanded that the internet infrastructure be shut down; the loss to 
the national internet cost Egypt 4 percent of its annual GDP, or about $90 
million dollars from a loss of revenue and global fi nancial transactions. Simi-
larly, on February 18, Libya abruptly turned off  the entire internet before col-
lapsing into civil war. Internet traffi  c fl uctuations in Yemen also dropped 
briefl y when the government was suspected of installing fi ltering soft ware. 
Arbor Networks, an agency that monitors information security said, “We have 
never seen a country as connected as Egypt completely lose connectivity for 
such an extended period” (Labovitz  2011 ). Of 110 major internet providers 
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worldwide during the Arab Spring protests, Bahrain and Libya had the most 
pronounced changes in internet traffi  c. Some blamed “overloaded circuits” 
while others suspected governments of enforced slowdowns of servers. 
 Shutt ing off  the internet for a country’s network also impacts the capacity 
of the state to respond to a crisis. Th erefore, the decision tree for choking off  
internet access also involves some willingness to incapacitate portions of the 
government’s security apparatus. Civil society groups do fi nd methods to cir-
cumvent the blocked social media. A signifi cant body of literature has grown 
around social movement use of newer digital media against authoritarian 
regimes (Garrett   2006 ; Marmura  2008a ,  b ; McLaughlin  2003 ). While there is 
a healthy, ongoing conversation by scholars on the ways civil societies use dig-
ital media for social and political mobilization, studies are rare that examine 
the motivations, tactics, and impacts of government responses to online civic 
activity. 
 Comparative case analyses of the occasions in which regimes disconnected 
signifi cant portions of their national digital infrastructure, including mobile 
phones and internet access, can help illuminate this issue. We need to defi ne 
the range of situations in which states have actually disrupted large sections of 
their own national information infrastructure, evaluate the outcomes for 
regime stability and civil society, and advance collective action theory through 
a typology of regime-based censorship of digital hardware and digital content. 
Th rough this typology we argue for the importance of the regime in shaping 
the political economy of ICT infrastructures. Aft er all, activists must operate 
within the overall information infrastructure available to them in the market, 
which the government has a heavy hand in shaping. While some have argued 
that the state no longer has strong control of media production and consump-
tion systems, there are many occasions when a state can exercise power over 
digital networks. 
 How Do States Interfere with Digital Networks? 
 Th e internet has become an invaluable logistical tool for organization and com-
munication among civil society groups. It is an information infrastructure 
mostly independent of the state, and since civil society groups are by defi nition 
social organizations independent of the state, the internet has become an impor-
tant incubator for social movements and civic action. Some governments work 
hard to censor digital media, but even in such countries the internet is diffi  cult 
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to control. Governments might own nodes in the network, but rarely can they 
completely choke off  network connections. Th is means that tools such as You-
Tube, Twitt er, Facebook, and email are useful, and at sensitive times, critical 
organizational tools. In some of the toughest authoritarian regimes, these tools 
are crucial because face-to-face conversations about political life are so problem-
atic. For civil society groups these tools are oft en content distribution systems 
largely independent of the state. But there are numerous circumstances in which 
governments and repressive regimes have learned to co-opt or limit these op-
portunities for autonomous civic action. Th e internet has altered the dynamics 
of political communication systems in many countries, such that the internet 
itself is the site of political contestation between the state and civil society. 
 States interfere with digital networks using many tactics with various levels 
of severity. Generally, all states, including democracies, emerging democ-
racies, authoritarian regimes, and fragile states, have targeted members of civil 
society. Th ey have done so online by shutt ing down websites or portals; offl  ine 
by arresting journalists, bloggers, activists, and citizens; by proxy through con-
trolling internet service providers, forcing companies to shut down specifi c 
websites, or denying access to content the state considers disagreeable; and, in 
the most extreme cases, shutt ing down access to entire online and mobile net-
works. Surprisingly, while authoritarian regimes generally att empt to control 
full networks, sub-networks, and nodes more than democracies do, democ-
racies are more likely to target civil society actors by proxy through control of 
internet service providers.  Table  4.1 presents cases where governments exer-
cised control by targeting full networks (shutt ing down the internet), sub-
networks (blocking websites), and network nodes (targeting individuals), 
and by proxy (pressuring service providers). 
 Event-history analysis is a commonly used comparative method for ex-
amining the real circumstances of political crises. More important, it is par-
ticularly useful for developing a nuanced understanding of relatively new 
social phenomena and for building typologies and categories of political 
action. Drawing on a range of sources, we built a unique collection of 
detailed event logs for major disruptions in digital networks of nations 
between 1995 and 2011. We collected information about incidents as 
reported in major news media, specialized news sources such as national 
security and information  security blogs, and other online forums for dis-
cussing such topics. 
 A case is defi ned as an occasion when a government intervened in a digital 
network by breaking or turning off  connections between national sub-networks 
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and global information networks. Sometimes this meant blocking ports or access 
to a particular sub-network of digital media, such as content at the domains Face-
book or YouTube. In times of signifi cant political or military crisis, such as war or 
contested elections, the governments might disconnect SMS messaging services 
or block the entire country’s access to global networks. Additionally, regimes may 
target individual actors in networks. But these incidents are more than general 
government threats of surveillance or intimidation (which are also forms of cen-
sorship). Th ey are distinct incidents when government offi  cials made the specifi c 
decision to disable the links or nodes in the portions of the information networks 
they can control. 
 Since the literature on digital censorship oft en makes a distinction between 
democracies, emerging democracies, and authoritarian regimes, we rely on 
the Polity IV data about regime type (Marshall and Jaggers  2010 ). In addi-
tion, since several of the governments appearing in the event log are too frag-
ile to be placed defi nitively into one of these three categories, we rely on 
Polity IV data for a category of fragile regimes. As per Polity IV coding, if a 
state was recovering from civil war or foreign military invasion, experiencing 
a complex humanitarian disaster, or had eff ectively failed for other reasons, 
we coded this state as fragile. A state’s regime type was set according to the 
Polity IV score for that state in the year of the reported incident. Several 
countries had several incidents, and it is possible that regime types changed 
over time. 
 Table 4.1  How Do States Disconnect Th eir Digital Networks? Incidents 
by Regime Type 
  Democracy  Emerging 
Democracy 
 Authoritarian  Fragile  Total 
 Complete Network 
Shutdown (Full 
Networks) 
 13  3  30  3  49 
 Specifi c Site- oriented 
Shutdowns (Sub-Net-
works) 
 140  25  210  8  383 
 Individual Users 
(Nodes) 
 82  16  125  3  226 
 By Proxy Th rough ISP  47  4  41  4  96 
 Source : Based on authors’ calculations, replication data available at www.pitpi.org. 
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 In all, there were 566 unique incidents involving 101 countries: 39 percent 
of the incidents occurred in democracies, 7 percent in emerging democracies, 
51 percent in authoritarian regimes, and 2 percent in fragile states. Each inci-
dent was coded for the name of the country in which a state agency intervened 
in digital networks, the year of the incident, the type of regime, and a precise 
date if available. We made general notes on the narrative of each incident and 
mapped on the Polity IV score for the country in the year of the incident. Th en 
we developed three standardized typologies for the kinds of incidents being 
reported. First, we developed a category that iteratively helped defi ne the case 
and a typology of actions that states take against social media. Second, we 
developed a category for the reason a state took that action, sometimes relying 
on third-party reports if the state simply denied any interference. Finally, we 
developed a category for the impact of the interference. 
 While we might expect authoritarian regimes to interfere more aggres-
sively with their digital infrastructure than other types of regimes,  Figure  4.1 
reveals that democracies also substantively disconnect their communication 
networks—with at least 80 incidents a year occurring in recent years. Only a 
fraction of these involve emerging democracies, but  Figure  4.1 provokes 
more questions. Over time, it appears that all types of regimes have become 
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 Figure 4.1  Number of Major Incidents of State Intervention in Digital Networks, by 
Regime Type, 1995–2011. 
 Note : In total, there were 566 incidents before April 2011. Regime type is tied to the specifi c 
year in which the incident was recorded. 
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more and more willing to interfere with information access. As social media 
have diff used, they have become a fundamental infrastructure for collective 
action. Even though democracies appear just as aggressive as authoritarian 
regimes in disconnecting digital networks, are there diff erences in the ways 
such states intervene? What are the diff erent reasons for such drastic inter-
ventions (see  Table  4.2 )? 
 Th e most extreme form of network control occurs when states shut down 
access to the internet entirely. Authoritarian regimes have done so signifi -
cantly more than fragile states and emerging democracies, and also twice as 
oft en as democracies. For example, China shut down internet services in the 
Xinjiang region aft er ethnic riots erupted in 2006. Th e riots resulted in 140 
fatalities, and the state has since blocked access to Twitt er and other social 
networking sites to control the confl ict and dissent. Pakistan also severely 
restricted the internet aft er a US-based cartoonist organized the “Everybody 
Draw Mohammed Day.” Aft er the event att racted 43,000 fans from around 
the world, the Pakistani government began banning content. Emerging de-
mocracies such as Haiti and Th ailand have engaged in shutt ing down inter-
net service providers and entire online networks like YouTube. Th ousands 
of Haitians lost internet access in 1999 when the government allegedly 
att empted to silence dissent and consolidate power under the guise of pun-
ishing Alpha Network Communications for selling telephone cards and pro-
viding international telephone services. Bangladesh blocked YouTube and 
most other fi le-sharing services aft er recordings of a meeting between the 
prime minister and senior army officers were leaked. Thailand, also an 
emerging democracy with a record of political online censorship, maintains 
a block on entire internet services like YouTube. Guatemala, a democracy, 
also blocked entire networks when a political crisis over the murder of a 
prominent lawyer raged on the WordPress network. Th ese examples suggest 
that although complete network shutdowns are least common, they tend to 
materialize when states face national controversies and moments of severe 
social and political unrest, oft en (but by no means  exclusively) in authori-
tarian regimes. 
 Th ese examples and narratives surrounding the circumstances when 
governments are most likely to limit or shut off  internet and mobile ser-
vices were replayed during the Arab Spring. But the Arab Spring also led to 
some important innovations and advancements in states’ strategies for 
managing information networks, either as long-term investments or more 
sophisticated short-term responses. For example, the US Department of 
State has commented that many Arab regimes engaged in second- and 
 Table 4.2.  Why Do States Disconnect Th eir Digital Networks? Incidents by 
Regime Type 
  Democracy  Emerging 
Democracy 
 Authoritarian  Fragile  Total 
 Protecting Authority 
 Protecting Political 
Leaders and State 
Institutions 
 30  7  23  1  61 
 Election Crisis  4  3  9  0  16 
 Eliminating 
Propaganda 
 5  1  24  0  30 
 Mitigating 
 Dissidence 
 8  5  11  3  27 
 National Security  29  6  34  0  69 
 Preserving the Public Good 
 Preserving Cultural 
and Religious 
Morals 
 27  4  37  6  74 
 Preserving Racial 
Harmony 
 9  0  1  0  10 
 Protecting Children  30  0  2  0  32 
 Cultural 
Preservation 
 2  0  19  0  21 
 Protecting Indi-
vidual’s Privacy 
 3  0  2  0  5 
 Dissuading 
Criminal Activity 
 29  3  18  1  51 
 Alleged System 
Failure, Neither 
Denied Nor 
Admitt ed 
 4  4  9  0  17 
 Censorship Denied 
By State 
 3  1  11  0  15 
 Unknown, Other  40  4  90  4  138 
 Total  223  38  290  15  566 
 Source : Based on authors’ calculations, replication data available at www.pitpi.org. 
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third-generation strategies (Marks  2011 ). First-generation strategies were 
limited to buying online censorship soft ware from Silicon Valley and in-
stalling it in-country. Second- and third-generation strategies are more so-
phisticated and eff ective. For example, governments have organized 
“denial-of-service” att acks on human rights or activist organizations’ web-
sites: fl ooding their sites with so many requests that it eff ectively crashes 
organizational servers and prevents other citizens from accessing their con-
tent. Some regimes sent malware and viruses to websites to infect program-
ming and hardware. Although second- and third-generation strategies are 
more eff ective, the ultimate strategy used by many regimes in the Arab 
Spring was to completely turn off  access. 
 Unlike the most extreme measure of shutt ing down entire online networks, 
states are most likely to target individual websites (online) or their producers 
and users (offl  ine). Democracies are much more likely to engage in online 
content censorship than other tactics, though they also frequently target civil 
society members offl  ine. Th e earliest case of a democracy shutt ing down 
online sub-networks was the aforementioned German att empt in 1995. In 
1996, German authorities again removed access to banned material, including 
a Dutch online magazine. More recently, Australia, as of July 2010, is consid-
ering a mandatory internet fi lter to censor a list of URLs associated with child 
sexual abuse, bestiality, sexual violence, crime, violence, drug use, and content 
advocating violence and extremism. 
 While socially questionable material and content promoting criminal activ-
ities are commonly cited reasons for blocking online material in democratic 
states, some states have used the same tactic for dealing with foreign policy 
disputes. In August 2010, South Korea engaged in an online dispute with North 
Korea over social media when South Korean citizens were threatened by the 
South Korean government with arrest for accessing North Korea’s Twitt er feed. 
However, despite att empting to reroute requests from North Korea’s Twitt er 
page to a warning page, North Korea’s page accumulated more than 9,000 fol-
lowers. In instances like this, when states are unable to block online content 
eff ectively, they are forced to move more directly toward censoring individuals. 
Authoritarian states do this most oft en, and in many cases, with more severity. 
Bloggers, journalists, and social activists are the most common individual tar-
gets of offl  ine censorship, oft en facing arrest and fi nes. Following Th ailand’s 
military coup in 2006, two cyber dissidents were arrested for comments made 
about the monarchy in online discussion boards, and they now face a minimum 
sentence of 15 years in prison. Another example of online activities leading to 
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offl  ine government reactions is Cuba’s arrests of two online journalists working 
for CubaNet in 2005 and 2007. Th ese journalists were arrested for engaging in 
“subversive propaganda” and “precriminal social danger.” 
 While democracies engage in censoring individual users, like authoritarian 
regimes, they also have a unique tendency to target individuals providing the 
infrastructure. In fact, democracies have a slightly higher rate of blocking con-
tent and controlling civil actors through indirect measures, such as targeting 
internet service providers. Turkey and Italy, both democracies, have legally pur-
sued charges against both internet service providers and their users. In March 
2010, an Italian court convicted three Google executives for not removing vio-
lent video content that appeared on their online services. In August 2009, 
Malawi approved legal measures to pressure internet service providers to mon-
itor social networking sites such as Twitt er and Facebook. Hungary and Bel-
gium have also shared experiences where internet service providers have come 
under pressure to approve “notices of takedown” procedures from their govern-
ments, a process whereby online hosts remove content in response to court 
orders or allegations of copyright infringement. Th is could be because much of 
the global information infrastructure is based out of advanced economies, such 
as the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. Authoritarian 
regimes oft en do not have direct control over these foreign entities, other than 
through state-run ISPs based in Tripoli, Riyadh, Cairo, and other countries. 
Surprisingly, while authoritarian regimes are more likely to fi ne and imprison 
civil society actors directly for criticizing the regime and its elites, democracies 
have more examples of regimes using legal frameworks and roundabout 
measures for targeting both internet service providers and their users. 
 Why Do States Interfere with Digital Networks? 
 Governments interfering with digital networks oft en justify their actions by 
saying they are merely protecting public offi  cials and state institutions, or pre-
serving the “public good.” Authoritarian regimes oft en do so during election 
crises, to eliminate propaganda and mitigate dissidence in the purported in-
terest of national security. Public offi  cials cite “terrorism threats” and prevent-
ing the spread of “state secrets” as reasons to do so. For example, the Bahraini 
government turned the state media against protesters, broadcasting messages 
encouraging citizens to report the identities of Shia dissidents inciting criti-
cism against the Sunni government. Undermining authority fi gures is a 
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 frequent reason for justifying digital interference by non-democratic regimes. 
As far back as 2007, Kazakh offi  cials shut down opposition websites because 
of published transcripts and recordings related to a public batt le between au-
thoritarian President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his estranged son-in-law. 
 Because sensitive communications such as these can be used by dissident 
groups for propaganda purposes, governments also target online activists legally 
as well. In 2003, China sentenced a user to four years in prison for discussing 
and posting information about democracy over email, online forums, and chat 
rooms. Established democracies such as the United States have also att empted 
to discourage dissidence. In 2009, two citizens were arrested for tweeting about 
police locations during G20 protests in Pitt sburgh, Pennsylvania. Although 
regimes interfere with digital networks to preserve regime legitimacy, election 
periods are especially sensitive times for authoritarian regimes. Th ese elections, 
although oft en forged and rigged, present a lucrative opportunity for pro-
democracy activists to illuminate the public about government corruption. 
Regimes are on higher alert during these periods to intervene and eliminate 
conversations about corruption prior to, during, or aft er elections. During the 
contentious Iranian elections of 2009, offi  cials fi rst slowed and then shut down 
access to the entire Twitt er network, heavily used by protest movements to 
coordinate and share information about the contested elections. Similarly, 
Egyptian citizens have been known to post footage of votes being counted, with 
clear evidence of forgery and bribing, on YouTube. While the Iranian regime 
was very sophisticated in tracking, deleting, and arresting these activists, Egyp-
tian state security was not. 
 While authoritarian regimes (and sometimes established democracies) 
will justify digital interventions as a means to protect public offi  cials and state 
institutions, they must also engage in some rhetorical gymnastics to justify 
their actions as being in the interest of the public good. States also disable 
social media by claiming an urgent need to preserve the public good and, 
sometimes, public safety. During the Arab Spring, preserving cultural and reli-
gious morals (Saudi Arabia), preserving racial harmony (Bahrain), and dis-
suading criminal activity (Egypt) were common reasons cited for shutt ing off  
social media and mobile networks. 
 Offi  cials att ribute intervention to preventing the spread of blasphemous or 
off ensive information that challenges the religious and cultural morality of the 
state. Th is is especially true of Saudi Arabia and other Islamist regimes. A com-
prehensive project by the Open-Net Initiative investigating religiously sanc-
tioned censorship found that “religion-based internet censorship bars the free 
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fl ow of information in many majority Muslim countries by means of regula-
tory restrictions and ISP-level technical fi ltering that blocks objectionable 
web content. When regimes implement and enforce faith-based censorship 
they create borders around certain content .  .  . . For example, many majority 
Muslim countries criminalize the promotion of non-Islamic faiths among 
their Muslim citizens offl  ine” (Noman  2011 ). Because many authoritarian 
regimes in the Arab world maintain legitimacy by relying on religious sanc-
tion, censoring religious content and perspectives is as critical as censoring 
other types of political information (Noman  2011 ). 
 Th e long list of countries that engage in religiously sanctioned censorship 
of sensitive political information include Bahrain, Gaza, Kuwait, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the UAE, and Yemen. Th ese cases 
involve targeting websites and individuals who access or distribute “anti-
Islamic” (a category frequently used to block anything threatening to the 
regime or local power elites) or pornographic material. For example, Pakistan 
blocked access to 450 sites in 2009, including Facebook and YouTube, aft er an 
international event to depict the Prophet Mohammed was organized on Face-
book. In another example, Iran shut down access to YouTube and Amazon, in 
2006, to “purge the country of Western infl uence.” 
 Regimes sometimes justify their actions by claiming to protect public 
safety. Reducing criminal acts is used as a reason to justify interventions when 
individuals have been arrested for copyright infringement, distribution of il-
legal information, and participation in activities deemed illegal by the state. 
Individuals have oft en been prosecuted for breaking the law in their home 
countries. For example, in 2009, Polish authorities arrested the creators of a 
peer-to-peer portal and shut down the site because of alleged copyright in-
fringement. On the other hand, long before the Arab Spring, Tunisian citizens 
were fi ned and jailed for “causing harm by means of telecommunication net-
works” when they fi lmed and posted content online without an offi  cial permit 
or writt en consent of those being fi lmed. 
 Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences 
of Digital Interventions 
 Th e lasting impact of a temporary disconnection in internet service may actu-
ally be a strengthening of weak ties between global and local civil society net-
works. When civil society disappears from the grid, others notice. What lasts 
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are the ties between a nation’s civic groups, and between international non-
governmental organizations and like-minded, in-country organizations. Cer-
tainly not all of these virtual communities are about elections, but their 
existence is a political phenomenon particularly in countries where state and 
social elites have worked hard to police offl  ine communities. Th us, even the 
bulletin boards and chat rooms dedicated to shopping for brand-name watches 
are sites that practice free speech and where the defense of free speech is a 
topic of conversation. Th e internet allows opposition movements that are 
based outside of a country to reach in and become part of the system of polit-
ical communication within even the strictest authoritarian regimes. Today, 
banning political parties could simply mean that formal political opposition 
will move to organize online, from outside the country. It also means that civil 
society leaders may turn to other organizational forms permitt ed by network 
technologies. 
 When states disconnect particular social media services, student and civil 
society leaders develop creative workarounds and relearn traditional (offl  ine) 
mobilization tactics. Th is almost always means that target sites, such as You-
Tube, Facebook, and Twitt er, are accessible through other means. When 
regimes cannot successfully shut off  online dissidence and autonomous civil 
conversations, they are forced to look outward. Sometimes, it is possible to 
have enough leverage through international relations or legal frameworks to 
successfully curb an opposition movement. In March 2011, a Facebook page 
supporting the Palestinian intifada was pulled down by Facebook aft er the 
Israeli government complained that the page was inciting violence against 
Jews. In authoritarian regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and 
others, such an act is not as easy. Th ese regimes must work hard to curb 
online dissidence internally in creative ways. When 40 Saudi women staged 
a rare demonstration in Riyadh demanding the release of prisoners held 
without trial, they were supported by an online campaign calling for polit-
ical reform and launched on Facebook. In April 2011, prominent blogger 
and democratic activist Ahmed Mansoor was conveniently charged with 
possession of alcohol and arrested (aft er receiving death threats online). He 
had been petitioning for political representation and legislative powers for 
democratic institutions. 
 Beyond arrests and beatings, government responses have become more 
sophisticated. In the case of Mansoor, a Facebook page called “Ahmed Man-
soor, a traitor without a nation” was created to defame the activist and his 
work. Th ese tactics have been echoed in neighboring countries as well. 
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 Bahraini offi  cials responded to Shia activists by not only fi ring on peaceful 
protesters but also creating what Al Jazeera English has called “a virtual lynch 
mob.” Th e Facebook pages used by Bahraini activists were turned against 
them to hunt down organizers and participants through crowd-sourced iden-
tifi cation of individuals in online photographs and videos. Once identifi ed, 
many of these citizens were arrested, publicly defamed online and on state 
media, and tortured, and some killed, by Bahraini authorities. 
 When a political, military, or other security crisis is over, what remains is 
the lasting impact of a temporary outage in digital network connectivity. Th e 
internet has become a crucial component of political communication during 
elections—even rigged ones. It has also become a crucial component of polit-
ical communication during other kinds of regime transition, such as executive 
turnover, foreign military intervention, natural disasters, and social protests 
that challenge in a very fundamental way a regime’s legitimacy. Information 
infrastructure is not simply part of the general context of contemporary social 
mobilization. Indeed, social computing is a defi ning feature of elections. Dig-
ital media such as mobile phones and the internet now help incubate civic 
conversations, especially in countries that heavily censor the national print 
and broadcast media. 
 Internet access is oft en limited to wealthy social elites, but these elites have 
a key role in either accepting or rejecting the outcome of an election. Th e 
internet has become a necessary infrastructure for the development of civil 
society, and election season is oft en the time for civic groups to be most active. 
Most, though not all, of the regimes studied in this event catalogue are author-
itarian, or were when the decision to disconnect from global information net-
works was taken. For authoritarian regimes, the single greatest threat to 
stability is oft en internal elite defection. When a cohort of wealthy families, 
educated and urban elites, and government employees decide they no longer 
wish to back a regime, it is likely to fail. In most of the countries studied here, 
only a small fraction of the population has internet access through computers 
and mobile phones. However, this small population is the one for which 
 authoritarian regimes work hard to broker information. 
 It is not Twitt er, blogs, or YouTube that cause social unrest. But today, suc-
cessful social movement organizing and civic engagement is diffi  cult to ima-
gine without this suite of social media tools, even in countries such as Iran, 
Egypt, or Tunisia. Many people in these countries have no internet or mobile-
phone access. Nevertheless, the people who do—urban dwellers, educated 
elites, and the young—are precisely the population with the capacity to  enable 
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regime change or to tacitly support electoral outcomes. Th ese are the popula-
tions who support or defect from authoritarian rule, and for whom connec-
tions to family and friends have demonstrably changed with technology 
diff usion. Comparative analysis reveals the degree to which diff erent regimes 
feel threatened by social media, whether such tools are actively used to orga-
nize dissent, or passively used for producing and consuming culture. 
 When digital networks are reactivated, personal networks that cross inter-
national boundaries also reactivate. Digital outages have become sensitive 
moments in which student leaders, journalists, and civil society groups exper-
iment with digital technologies. Even if their favorite candidates are not 
elected, the process of experimentation with digital media is important 
because it infuses more information habits and news diets independent of the 
state into their daily engagement with public life. 
 Information infrastructure  is politics. And the political culture that we now 
see online during elections comes not just from political elites but also from 
citizens: using social media, documenting human rights abuses with their mo-
bile phones, sharing spreadsheets to track state expenditures, and pooling in-
formation about offi  cial corruption. Perhaps the most lasting impact of digital 
media use during crises is that people get accustomed to being able to consume 
 and produce political content. When regimes disconnect from global informa-
tion infrastructures, they employ a range of stop-gap measures that usually 
reinforce public expectation for global connectivity. One of the things author-
itarian regimes did consistently during the Arab Spring was to block citizens 
from reading international news and activists from reaching international jour-
nalists. On the eve of major protests in Tahrir Square, one protestor noted, “If 
Al Jazeera turns off  its cameras tonight, there will be a massacre in Tahrir 
Square.” In the following chapter we explore why activists, even primarily dig-
ital activists, rely so heavily on international news organizations, but also why 
non-democratic regimes loathe them so much. 

89
 5 
 Al Jazeera, Social Media, 
and Digital Journalism 
 Th is is why I no longer have the control over the country 
that I once had. 
 —Mubarak to diplomat in-fl ight over Cairo, pointing to the 
forest of television antennas below, 1995 
 If you switch off  your cameras tonight, there will be 
genocide . . . . You are protecting us by showing what is 
happening in Tahrir Square. 
 —Caller fr om Tahrir Square to director of Al Jazeera 
network, January 25, 2011 
 Yes, we may have helped Tunisia, Egypt. But let us not 
forget the elephant in the room: Al Jazeera + sat dishes. 
 —WikiLeaks’ tweet, January 29, 2011 
 In previous chapters, we demonstrated the ways in which social media pro-
vided new capacities and constraints on a range of political actors, from des-
perate democracy activists to traditional political parties and tough dictators. 
But we would be remiss not to look into the important changes in how jour-
nalists work and to the role of news organizations since news consumers in the 
region began using technologies like mobile phones and the internet to read 
and produce news. In many of the countries caught up in revolutionary fervor, 
it was a small group of civic leaders who fi rst used digital media in creative 
ways to reach a wider public eager for political change. But in recent years, an 
even wider public began using consumer electronics in ways that changed the 
dynamics of news markets. And as a news agency, Al Jazeera has been the most 
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adept and autonomous at keeping up with media habits and demands of 
people in the region. 
 Across North Africa and the Middle East, a growing cohort of citizens now 
consumes more international news than ever before. Th ere is some evidence 
that the news sources are primarily Al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN, and other inter-
national news organizations with a vivid online presence. Th is is an important 
development because regimes that used to be able to play distinct domestic 
and international political games through state-owned media can no longer 
do so to the same degree. Distinctions between local and international news 
are intertwined for many citizens. During the Arab Spring protests, Arab citi-
zens learned about what was happening in Amman and compared it with what 
took place in neighboring Cairo, as well as in international Western hubs with 
large overseas diasporas such as Paris, Toronto, and Chicago. How did news of 
their experiences reach regional and international readers so quickly and effi  -
ciently? What role did the mainstream news organizations play in this critical 
diff usion of information? And how are traditional broadcast networks forging 
new ways of operating in environments where activists can eff ectively operate 
side by side? 
 In this chapter we discuss the indispensable role broadcast organizations, 
such as Al Jazeera English, played in amplifying social media narratives inter-
nationally. Al Jazeera is a fascinating case study in how traditional news media 
helped create new linkages among civil society actors within and between 
countries. Unlike many Western news cultures that socialize journalists to 
maintain a healthy distance from the subjects of their coverage, news cultures 
in North Africa and the Middle East operate more nimbly and cooperate with 
citizen journalists. Embedded in digital environments, participatory citizen 
bloggers upload user-generated content through mobile phones, and activists 
reach out directly to journalists. Newly established news organizations such as 
Al Jazeera English played a critical role operating not only alongside digital 
activists, but acting hand-in-hand with them. 
 During the height of the protests in Tahrir Square, activists pleaded with Al 
Jazeera to not stop fi lming, saying, “If you switch off  your cameras tonight, 
there will be genocide . . . . You are protecting us by showing what is happening 
in Tahrir Square” (Bosker  2011 ). In notable contrast were Libya and Bahrain, 
where broadcast journalists were not present and protest movements were 
notably less successful and more violent. First, we treat Al Jazeera as a news 
organization and discuss the role of digital media in shaping organizational 
and product innovation. Th en we discuss the impact of media privatization on 
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the political economy of news in the region and the growing market for news 
about local events among each country’s global diaspora. Subsequently, we 
make the argument that in the absence of legitimate opportunities to be a cit-
izen through voting and public assembly, generating content for blogs and 
news sites has become, in recent years, one form of civic expression for people 
in several countries across the region. Citizen journalists have been carrying 
out some of the most vociferous critiques, and the habits of citizen journalism 
spread widely in the moments of crisis in early 2011. 
 Al Jazeera, Digital Media, and the Changing 
Organization of News 
 Th e online and broadcast audience for Al Jazeera’s news products has grown 
over the years, though it certainly varies from country to country. But during 
the Arab Spring, Al Jazeera was instrumental in constructing a news audience 
in two ways. First, it covered stories that the national news media in many 
countries would not, particularly at times when citizens wanted those stories. 
Second, as an independent organization it remained active and “live” as a news 
agency when governments shut down domestic news agencies. Th ird, Al 
Jazeera actively cultivated content from citizens, providing fresh, local content 
that news consumers wanted. 
 Al Jazeera is probably the most widely read single online news source in the 
Arab world. Its content is frequently updated and is thematically consistent 
across English and Arabic versions (Abdul-Mageed  2008 ). Yet, compared to 
Western media, there are defi nite diff erences in the frames used. Websites for the 
 New York Times and the  Guardian consistently framed the Iraq war as a project in 
rebuilding the country. In contrast, Al Jazeera and  Al Ahram —the newspaper of 
record for the Egyptian government—framed the Iraq war in terms of confl ict 
and strife using negative tones and terms (Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern  2007 ). 
Online news sources still exhibit cultural biases: news sources from the United 
States and countries in the “Coalition of the Willing” produced positive content, 
human-interest stories, and media self-coverage; news sources in Egypt, Malay-
sia, Pakistan, Turkey, and the UAE framed the war in terms of responsibility 
(Dimitrova et al.  2005 ). For many Arab citizens, online news sites are not just an 
alternative to state-run or state-censored sources but are an alternative to Western 
news sources. Regular Arab readers fi nd Al Jazeera online more respectful of reli-
gion, culture, and tradition than the CNN and BBC websites (Barkho  2006 ). 
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 In important ways, digital technologies allow citizens to surveil the activ-
ities of their states. During Israel’s invasion of Gaza in December 2008, Al 
Jazeera developed an application for collecting incident reports from the 
ground using SMS technology and Twitt er (Al Jazeera English  2009 ). As 
Anderson and Eickelman conclude, online Arab newspapers “collectively con-
stitute a new community of communication that is transnational, open to more 
participants, and interactive in a way that traditional broadcasting has not 
been” (Eickelman and Anderson  2003 ). For example, analysis of articles pub-
lished during the second Iraq War on Al Arabiya’s site and reader responses to 
those articles reveal that that Arab readers not only challenged the views of Al 
Arabiya about the war, but they also off ered their own versions of events (Al-
Saggaf  2004 ). Moreover, in their responses, readers also posted news about the 
events covered that they obtained from other satellite television stations, such 
as Al Jazeera or from websites in which news was reported by people who 
 witnessed or were involved in the events themselves (Al-Saggaf  2006 ). 
 Online journalism is subject to many of the constraints and pressures that 
can beleaguer the production of news in print or for broadcast. Sensational 
stories are given the most hype, broadcast time, or screen space. Research on 
Al Jazeera’s site has consistently revealed that military and political violence, 
politics, and foreign relations are priorities for its editors, and these stories in 
turn receive the most commentary from its online readership. Th e capacity for 
debate has grown signifi cantly in the vast majority of Muslim communities 
around the developing world. Historically, the capacity for debate over Islamic 
texts has expanded whenever new information technologies have been intro-
duced (Miller  2007 ; Rao  2003 ). More recently, Al Jazeera helped satisfy a 
hunger for debate in the Arab world by covering Arab issues in depth and host-
ing debates from a diversity of perspectives: from feminists and traditionalists, 
Arab nationalists and non-Arab separatists, mullahs and secular parliamentar-
ians, apostate scholars, and authoritarian apologists (Ghareeb  2000 ). 
 Media Privatization and the Political 
Economy of News 
 When Bouazizi set himself on fi re on December 17, Tunisia’s state-run media 
did not cover the incident. Indeed, the fi rst state coverage appeared two weeks 
later, when Ben Ali deigned to visit Bouazizi in the hospital. In the intervening 
period, citizens turned the plight of a disaff ected shopkeeper  into news. Ben 
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Ali went to the hospital not because of mainstream media pressured him to do 
so but because Tunisians had created a news event through online social net-
works without the help of state media; Ben Ali had to respond. Th ese citizen 
journalists were able to operate because of the proliferation of internet access 
and sophisticated, digitally mediated civic innovations that have taken root 
over the last fi ve years. To unpack how broadcast media and social media net-
works have hybridized, we must refer to examples from before the Arab Spring 
as well as during the protest period. In Morocco, when 37,000 protesters 
poured out onto the streets on February 20, human rights groups and labor 
unions were not the only ones responsible for organizing them—journalists 
were also critical to the mass mobilizations and joined in. Th e Overseas Press 
Club of America reports that more than 450 journalists were att acked through-
out the Arab Spring movements. Ironically, it is perhaps WikiLeaks’ January 
29 post on Twitt er that most accurately describes the importance of news or-
ganizations in the Arab Spring: “Yes, we may have helped Tunisia, Egypt. But 
let us not forget the elephant in the room: Al Jazeera + sat dishes.” 
 Because much of the North African and Middle Eastern societies have not 
enjoyed the right to free political discourse through uncensored public infor-
mation systems, Arab public opinion has been simplistically assumed to be 
monolithic and cynical. State censorship of public discourse has also been 
credited with the seclusion of political discussion to private spheres, with few 
opportunities for public deliberation. However, the events of the Arab Spring 
present important contradictions to traditional understandings of public opin-
ion formation in North Africa and the Middle East. First, digital media have 
provided many new spaces for free and semi-public political discussion. Sec-
ond, much of this space takes on an element of transnational and transregional 
(Zayani  2008 ) engagement across diverse Arab and Western  audiences—both 
local audiences and diasporas seem to be enjoying access to the same types of 
political information. Th is shared discourse allows for learning about shared 
grievances across borders, and especially by overseas diasporas. 
 Khamis off ers a two-part explanation for the contemporary development of 
Arab media ecology: the state-dominated broadcast era and the post-broadcast 
digital era (Khamis  2011 ). Before the 1990s, media ownership in many Arab 
states was largely dominated by governments under strict political censorship 
norms. In this era, Arab citizens found it diffi  cult to learn about political events 
and engage in political discussion. Also in this era, print media enjoyed some 
political liberty to test the boundaries of state-monitored status quos because 
readership was limited to the highly literate and political elites of societies. On 
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the other hand, broadcast media did not share this political liberty; media 
ownership before the 1990s was mainly locally based, and top-down organiza-
tional hierarchies made it easy for non-democratic governments to coerce 
journalists to play by party rules. During and aft er the 1990s, however, many 
important economic and legal changes took place across Arab media systems. 
 First, media privatization, like that in Egypt, led to direct broadcast satellite 
television being introduced in the region. Laws that carefully monitored news 
workers were also altered in a struggle to keep up. For example, many of 
Egypt’s press laws were removed in 2006, while media rights and journalism 
advocacy organizations funded by media-development programs began to 
thrive (Hamdy  2009 ). Similarly, Morocco, which until 2006 had only two 
radio and two television stations, established more private radio and televi-
sion stations—all while regulatory codes struggled to keep up with the 
changing media environment (Hidass  2010 ). Second, large-scale foreign mil-
itary interventions like the First Gulf War paved the way for non-Arab news 
organizations to acquire fi rsthand footage, such as CNN’s introduction to the 
region. Previously isolated Arab publics began having direct exposure to inter-
national images and events. Consequently, Arab regimes and their state-run 
television channels lost a signifi cant monopoly on offi  cial versions of the 
public narrative. Th ird, media privatization and the introduction of non-Arab 
news outfi ts also coincided with the diff usion of internet access to private cit-
izens. Tunisians were the fi rst to gain internet access (1991), followed by 
Egyptians, Algerians, the citizens of the Emirates, and then Kuwaitis (1993), 
then Jordanians, Bahrainis, Lebanese, and Moroccans (1994–5), and last, 
Yemenis, Omanis, Saudis, and Syrians (1996–7)(Oghia and Indelicato  2011 ). 
 Since the ushering in of the post-broadcast digital era, online civil society 
has fl ourished in the Arab world, with popular social media destinations such 
as Facebook skyrocketing (Mourtada and Salem  2011 ); 2 million Algerians, 
6.5 million Egyptians, 1.4 million Jordanians, 1 million Lebanese, 3.2 million 
Moroccans, 4 million Saudis, 2.3 million Tunisians, and 2.4 million Emiratis 
use social media regularly to access international news information. For this 
growing membership of online civil society, access to a diverse array of polit-
ical information was not only possible but it was also a crucial new opportu-
nity to seed autonomous political engagement. New satellite stations and 
print newspapers hosted themselves online with the growth of internet acces-
sibility, making it easier for more uncensored sources of international news 
information. Faced with an increasingly young and college-educated labor 
pool, government eff orts to join information society development initiatives 
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necessitated Arab regimes’ compliance with access to information laws and 
instrumental openness on the web. For example, the UAE does not have such 
laws but is ranked as #12 by the United Nations on e-government measures 
(Relly and Cuillier  2010 ). Similarly, Jordan has taken a lead in making infor-
mation society building a national priority—such as improving e-government 
services, facilitating the growth of the private information technology sector, 
and generally improving quality of public life (Nagi and Hamdan  2009 ). 
 Between the late 1980s and now, the era of monolithic state-controlled and 
government-owned media environments in many Middle Eastern nations has 
shift ed to a more privatized and non-hierarchically organized digital public infor-
mation infrastructure for their citizens. Th ese shift s mostly began aft er the 1990s 
and have accelerated since 2006 because of demands for economic growth and 
job-creation needs through information society-based economic development 
initiatives. As a consequence, online-only media outlets and online versions of 
broadcast channels and print newspapers have particularly boomed with a wide 
array of political information and perspectives to be shared, consumed, and dis-
cussed by individuals. For citizens whose political discussions were oft en margin-
alized to the safety of the private sphere, online discussion spaces allowed for more 
autonomous and semi-public political discussions and public opinion formation. 
 Diasporic News Consumption during the Arab Spring 
 Th e international Arabic-speaking diaspora is estimated to be more than 30 
million and is located primarily in Europe (France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom), with a few noteworthy populations in North and South America 
(Brazil, Argentina, and the United States). With signifi cant diasporic minor-
ities in Europe and millions in the Americas now consuming a shared diet of 
international news, Arab citizens are both transnational and transregional. 
ICTs and digital media off er their cyber activists new opportunities to gather 
and disseminate political information produced by the new cohort of news 
workers. Social change in the Arab Spring was in large part due to this impor-
tant dynamic of growing media access and networked activists sharing this 
information. Studies exploring large and small national organizations fi nd that 
web discussion forums made use of news information to discuss political 
events and to produce action alerts for interested online citizens to engage 
 locally and transnationally (Nagel and Staeheli  2010 ). Mass emailing lists 
allow these individuals to organize and to publicize their activities. 
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 Furthermore, the newly privatized pan-Arab media networks discussed earlier 
do not operate alone. Western media outlets such as CNN International and the 
BBC World Service are accessed by Western Arab diasporas, as well as transre-
gional Arab activists. BBC World News’ Arabic network was the oldest (launched 
in 1938) (el Issawi and Baumann  2010 ) and had the largest budget, broadcasting 
a 24-hour television channel duplicated online with a large quantity of interactive 
web content (Cheesman, Nohl, and BBC WS US Elections Study Group  2011 ). 
In the Arab diaspora located in the European Union, Arab news consumers com-
bine national television consumption with Arabic language television. Al Jazeera 
is the most watched network for diasporas originating from the Maghreb region 
(Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) located primarily in France, Spain, and the Neth-
erlands, and they have a more distinct news diet (Slade  2010 ). A more diverse 
range of Arab transplants located in Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom, 
on the other hand, consume a combination of BBC Arabic, Al Jazeera, CNN, and 
Al Arabiya; these individuals have particularly high levels of media literacy and 
critical evaluations of media content (Camauer  2010 ). 
 On the other hand, a closer examination of Arab citizens who consume 
Western international news services is also revealing: they are primarily 
 located in North Africa and the Middle East (61 percent of all non-Western 
audiences) (Andersson, Gillespie, and Mackay  2010 ). Th e top countries con-
suming BBC Arabic online information are Egypt, the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Germany, and Can-
ada. Th is audience is relatively young and technologically savvy 25- to 44-year-
olds with professional backgrounds and high levels of education. Of the 
frequently consumed international news content, one third of all news tends 
to be about the Middle East. Because mobile phones have reached relative 
ubiquity in developing Arab countries, many individuals reach international 
news content through mobile phones. 
 Citizen Journalism and User-Generated 
Content as Civic Engagement 
 It is important to reemphasize here that contemporary Arab media systems 
are both transnational and transregional. Th ey nurture digital diasporas that 
connect citizens of Arab countries who do not enjoy free and open political 
systems. Th e evolution of broadcast channels entering a post-broadcast era 
has also led to a boom in online journalism. Th is has introduced new avenues 
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for the creative consumption of international news content with new reper-
toires for political action. Sometimes these repertoires are strikingly vivid, 
but oft en they come in the form of semi-public online spaces for political dis-
cussion and learning about shared experiences and grievances. Th ese new 
developments are in important ways possible only due to the uniqueness of 
digital information: multimedia content that is interactive, immediate, and 
transportable. 
 Th e nature of digital news information means that dynamic political infor-
mation can be found immediately through offi  cial outlets (CNN, BBC, Al 
Jazeera online) as well as through online indexing and search services (Google, 
Yahoo, MSN). It means that this information can be transported and re- 
packaged by online information consumers to suit their needs, such as discus-
sion and mobilization. Important by-products of these possibilities come in 
the form of thriving news discussion forums and political blogs. Even in coun-
tries with strict digital censorship, such as Egypt and Tunisia, activists were 
able to organize  because they had been taking part in identifying and discuss-
ing shared grievances and nurturing tactics for political action. Free from the 
institutional constraints of news organizations, digital activists are free to 
reshape and repackage news information with their personalized interpreta-
tions and motivating messages for sympathetic audiences. 
 Long before the swelling of the Arab Spring, there were many Arab blog-
gers and digital activists shaping their tactics with the new international news 
information made available to them on the web. Dashti has documented the 
role of online journalism in the 2006 Kuwaiti electoral crisis: while the local 
press was not able to cover the electoral controversy eff ectively, Kuwaiti citi-
zens looked online (Dashti  2009 ). Because offl  ine political discussion could 
not take place publicly, the online public sphere fi lled with international news 
information and free discussion spaces served as the forum to fi nd and 
express citizen views. Th ese political discussions could have taken place with-
out international news information, but with it, Kuwaitis could fact-check 
and refute the offi  cial statements of political elites. In contrast to Kuwait’s 
moment of political crisis, Al-Saggaf ( 2006 ), looking at the Saudi-owned Al 
Arabiya online, found that Arab online citizens also fact-check news organi-
zations’ narratives by responding to articles and discussing issues, as well as 
expressing their opinions and att acking views by challenging them with evi-
dence found in competing news services. Online discussion spaces found in 
autonomous news forums or in news organizations’ interactive spaces, then, 
became a vital new semi-public sphere in the Arab world. Al Nashmi et al. 
 98  DEMOCRACY’S FOURTH WAVE?
( 2010 ), looking at Kuwaiti, Saudi, Egyptian, and Jordanian online forums, 
found that almost every news event in 2006 was heavily discussed and 
 debated by Arab internet users. 
 It is accurate to describe contemporary Arab media systems as both tran-
sregional and transnational. Th is mediascape is also composed of regional 
journalists who see themselves as Al Jazeera-type change agents, as well as 
non-Arab international news organizations such as CNN International and 
BBC Arabic. It includes citizen bloggers and online citizens who consume 
news information in an interactive and creative way. Since the Web2.0 boom 
beginning in 2006, this hybrid environment has led to a thriving ecology of 
transregional Arabic speaking and diverse international digital diasporas com-
posing the Arabic blogosphere. Th e network study of Arabic language blogs 
conducted by Etling et al. ( 2010 ) has identifi ed some signifi cant clusters. 
Many of the bloggers are located in the Middle East, but there is a signifi cant 
“bridge” of English-speaking bloggers that are expatriates from North Africa 
and the Middle East residing in Western countries. Th ey are political and ac-
tive consumers of online, international news information. In fact, 46 percent 
engaged with international news as well as other social and political issues. 
Th ey also share a high level of inter-linking, but not much external-linking; in 
other words, they are a cohesive and dynamic group of individuals with shared 
interests. Th ey frequently rely on online news from BBC, the  Guardian , CNN, 
Al Jazeera, the  New York Times , and other Arab and English news organiza-
tions. News-aggregating services are also popular, such as Google News. In 
contrast to previous concerns of an Arab street, Etling et al. concluded that 
this is ample evidence of a thriving, networked Arab public sphere: 
 It is a political discourse space apparently free of government control. 
It draws as heavily on peer-produced Web 2.0 resources such as You-
Tube and Wikipedia as on traditional mainstream media; however, it 
remains deeply enmeshed in the domestic, pan-Arab, and interna-
tional news media ecologies . . . . Mainstream news is cited alongside 
cell phone video shot in the street. Sometimes mainstream media 
events become the basis for “bott om-up” action, as in the case of the 
Saudi prince whose on-air criticism of sports announcers sparked 
mass online outrage. It is a space that members of these societies use 
to communicate about matt ers they understand to be of public con-
cern and that potentially require collective action or recognition. 
(2010, pp. 1240) 
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 Acting Together: Al Jazeera and Citizen Journalists 
during the Arab Spring 
 Despite the diverse and active digital mediascape made possible by the prolif-
eration of social media and broadcast media, it is Al Jazeera English (AJE) that 
played a signifi cant role in amplifying the distributed and diverse voices of the 
Arab Spring. Over the past several years, Al Jazeera English has grown rapidly 
in importance for mediating both transregional and international politics. 
Over the past several political crises, Al Jazeera English has also learned ac-
tively from past challenges and beta-tested strategies for covering dangerous 
areas. Combining both advantages during the Arab Spring, Al Jazeera was well 
equipped to navigate the region’s political and cultural complexities, feeding 
coverage about the Arab Spring to the rest of the world; it became the default 
go-to source on Arab Spring updates for many other organizations, including 
the  New York Times , the Huffi  ngton Post, Reuters, and Wired. 
 Since 2008, Al Jazeera English has laid the groundwork for a unique style of 
storytelling that presents compelling narratives, but also a mix of citizens’ 
voices with political elites. For example, during the 2008 Gaza War, Al Jazeera 
reporters lost contact with the network’s Doha headquarters. Instead of stop-
ping coverage, they turned to mobile phones until live feeds were restored, 
winning prestigious awards in the process, such as “Best 24 Hour News Pro-
gramme” at the 48th Monte Carlo Television Festival, and AdBuster’s “Broad-
caster of the Year” in 2010. Th eir Gaza coverage won them references such as 
“the BBC of the [global] South.” During the Arab Spring, Secretary of State 
Clinton applauded Al Jazeera English for outcompeting US news media in of-
fering “real news.” While prestigious Western news outlets such as CNN and 
MSNBC turned to American political commentators for updates about the 
Arab Spring, Al Jazeera English was securing interviews with Egyptian oppo-
sition party leaders and covering minute-by-minute updates through live feeds 
even in the most contentious and dangerous locations. Reaching more than 
150 million households in more than 100 countries worldwide through televi-
sion, Al Jazeera English’s footprint also reaches the Arab digital diaspora, 
which was an essential ingredient for the digital activists both on the ground 
in places such as Tahrir Square and their counterparts mobilizing solidarity 
protests in Europe and North America. 
 Th ese trends were facilitated through AJE’s unique approach toward in-
corporating digital content and reaching online news consumers. Beyond 
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AJE’s existing regional advantage in North Africa and the Middle East, the 
network had a number of digital tools and digital strategies to deploy that 
others did not. As soon as the protests began in Tunisia and cascaded to mul-
tiple countries, AJE organized rapid updates and a large infl ux of news in its 
live blogs. Unlike other services waiting patiently to verify and double-check 
information, AJE did both: posting information as it came in onto the live 
blogs, then doing extended articles and in-focus stories on information that 
was double-checked and verifi ed. With this combination of rapid reporting 
and in-depth coverage, a diverse set of viewers’ needs was addressed. First, 
online and offl  ine activists were able to coordinate with a quick under-
standing of successes, failures, and dangers experienced by others like them 
in neighboring countries. Second, the 150 million households in 100 coun-
tries could learn about a rapidly escalating and complex cascade through 
AJE’s deep coverage. 
 Another important innovation AJE off ered its online viewers was its re-
markably open and forward-looking approach toward user-generated con-
tent. It is true that AJE journalists have risked their lives to cover dangerous 
locations. But sometimes the dangers are too high for reporters to cover 
events eff ectively. As a route-around during the 2009 Gaza War, Al Jazeera 
Labs began testing an online citizen journalism application based on the 
award winning Ushahidi platform, giving citizen journalists on the ground 
in Gaza a way to document casualties. Between late December 2008 and 
late January 2009 this platform documented daily casualties, which peaked 
during the war with more than 40 user-submitt ed and documented reports. 
Th e meta-data from these reports were used to generate maps of the confl ict 
and seed real stories then explored and expanded upon by professional 
journalists. 
 AJE also accepted contributions through its YourMedia page, where any 
citizen could submit stories for coverage and att ach raw content giving AJE a 
Creative Commons License use for rebroadcast in their coverage. Th e Crea-
tive Commons Repository was deployed by AJE during the Gaza War and fed 
mostly through direct submission by citizens and activists working on the 
ground. With this repository, AJE encouraged its online supporters with the 
message that their “videos will be downloaded, shared, remixed, subtitled, 
and eventually rebroadcasted by users and TV stations across the world” 
(Andrews  2009 ). 
 Riyaad Minty, head of Social Media and AJE Labs, cites that much of 
the Creative Commons and user-submitted content was redeployed at 
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Wikipedia by film makers, for remixing music videos; by artists; in video 
games; for teaching; and by activists and indie media. The recently 
launched television show “The Stream” is also an important innovation—
both a social media community and a daily television program; the crea-
tors tap into user-generated content to seek out unheard voices, find new 
perspectives, and amplify less-covered communities’ perspectives both 
online and through its television show. The founder of the Creative Com-
mons license, Lawrence Lessig, praised AJE’s bold approach toward user-
generated content, stating, “Al Jazeera is teaching an important lesson 
about how free speech gets built and supported. By providing a free 
resource for the world, the network is encouraging wider debate and a 
richer understanding” (Al Jazeera English  2009 ). 
 Al Jazeera English reaches its largest numbers of followers through its satel-
lite shows and television viewership. But in important ways, most viewers fi nd 
its content online. In countries where AJE was not available on television 
(such as the United States and parts of Europe), AJE eff ectively bypassed the 
telecommunications ban by streaming live content online. In February 2011, 
Al Jazeera live streamed 24-hour coverage of the Egypt protests through 
Google TV and its YouTube channel, driving a 2,500 percent increase in traffi  c 
to its home website (Lee  2011 ). Th e majority of the traffi  c came from the US 
viewers, whose opinions have a weight in foreign policy toward the Middle 
East. Another steady, live source of AJE coverage was through its main Twitt er 
channel and as well as Al Jazeera journalists’ individual Twitt er channels. For 
example, during the riots leading up to the Tunisian revolution, journalist Yas-
mine Ryan’s Twitt er page became a critical source for organizing and sharing 
rapid updates about the protests. 
 Al Jazeera English and other news organizations established since the in-
ception of digital media are more limber in their newswork and more suc-
cessful in adapting to digital environments saturated with user-generated 
content than other, traditional media organizations. Al Jazeera English was 
open to incorporating inspiring examples of citizen journalism, innovative in 
promoting the use of Creative Commons Licensing, and successful in extract-
ing critical updates from within dangerous regions such as Gaza with creative 
digital tools. Both new media journalism and young citizen journalists did a 
lot of work to bring youth activists together, resulting in the unifi cation of 
these kinds of movements while older, traditional political parties were frag-
menting and older news organizations were struggling to adapt to a new polit-
ical information environment. 
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 Conclusion: Digitizing the News about 
the Arab Spring 
 As an event, the Arab Spring had two primary consequences for the political 
economy of journalism in the Arab world. First, citizens demonstrated, using 
social media, that they could make news in creative ways using digital tools 
and their social networks. Second, Al Jazeera’s position in the region as a cred-
ible, responsible, and responsive news organization was solidifi ed. News about 
the Arab Spring came from social media and cell-phone videos uploaded on 
Facebook, Twitt er, Flickr, YouTube, and other sites, but they were eff ective 
because pan-Arab satellite networks such as AJE rebroadcast them with am-
plifying eff ects that mobilized and enraged regional and international publics. 
 Indeed, studies of Arab journalists fi nd them favoring regional coverage 
and explicitly pushing for social change (Pintak and Ginges  2008 ). In a 2008 
survey of Arab journalists, 75 percent identifi ed “encouraging political reform” 
as the most signifi cant job of a journalist, followed by human rights, with 32 
percent believing that a lack of political change was the greatest threat facing 
the Arab world, not foreign threats, such as US policies. It is telling, then, that 
Al Jazeera’s vision includes a mission “to support the right of the individual to 
acquire information and strengthen the values of tolerance, democracy and 
the respect of liberties and human rights.” Perhaps more signifi cantly, the 
growing cohort of Arab journalists also self-identify more with the Muslim 
world (35 percent) than the Arab region (25 percent) and least with their 
home country (15 percent) (Pintak  2009 ), and they “represent a fusing of 
Muslim and Arab worldviews that is leading the body politic in directions that 
reinforce a sense of shared consciousness.” 
 One important consequence of this new socialization of journalists is their 
signifi cant role as cultural intermediaries (Mellor  2008 ) for Arab publics: 
from messengers of the state to rebels guiding social change. Indeed, the 
growth of pan-Arab television has also been credited with the growth of trans-
national political identifi cation (Nisbet and Myers  2010 ). But beyond satellite 
television, social media had a role in supporting a particular kind of identity 
formation among the young men and women who eventually led the upris-
ings. Even in countries with relatively few social media users, such as Libya, 
analysis of Facebook content noted signifi cant identity markers of collec-
tivism, pan-Arab and national pride, but fairly few markers of Islamic affi  rma-
tion in the cause (Carr et al.  2011 ). 
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 Conclusion: Digital Media and the 
Rhythms of Social Change 
 By 2012, Egypt and Tunisia had run elections and were draft ing fresh consti-
tutions, there were new Parliaments and Cabinets in Morocco and Jordan, 
with signifi cant commitments to extend franchise. Traditional political actors 
had been drawn into the movement for popular democracy. Even in constitu-
tional monarchies where ruling families remained in control, a greatly ex-
panded welfare state was the cost of the stability. Several countries are now 
governed by transitional governments with imperfect constitutions and pred-
atory militaries. It will be years before we can judge the democratic practices 
of the new governments. But even in countries where Islamism is on the rise, 
the most viable Islamist leaders are competing in elections and advocating 
 diff erent brands of Islamic constitutionalism. 
 In this chapter, we build on the multi-stage framework for political change 
observed during the early aft ermath of the Arab Spring (Howard and Hussain 
 2011 ) to understand the contextual variables that were in play before it oc-
curred. Th e most successful cases of sustained and peaceful protest, followed 
by institutional regime change, were Tunisia and Egypt. Both cases exempli-
fi ed certain phases: a preparation phase, involving activists’ use of digital 
media across time to build solidarity networks and identify collective iden-
tities and goals; an ignition phase involving symbolically powerful moments 
that ruling elites and regimes intentionally or lazily ignored but that served to 
galvanize the public; a protest phase, where, by employing offl  ine networks 
and digital technologies, small groups strategically organized in large numbers; 
an international buy-in phase, where digital media networks extended the 
range of local coverage to international broadcast networks; a climax phase 
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where the regime maneuvered strategically or carelessly to appease public dis-
content through welfare packages or harsh repressive actions; and fi nally, a 
follow-on information warfare phase where various actors, state based and 
from international civic advocacy networks, compete to shape the future of 
civil society and information infrastructure that made it possible. But this nar-
rative of political change, though generalizable to many Arab Spring cases, 
does not account for some important variables that were in play or for cases 
where regimes benefi ted or did not experience any noticeable liberalization. 
Weighing multiple political, economic, and cultural conditions, we argue that 
information infrastructure—especially mobile phone use—consistently ap-
pears as one of the key ingredients in parsimonious models behind regime 
fragility and social movement success. Internet use is relevant in some solu-
tion sets, but by causal logic it is actually the absence of internet use that 
explains low levels of success. 
 Looking at these important steps toward the fi rst successful large-scale 
movements for political and economic reform in the Arab world, it is clear that 
the batt le over the use and applicability of information infrastructure became 
a repeated tool and location for political contention. Th ough it is tempting to 
follow this chronology of phases and begin anticipating what is next to come, 
it is important to recognize that successful uses of digital media across many 
cases of the Arab world were potentially counterbalanced by important in-
stances where digital media, even when available, may not have been very 
useful. For example, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar boast some of the 
highest levels of connectivity and e-government development in the Arab 
world, but these countries experienced hardly any successful offl  ine mobiliza-
tion. Additionally, as in Saudi Arabia (and Iran), some regimes were very mas-
terful in designing information censorship and management protocols nearing 
the sophistication shown by China. 
 In prior observations during the lead up to the Arab Spring movements, we 
have also observed four key criteria that were being supported by the diff usion 
of mobile phones and digital media (Hussain and Howard  2012 ): an increase 
in the production and consumption of international news ( Chapter  1 ); wide-
spread diff usion and use of social networking tools ( Chapter  2 ); the entrench-
ment of online civil society; and growing access to include a greater number 
of political publics, including women and minority ethnic communities 
( Chapter  3 ). As evidenced during the Arab Spring, Al Jazeera English, the 
BBC, and related international news organizations have paved inroads across 
Arab countries and delivered political information and news countering the 
Conclus ion   105 
state-managed broadcast networks ( Chapter  5 ). Authoritarian regimes that 
were used to playing closed internal games related to the narratives of corrupt 
election practices and inability to provide necessary welfare to their citizens 
are no longer able to do so ( Chapter  4 ). 
 Furthermore, when periods of political upheaval present themselves, 
these international news organizations play an important function in 
spreading the news to sympathetic political diasporas abroad and some-
times encouraging foreign governments to intervene, as in the case of Libya 
and, less successfully, Syria. This international networking of citizens is 
amplified by broadcast networks and the successful connectivity made 
possible by the diffusion of social media tools, like Facebook, YouTube, 
and Twitter, and it includes average citizens in the shaping and flow of 
political information. Indeed, citizen journalism videos and blogs were 
important vehicles for spreading news about self-immolations in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria. More formally organized networks of cit-
izens and civic organizations have also led to the entrenchment of civil so-
ciety, albeit in some cases, mostly online. These civil society groups, like 
the April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt, and banned but preeminent polit-
ical parties, like the Muslim Brotherhood, have all successfully used infor-
mation infrastructure to do political organizing and capacity building  over 
time , not simply during the phase of street protests. The April 6 Youth 
Movement has been active since at least 2008, and the Muslim Brother-
hood has built a massive online blogging and news production ecology 
outweighing any other Egyptian party or movement. Last, and especially 
in the case of women in the Middle East, many, including but not limited 
to, feminist movements, have expanded the range of political inclusion 
from suffrage rights to driving, particularly in Saudi Arabia—and they have 
done so through online advocacy movements and awareness campaigns. 
Media have been particularly important to “pink hijabis,” who integrate 
their faith with the pursuit of women’s rights by circulating films about 
female genital mutilation to friends and family, organizing workshops 
about technology strategies, and learning about successful digital strategies 
from like-minded groups in other countries (Wright  2011 ). This short list 
of key changes in the social makeup of societies in closed authoritarian 
regimes is evidence of locations where state and society relations have 
been forever altered (Migdal, Kohli, and Shue  1994 ). One of the key ingre-
dients facilitating them has been the  long-term diffusion and use of digital 
media (Howard  2010 ). 
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 Fuzzy Logic 
 In the analytical discourse so far, there are two ways of describing the causes 
and consequences of the Arab Spring. Th e fi rst analytical frame is to identify 
the things that make a country susceptible to protests, or fragile when faced 
with a popular uprising. Th e second is to identify the things that might explain 
a successful uprising. Rather than looking for simple or singular causal expla-
nations for what made a country susceptible to popular uprisings or what 
allowed a popular uprising to achieve its goals, we should observe that there 
are complex causal patt erns, or even several “causal recipes” that would pro-
vide analytical purchase over several sets of cases. Moreover, knowing what we 
now know about social movements and regime change, it makes most sense 
to look for “conjoined causal conditions,” the set of multiple indicators that 
together provide a fulfi lling narrative for understanding political outcomes. 
 Th ere have been numerous single-country case studies in which ICTs have 
been part of the contemporary narrative of both democratic entrenchment 
and persistent authoritarianism. Th e comparative perspective taken in our in-
vestigation is not limited to the standard cases or even to situations that stand 
out as incidents of technology-driven, enhanced, or enabled regime change. 
Instead our comparative perspective embraces situations in which informa-
tion technologies had litt le to no role in democratic promotion, those in 
which information technologies were carefully used by authoritarian elites to 
become bett er bullies, and situations in which information technologies 
played a critical role in sudden democratic transitions. Th us, the comparative 
approach is anathema to those who would generalize from singular studies in 
which information technologies had a central role in a grand democratization 
project and those who would generalize by only relying on statistical models 
of international data on government eff ectiveness in terms of internet pene-
tration. 
 Methodologically, the comparative approach is powerful and productive 
in that it confronts theory with data. Sometimes this approach is called “set- 
theoretic” in that att ention is given to consistent similarities or diff erences 
across a set of cases, especially the causally relevant commonalities uniformly 
present in a given set of cases (Byrne and Ragin  2009 ). Th e set of cases at hand 
is the population of Arab countries with large Muslim communities, and there 
are at least 22 of these. Th e argument of our investigation is that in recent 
years, information technologies have opened up new paths to democratiza-
tion and the entrenchment of civil society in many Arab countries. 
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 Large-N quantitative researchers oft en turn “democratization” into an indi-
cator for which the Western democracies are the standard. In our set-theoretic 
approach, we assume that democratization among these 22 countries is best 
calibrated according to more grounded standards, set by countries such as 
Lebanon at the high end, and Saudi Arabia at the low end. Th is calibration 
does not preclude the theoretical possibility of an Islamic democratic ideal 
type. So a grounded approach does assume that healthy, functional Muslim 
democracies may not look like Western democracies. Set-theoretic reasoning 
allows for fi ne gradations in the degree of membership in the set of successful 
democratic outcomes, and it requires evidence about each country’s degree of 
membership in the set of countries that have experienced democratic transi-
tion or entrenchment during or since the Arab Spring. 
 Moreover, a set-theoretic explanation of the role of ICTs in contemporary 
democratization requires that we identify a consistent set of causal relations 
between technology diff usion and political liberalization outcomes. To con-
struct this explanation requires fuzzy set logic, which does not explain varia-
tion in a sample through reductive correlational statistics. Instead, fuzzy set 
logic produces general knowledge about the role of information technology in 
contemporary democratic transitions through the accumulated experience of 
particular countries where rapid technology diff usion among political actors 
such as the state, parties, journalists, and civic groups has an observed impact 
on the domestic balance of power, the opportunity structure for social mobi-
lization, or the “cognitive liberation” of citizenry. 
 Fuzzy set logic off ers general knowledge through the strategy of looking for 
shared causal conditions across multiple instances of the same outcome—
sometimes called “selecting on the dependent variable.” For large-N, quantita-
tive, and variable oriented researchers, this strategy is unacceptable because 
neither the outcome nor the shared causal conditions vary across the cases 
(King, Keohane, and Verba  1994 ). However, the strategy of selecting on the 
dependent variable is useful if researchers are interested in studying necessary 
conditions (Ragin  1987 ). Perhaps most important, this strategy is most useful 
when developing theory grounded in the observed, real-world experience of 
democratization in the Arab-Muslim communities of the developing world 
rather than deploying theory privileging null, hypothetical, and unobserved 
cases. 
 Th e qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence reviewed thus far lends 
itself to a set-theoretic argument, because the evidence reveals that many of 
the countries experiencing protests have high levels of ICT diff usion, and 
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almost all experienced signifi cant changes in their political systems and/or 
economic welfare policies. Our claim is based on the parsimoniously summa-
rized relations between properties and cases rather than modest correlations 
between technology diff usion and democratization. Examining cases with the 
same causal conditions to see if they also share the democratization outcome 
is appropriate for identifying suffi  cient conditions, and suffi  cient conditions 
oft en appear as combinations of conditions. Identifying the causal conditions 
shared by cases that have democratized is appropriate for identifying the 
necessary conditions of democratization. In other words, if information tech-
nologies and infrastructure are a suffi  cient cause of democratization, then the 
presence of information technologies implies the presence of democratiza-
tion (though democratization does not imply the presence of information 
technologies). 
 On the other hand, if a sophisticated information management and censor-
ship infrastructure is a necessary cause of no political change, then the pres-
ence of no democratic outcome implies the presence of a strong censorship 
regime. It is possible that there are several recipes for contemporary democra-
tization, and many possible ingredients and combinations of ingredients. One 
way to assemble the accumulated country experience is by comparing the 
recent histories of countries that share the common outcome of a signifi cant 
period of democratic transition or entrenchment, such as in the Arab Spring. 
Analyzing the relationships in this set-theoretic manner exposes the key ingre-
dients for democratization. Moreover, treating the institutional outcomes as 
fuzzy-sets avoids selecting cases based on the outcome because countries will 
actually vary in their degree of membership in the set displaying democratic 
transition or entrenchment. Set theory allows us to examine cases with the 
same causal conditions to see if they also share the same outcome. More 
important, if we assume that there is not just one recipe for contemporary 
democratization, but several, we can use fuzzy set analysis to identify combi-
nations of causal conditions that share the same outcome. 
 Fuzzy Variables 
 Several contextual factors may have exacerbated or mitigated the causal role of 
particular aspects of technology diff usion, and reducing the set of causal att rib-
utes to a few important ones must also respect the signifi cant diversity among 
these countries. Th e cases involved in the Arab Spring diff er in important ways, 
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yet there may still be causal patt erns and shared att ributes that explain mem-
bership in the set of countries that have or have not democratized. Along with 
the impact of technology diff usion on the system of political communication 
involving states, journalists, political parties, civil society groups, and cultural 
elites, additional contextual conditions should also be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis, and they vary widely across the region. 
 Average incomes vary among countries and are measured as GDP per 
capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity), a measure that accounts for the 
large diversity in the access to wealth by citizens. Among other things, this in-
dicator is useful for contextualizing the relative cost of living and infl ation rates 
in countries rather than distorting the real diff erences in income by countries. 
Th e high end of this scale includes rich countries like Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, 
and Bahrain (average range of $20,000–$70,000); the low end includes coun-
tries like Djibouti, Mauritania, Iraq, and Somalia (average range of $200–
$1,000). Equitable distribution of wealth is also a key indicator oft en measured 
as Gini coeffi  cients for income distribution. Th is measure accounts for the 
wide range of access to wealth by diff ering members of Arab societies. Th e 
distribution of wealth in many Arab countries is relatively unequal—the upper 
half of more equally distributed wealth in societies includes cases like Leba-
non and Qatar, and the lower half of  un equally distributed wealth includes 
extreme cases like the UAE and Egypt. Many commentators have noted that 
access to jobs may have been a primary source of existing discontent in many 
countries, particularly Tunisia (14 percent) and Yemen (15 percent), but cases 
on the lower end, including Saudi Arabia (5 percent) and Kuwait (1 percent) 
also experienced political discontent and protests. Levels of unemployment 
are useful to include because whether levels of unemployment were a central 
factor in nurturing support for political and economic change must be exam-
ined comparatively in the recipes for democratic political change. 
 Beyond economic inequality, general population measures are important 
for understanding the macro social contexts of Arab societies undergoing 
profound political and social change: the total population, the proportion of 
urban population of societies (where most digital connectivity is located), 
and the proportion of those societies that is under the age of 25 (a demo-
graphic oft en cited as most politically disenfranchised and enraged). Qatar 
and Kuwait are the most urbanized (96–98 percent) and are counterbal-
anced by Yemen and Somalia (32–38 percent). Yemen and Somalia also have 
the largest proportion of young citizens (45 percent), while Qatar and 
Kuwait have the smallest (16–23 percent). When considering the total mass 
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of citizenry, Qatar and Kuwait are well below 10 million, and both Yemen 
and Somalia are well over. Understanding the dynamic relationships between 
the total population and critical proportions of young disenfranchised citi-
zens residing in connected urban hubs will provide important context for 
unpacking the recipes for political change. 
 Additionally, one of the most consistent variables predicting a regime’s ca-
pacity to hold out from making a meaningful political transition has been the 
amount of natural resources it can utilize to buff er its security apparatuses or 
quell discontent over distributions of wealth. In the Arab Middle East, many 
countries, particularly those in the Gulf Cooperation Council, export vast 
volumes of crude oil and enjoy a signifi cant backing from the international 
system whose foreign policy interests prioritize regional stability over the un-
predictable democratic transition of ailing authoritarians. To account for this 
signifi cant variable, we included countries’ levels of oil production and shares 
in the global oil resources available. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait 
ranked highest. 
 Digital connectivity and access to information infrastructure are the cen-
tral variables being investigated in relation to other variables. Here, we observe 
digital connectivity through the diff usion of mobile and internet telephony. 
Interestingly, more than half of Arab countries have mobile penetration well 
over 100 percent. Th ese countries include Tunisia (106 percent), Bahrain 
(124 percent), and Saudi Arabia (188 percent). Th e other half are below 100 
percent and include Egypt (87 percent), Syria (68 percent), and Yemen (46 
percent). Patt erns of internet diff usion share similar properties, but are some-
what lower than mobile penetration. Countries with 25 percent or more inter-
net access include Saudi Arabia (27 percent), Tunisia (34 percent), and 
Bahrain (54 percent). Countries with 25 percent or less internet access include 
Libya (5 percent), Yemen (10 percent), and Egypt (15 percent). To counter-
balance digital access and shared connectivity, many regimes in the Arab 
world have instituted censorship mechanisms that range widely in levels of 
sophistication. As noted earlier, a few countries have very sophisticated mon-
itoring and management systems, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the 
UAE. On the other hand, some regimes, including Algeria, Egypt, and Libya, 
were either sloppy or unable to monitor activity. To examine these cases com-
paratively we created an index combining the OpenNet Initiative’s monitoring 
of countries that had instituted  no fi ltering , or a range of  selective ,  substantial , 
and  pervasive fi ltering on content for  political ,  social ,  security reasons or used 
 automated tools to do so. Our index combines these multiple dimensions of 
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censorship and sophistication in fi ltering to assess the overall censorship 
regime’s capacity for managing new information infrastructure. 
 Last, because our key research questions deal with the contextual factors 
and variables at play during the Arab Spring, many of our predictive variables 
listed above come from the latest data points available at or just before the 
protest periods. However, our overall objective in this investigation was to 
identify causal recipes that best predict the widest range of democracy pro-
moting outcomes from the Arab Spring. Th erefore, our outcome variable 
measures countries on a scale from ideal cases of peaceful democratic regime 
change (Egypt and Tunisia), followed by major political and economic con-
cessions (Oman and Saudi Arabia), followed by major political concessions 
only (Kuwait and Jordan), followed by economic concessions only (Lebanon 
and Bahrain), and last, countries that reached bloody civil wars and/or violent 
stalemates with ruling elites (Libya and Syria). Th e fuzzy ranks for this vari-
able took into account the detailed qualitative information for each case, in-
cluding the longevity of protest, numbers of killed and injured citizens, types 
of meaningful political concessions, and levels of economic redistributions of 
wealth. Th e outcome variables were created from the data presented in  Tables 
 I.1 and  I.2 . 
 In each case and variable, the data used came from 2011 or the best avail-
able year (2005 to 2010). When the data taken from large datasets were 
incomplete, supplementary data from secondary sources were sought and 
double checked with cooperating sources. Patching these gaps by hand signif-
icantly reduced the number of missing cases and provided for a more robust 
and meaningful fuzzy ranking system. Preparing data for treatment as a fuzzy 
set required several steps. First, we computed indices for causal att ributes ana-
lyzed in each chapter and then we computed the indices for additional context 
variables oft en recommended by the literature on democratization in the de-
veloping world and the latest scholarly and policy reports since the Arab 
Spring. Th en we calibrated the indices, a process that evens out the distribution 
of cases between the thresholds for full inclusion in each set, full exclusion 
from the set, and the crossover point at which cases go from being partially in 
the set to being partially out of the set. 
 For example, among the 22 countries there are a few very populated coun-
tries and many countries with a small population. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are 
at the top of this set, and obviously help defi ne the category of “populated 
country.” In fact, Egypt has such a large population that if the set were left  
uncalibrated, Tunisia and Syria would be barely in the set, and most of the 
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countries would be fully out of the set. Yet the important att ribute is that some 
countries are comparatively more populated than others, so calibration makes 
the diff erences between the populous countries more comparable to those 
between smaller countries. Th e very populated countries still defi ne the set by 
being almost full members, while the rest of the cases get indexed by their 
degrees of membership in the set. In this case, the threshold value for full 
membership in the set of populated countries is established just below the 
actual population of Iraq. At the lowest points in the curve are countries such 
as Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, and these are defi nitely not very populated 
countries. So the threshold for full exclusion is set at 3 million people because 
these countries have even smaller populations than that. Th e crossover thresh-
old has been set at 10 million people, which roughly splits countries into two 
groups. Since Somalia and Tunisia have barely 10 million citizens, these two 
countries are just barely in the category of “populated country.” 
 Th e recalibration around these thresholds allows for fuzzy set values that 
more meaningfully reveal the degree to which each country can be included in 
the theoretical set of populated countries. As another example, for member-
ship in the category of countries with a strong censorship regime, the thresh-
old for full membership is defi ned as regimes that pervasively or substantially 
fi lter at least two categories measured by the Open Net Initiative (political, 
social, security, or tools). Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE all fall comfort-
ably into full inclusion into this category. Countries that had a very unsophis-
ticated political information management regime had no functional ability to 
monitor and fi lter online content. Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon all fall com-
fortably into the fully excluded category. Syria, Kuwait, and Oman are barely 
included because they do all, some, or no fi ltering, and none was robust 
enough to “pervasively” or “substantially” fi lter on two or more of the four 
fi ltering categories. 
 In addition, fuzzy calibrations allow researchers to put comparative knowl-
edge to work to complete incomplete datasets. In this study, there were four 
hand calibrations. Th ere were no censorship scores for Djibouti, Mauritania, 
and Somalia, but secondary sources suggest that the level of censorship in Dji-
bouti was much like that of Kuwait, that the level of censorship in Mauritania 
was higher than Lebanon’s but not as a high as Jordan’s, and that the level of 
censorship in Somalia was almost as high as that in Saudi Arabia. Th e fi nal hand 
calibration involved designating a Polity score for Somalia. Polity IV identifi es 
Somalia as a failed state in 2010. Th is case is not likely to teach us much about 
a theoretical relationship between political institutions, technology diff usion, 
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and popular movements for democracy, so it was given a fuzzy score of 0.50. 
Th is is a special score designating a case that is neither in nor out of the theoret-
ical set of democracies. A score of 0.51 would mean that a country is very 
slightly in the theoretical set of democracies, and a score of 0.49 would mean 
that a country is just out of such a set. But the transition score signals that if this 
variable is important, Somalia is not a good instance. 1 
 Fuzzy Recipes for Fragility and Success 
 Table  C.1 presents two of the parsimonious models with the best balance of 
case coverage and solution consistency. Certainly, there are more complex for-
mulations of conditions that would also explain the susceptibility of a regime 
to a popular uprising, or the chances such an uprising would be successful. 
Moreover, each case could be described with a unique combination of causal 
factors. Th e combinations reported here are not the only plausible ones, but 
they do cover the widest spectrum of Arab experience around the developing 
world, and the cases are largely consistent with causal conditions for demo-
cratic outcomes. Coverage refers to the percentage of cases explained by that 
recipe. 
 Consistency refers to the degree to which cases adhere to a particular 
causal recipe. As in many statistical procedures, the research proceeds by ex-
amining a variety of models. In testing out all of the plausible causal variables, 
urbanization and youth unemployment rarely appeared in parsimonious ex-
planations. Th ese variables were dropped in the analysis of regime fragility. 
Having high levels of income but poor internet diff usion and low Gini scores 
made regimes vulnerable to public demonstrations, and Libya, Algeria, and 
Saudi Arabia are the best examples of how this causal combination resulted in 
regime sensitivity. A second parsimonious explanation is that regimes with 
high levels of unemployment, signifi cant mobile phone use, and low levels of 
internet censorship also made regimes sensitive—Libya and Oman are the 
best instances of this causal relationship. 
 Whereas there were multiple conjoined causal recipes for regime fragility, 
and the two with highest levels of consistency were presented in  Table  C.2 , 
there was a relatively short and complete parsimonious solution for the 
analysis of social movement success. Th is analysis, presented in  Table  C.2 , 
yielded three causal recipes, which altogether covered two thirds of the cases 
with four fi ft hs consistency. Here mobile phones, not internet use, appeared 
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in several solution sets, and Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco were the best in-
stances of the conjoined causal relationships. Altogether, these three parsi-
monious recipes form a solution set with good coverage (0.64) and good 
consistency (0.79). 
 The Causes of Democracy’s Fourth Wave 
 What has happened online over the past several months, and what tools and 
technological structures facilitated the initial ignition of mass protest? What 
long-term preludes in information society development were necessary for 
this to happen? Are digital media simply a new “tool” for social protest, or does 
more need to be said about the modern character of social protest, the con-
temporary organizational form of civic unrest, or the changing opportunity 
 Table C.1  Two Parsimonious Models Explaining Regime Fragility 
 Variables 
Included 
 Causal 
Recipe 
 Raw 
 Coverage 
 Unique 
Coverage 
 Consistency  Best 
 Instances 
 Average 
income, 
unemployment 
rate, internet 
and mobile 
phone penetra-
tion rates, levels 
of censorship, 
size of the 
youth bulge, 
wealth 
distribution, 
economic 
dependence on 
fuel exports, 
regime type in 
2010 
 Relatively 
high average 
levels of 
income, where 
the wealth is 
evenly 
distributed, 
and internet 
use is very low 
 0.44  0.00  0.97  Libya 
(0.58,0.95), 
Algeria 
(0.58,0.53), 
Saudi 
(0.53,0.63) 
 Relatively high 
levels of 
unemployment, 
with many 
mobile phone 
users and not 
much regime 
censorship 
 0.50  0.00  0.98  Libya 
(0.81,0.95), 
Oman 
(0.58,0.74) 
 Note : Th e consistency cutoff  for the fi rst causal recipe was set at 1.00, and the cutoff  for the 
second recipe was set at 0.96. 
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structure for public dissent? How or to what extent were regimes ready or not 
ready to deal with unexpected periods of galvanized discontent? Did regime 
sophistication in managing information infrastructure translate meaningfully 
to limiting the capacity of civil society to operate and organize? 
 To answer these questions, we have examined the narrative arc of how dig-
ital media changed the tactics for democratization movements  during the Arab 
Spring, and how new information and communication technologies played a 
major role in the organization of street protests. First, many of the countries 
that experienced long and sustained movements of protest had preexisting po-
litical publics that had long been wired and developed tech-savvy civil society 
groups based both within the region and across borders. In these moments of 
 Table C.2  Parsimonious Causal Solution Explaining Social Movement 
Success 
 Variables 
Included 
 Causal Recipe  Raw 
Coverage 
 Unique 
Coverage 
 Consistency  Best 
 Instances 
 Average income, 
general and 
youth unem-
ployment rate, 
internet and 
mobile phone 
penetration 
rates, levels of 
censorship, 
urbanization, 
size of the youth 
bulge, wealth 
distribution, 
economic 
dependence on 
fuel exports, 
regime type in 
2010 
 Relatively high 
rates of mobile 
phone use in 
countries not 
dependent on 
fuel exports 
 0.53  0.08  0.83  Jordan 
(0.63,0.58), 
Tunisia 
(0.58,0.95), 
Morocco 
(0.53,0.58) 
 Relatively high 
rates of mobile 
phone use in 
countries with 
lower urbaniza-
tion rates 
 0.52  0.02  0.88  Jordan 
(0.63,0.58), 
Morocco 
(0.53,0.58) 
 Relatively low 
rates of unem-
ployment, in 
countries with 
lower urbaniza-
tion rates and 
wealth is more 
concentrated 
 0.44  0.03  0.86  Morocco 
(0.63,0.58), 
Jordan 
(0.53,0.58) 
 Note : Th e consistency cutoff  for the solution set was 1.00. 
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political crisis, multinational technology fi rms also played a critical role, where 
some were constructive in providing activists the tools to create action oppor-
tunities. Others, when pressured by dictators and authoritarian regimes, 
sometimes played into the hands of political suppression. It is diffi  cult to say 
whether the revolutions would or would not have happened without digital 
media. Indeed, other sociological factors, such as widespread poverty and 
governmental ineptitude, had created the conditions for extensive public 
anger. However, the networks of people who did mobilize did so with the 
direct application, initiation, and coordination of digital media tools. Coun-
terfactual scenarios are important, but the overwhelming evidence of what 
did happen concretely illustrates that the patt erns of political change in these 
protests were digitally enabled, both in the short term, but also over time since 
the early 2000s. 
 For scholars of social movements and collective action, there are several 
things in these examples that should be considered more centrally: the distrib-
uted leadership of protest organizers, the core groups of elite publics (literate, 
middle-class, youth, women, and technocrats) that were relatively quick in 
joining them, and the important role that international news organizations 
played in giving them the critical voice and global exposure that helped stave off  
overtly violent reactions from their repressive regimes. We can say more than 
that the internet changed the way political actors communicated—social move-
ments and collective action networks shared strategies for direct political action, 
created regional and international news events that drew att ention and sympa-
thy from neighboring countries, and inspired others to join and celebrate their 
causes. One of the key reasons we must turn our att ention to the role of informa-
tion technology is that citizens themselves have expressed and celebrated its role 
and now consider access to digital media a core nation-building resource. 
 Subsequently, we must also consider the years leading up to the Arab 
Spring and the diff usion of digital media, in the form of mobile phones, per-
sonal computers, and soft ware applications over time. Th ese technologies and 
their applications have signifi cantly impacted the political communication 
systems and their relationships to civil society organizations. First, mobile te-
lephony, in the form of small and aff ordable consumer-based communication 
devices, have allowed regular citizens to bear witness, record, and disseminate 
acts of injustice and repression by their ruling elites and their security agencies. 
 In important ways, authoritarian regimes holding phony elections also 
gained widespread infamy, particularly in the Egyptian elections of 2005, 
when Mubarak’s party won 89 percent of the vote. Mobile videos uploaded to 
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YouTube and other video sharing cites disseminated actual footage of vote 
counting and rigging. Second, over the last fi ve years, Al Jazeera became a 
functionally independent  regional news organization, and with the addition of 
the English-language network in 2006, an international powerhouse that illu-
minated the accusations, criticisms, and failures of autocrats. Th ird, wide-
spread internet access, though limited to middle-class urban-dwellers, off ered 
everyday citizens the opportunity to synthesize social networks with broad-
cast networks to communicate and engage with political issues. Together, 
these long-term trends mean that information infrastructure helped decen-
tralize state power, especially regimes that were not quick enough to adapt 
their management strategies to regulate these new political information 
spaces. 
 We have also argued that digital media were very important during the 
short-term cascade of street protests across the region. For example, we know 
that online conversations spiked  before major events on the ground in both 
cases, as well as many others, across many of the Arab Spring cases. Th is was 
possible because social media provided the structural antecedents for demo-
cratic ideas to spread across borders, through informal networks of families, 
friends, and interested onlookers. Th e intensity of political conversations that 
took place preceding major street protests supports the idea that virtual net-
works materialized before street protest networks. For example, detailed maps 
and guides were widely available before protests began and provided would-
be participants with strategies and nonviolent goals to sustain periods of 
 dissent that disabled authoritarian regimes’ past coercion and suppression 
techniques. Indeed, Facebook pages and Twitt er conversations were essential 
for designing and trying out new strategies as events took place on the ground. 
Political blogospheres, many based nationally but others also based more re-
gionally, brought together political diaspora communities from France, the 
United Kingdom, and other Western democratic countries (Etling et al. 
 2010 ). Th e ability to produce and consume political content was important 
because it created a sense of shared grievances and strong political effi  cacy 
that had not led to such sizable, diverse, and quick mobilization before the 
Arab Spring. 
 Despite the ample evidence illustrating the role of digital media in the Arab 
Spring, it would be a mistake to suggest the democratic potential of informa-
tion technologies without considering the important roles that regimes play in 
managing or limiting their applications. Indeed, there are several regimes that 
have very sophisticated strategies to eff ectively co-opt or coerce technology 
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providers. One of the key threats to authoritarian regimes is elite defection. 
Th erefore, some regimes, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, followed a closely 
guarded and systematic strategy to monitor and punish a variety of autono-
mous att empts at online political engagement. Others, like Egypt and Jordan, 
tolerated such incidents by assuming that some political dissatisfaction could 
be ventilated online and therefore not materialize substantively offl  ine. When 
this dissatisfaction did eventually spill over, unfriendly regimes took a range of 
measures to suppress the political application of digital media. During extreme 
circumstances, entire global information networks were taken offl  ine. Th is 
strategy caused street protests to increase in numbers, especially in Egypt, 
where individuals turned to traditional institutions to fi nd each other, such as 
aft er Friday prayer congregations in Cairo. Disconnecting large information 
networks also caused regimes to lose millions of dollars on global fi nancial 
transactions taking place in the world economy. Th is was the case in Egypt, 
which lost $18 million USD per day (nearly $90 million USD in total) aft er 
turning off  mobile and digital networks. 
 Digital media had a causal role in the Arab Spring in that they provided the 
fundamental infrastructure for social movements and collective action, a 
process Bennett  and Segerberg ( 2012 ) call “connective action.” In the fi rst few 
weeks of protest in each country, the generation of people in the streets—and 
its leadership—was clearly not interested in the three major models of polit-
ical Islam. Th ese social movements were not seeking to replace secular dicta-
torships with Al Qaeda’s Salafi  Jihadism, Iran’s Shiite theocracy, or Saudi’s rigid 
Wahhabism (Wright  2011 ). Instead, these mostly cosmopolitan and younger 
generations of mobilizers felt disenfranchised by their political systems, saw 
vast losses in the poor management of national economies and development, 
and, most important, voiced a consistent and widely shared narrative of 
common grievances—a narrative which they learned about from each other 
and co-wrote on the digital spaces of political writing and venting on blogs, 
videos shared on Facebook and Twitt er, and comment board discussions on 
international news sites like Al Jazeera and the BBC. 
 Th e causes of revolution are always complex, and the conditions under 
which revolts succeed rare. As Goldstone ( 2011 ) observes, for a revolution to 
succeed, the government must seem so unjust and inept that it is viewed as a 
threat to the nation’s future. A country’s combined social, economic, and mil-
itary elites must be alienated from the state. Th is happened in Egypt and Tuni-
sia, was slow to happen in Libya and Syria, and did not happen in Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia. A regime’s opponents must also build consensus across a broad 
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swath of the population, crossing ethnic, religious, and class groups, which in 
several Arab Spring countries was made possible by digital networks. Finally 
international powers must either refuse to step in and defend the government 
or they must constrain the government from defending itself too ruthlessly—
both roles which have been played by Western powers at critical moments, but 
not in all (Goldstone  2011 ). 
 The Arab Spring, then, is historically unique because it is the first set of 
political upheavals in which all of these things were digitally mediated. 
Digital media allowed local citizens access to international broadcast net-
works, networks that were then used by online civil society organizations 
to lobby advocacy campaigns regionally by Arab and Western support 
groups like AccessNow and the Electronic Frontier Foundation in se-
curing information infrastructure and combating regimes’ attempts at 
committing overt violence and censoring coverage of human rights atroc-
ities. When the internet went down in Egypt, Mubarak also revoked satel-
lite broadcast licenses. As a response, Google began streaming Al Jazeera 
English directly to YouTube. 
 Many of the dictators who have held on to power in the Middle East and 
North Africa have done so by telling their population, their neighbors, and the 
international community that they were the guardians against Islamist revolu-
tion. And many of these networked individuals showed a lack of interest in the 
political Islamist frameworks of previous generations (Bayat  2007 ). Some 
Islamist parties may have benefi ted from the Arab Spring, as in the aft ermath 
of Tunisia and Egypt, but they did not inspire the uprisings. In fact, they have 
categorically hesitated to join them till victory and political change was close 
to a real possibility. Among the countries in the region, those with high rates 
of technology diff usion and a signifi cant, tech-savvy, and young civil society 
were the ones where the Arab Spring was most successful, along with regimes 
that had not mastered the art of managing information infrastructure. Th e 
countries with the lowest rates of technology diff usion, or a fragmented civil 
society with few technology resources, had less successful uprisings. Some of 
these later countries, including Libya, Syria, and Yemen, did experience ex-
tended civil war, but the inciting incidents of political strife, again, were digi-
tally mediated. On the whole, however, the role of digital media in the political 
unrest of these countries was not as pronounced as it was in Tunisia, Egypt, 
and Morocco, all of which experienced major political concessions ranging 
from democratic regime changes or the lifting of political sanctions and 
 replacement of ruling elites. 
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 Th e argument devaluing the complex causal role of digital media in the Arab 
Spring is oft en made through the simple claim that it is people on the streets and 
their grievances that constitute political revolution. Pundits have made this 
claim in diff erent ways. Several, including Gladwell, Rosenberg, and Friedman, 
argue that while Facebook and Twitt er may have their place in social change, real 
revolutions take place on the ground (Gladwell  2010 ). Rosenberg wrote that 
the biggest obstacle in using social media for political change is that “people 
need those personal connections in order to get them to take action—especially 
if action is risky and diffi  cult” (Rosenberg  2011 ). For Friedman, “what brought 
Hosni Mubarak down was not Facebook and it was not Twitt er. It was a million 
people in the streets, ready to die for what they believed in” (Friedman  2011 ). It 
is true that Facebook and Twitt er were not singular  causes of revolutions, but it is 
also silly to ignore the fact that the careful and strategic uses of digital media to 
network regional publics, along with international support networks, have 
empowered activists in new ways. Th ese have led to some of the largest protests 
this decade in Iran, the temporary lift ing of the Egyptian blockade on Gaza, and 
the popular movements that ended the decades long rule of Mubarak and Ben 
Ali. Digital media had a causal role in the Arab Spring in the sense that they pro-
vided the very infrastructure that created deep communication ties and organi-
zational capacity in groups of activists before the major protests took place and 
while street protests were being formalized. Indeed, it was because of those well-
developed, digital networks that civic leaders so successfully activated such large 
numbers of people to protest. 
 Social media are the reason we have such good documentation of events. 
More important, they are the reason that Egyptians had such excellent live 
coverage of what was going on in Tunisia, and also the reason that Moroc-
cans, Jordanians, and Yemenis had coverage of what was going on in Egypt, 
just as Libyans and Syrians had coverage of what was going on in those coun-
tries, and so on. In other words, it was social media that brought the narrative 
of successful social protest across multiple, previously closed, media regimes. 
When things did not go well, as in the case of Bahrain and Libya, activists in 
the continuing cascade took note and applied these lessons—just as authori-
tarian regimes, like Syria and Bahrain, have made interesting moves like 
opening up previously embargoed digital networks to bett er monitor the 
strategies and activities of protestors. Th e Syrian government also very 
quickly developed a digital counterinsurgency strategy, eff ectively intimi-
dating that country’s activists (one of the region’s largest online civil soci-
eties) from using social media in a systematic way for organizing. For the 
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most part, it was physical intimidation that discouraged activists from com-
municating about their political activity on Facebook. But the authoritarian 
regime also invested in its social media strategy by actively employing people 
to create pro-government content to distribute over social media networks. 
 Perhaps the most compelling reason for not dismissing the important 
causal role of digital media in the Arab Spring is that the traditional analysis, 
privileging other factors, yields uncompelling explanations (Gause,  2011 ). 
For example,  Th e Economist magazine built an index of how press freedom, 
corruption, democratic institutions, income, the youth bulge, and years of au-
thoritarian rule might predict the vulnerabilities of particular regimes. Th is 
index used many of the variables that traditional social media theorists also 
consider important—suggesting that Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Iraq were the 
most vulnerable. Yet they are neither the inciting nor defi ning cases of the 
Arab Spring. Yemen, Libya, and Syria had a small elite of technology activists 
who helped spread the word of successful rebellion in other countries, but the 
tough authoritarian regimes responded quickly and forcefully and with their 
own digital media strategy. Th ese countries descended into months of civil 
strife and did not see a rapid regime transition. Th e countries that experienced 
rapid regime collapse or where regimes made major concessions did not 
 appear particularly vulnerable—for example, Egypt and Tunisia, and Saudi 
Arabia and Morocco, respectively. 
 It is wrong-headed to debate how many bloggers it takes to make a democ-
racy. But there is litt le doubt that, altogether, social media and information infra-
structure make useful contributions toward social movement organizing and 
the mobilization of popular protest. A peripheral look at counts of media use 
and digital diff usion reveals that the countries experiencing the most dramatic 
changes had low overall percentages of social media use (Mourtada and Salem 
 2011 ). But limiting the analysis to aggregate indicators precludes the possibility 
of telling a more complex, causal story. Moreover, if there is anything to the ana-
lytical frame of networks, the use of important media by a few important nodes 
of users could be exceptionally consequential. Th is is why, to unpack the com-
plexities of the Arab Spring, we must employ analytic approaches that make pos-
sible the examination of complex social systems that constitute the overall 
aggregate of state-based cases. Street protests were the most challenging mani-
festations of political opposition for each regime’s security forces, and they were 
certainly bolstered by decades-long economic and political disenfranchisement 
of their citizens. Yet the millions of individuals on the streets of capital cities 
around the region were not disconnected individuals. 
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 In fact, the opposite is true. Th ese protesters were very connected, in groups 
and networks. Not every Tunisian and Egyptian had access to a computer. But 
mobile phones were the key mediating instrument bridging communication 
gaps: they could be easily carried and concealed, could oft en be used to record 
and upload photos and videos, and could be recharged in the street. Given the 
high rates of mobile phone use, especially in the dense urban centers, it is safe to 
say that each person at the protests either had a mobile phone or was part of a 
group in which there were several mobile civic journalists and bloggers (see  Fig-
ure  C.1 ). Before the Arab Spring, most social movement theorists had landed 
on a straightforward way of describing the importance of digital media. Digital 
media aff ected the costs and benefi ts of action, the opportunities and constraints 
on actor commitment, and was one of many resources available to activist 
leaders (Earl and Kimport  2011 ). In Bimber’s account, “socio-technological 
 devices do not determine political outcomes, but simply alter the matrix of 
opportunities and costs associated with intermediation, mobilization and the 
organization of politics” (Bimber  2003 , p. 231). 
  
 Figure C.1  Mobile Charging Station in Tahrir Square. (© Alisdare Hickson) 
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 The Digital Scaffolding for Building a Modern 
Civil Society 
 What might have made some regimes more susceptible than others to popular 
uprisings, and what might explain the relative successes of some movements 
more than others? What role does information technology have in the mod-
ern recipe for democratization? Weighing multiple political, economic, and 
cultural conditions, we fi nd that information infrastructure—especially mo-
bile phone use—consistently appears as one of the key ingredients in parsi-
monious models for the conjoined combinations of causes behind regime 
fragility and social movement success. Internet use is relevant in some solu-
tion sets, but by causal logic it is actually the absence of internet use that 
explains low levels of success. 
 In every single case, the inciting incidents of the Arab Spring were digitally 
mediated in some way. Information infrastructure, in the form of mobile 
phones, personal computers, and social media, were part of the causal story 
we must tell about the Arab Spring. People were inspired to protest for many 
diff erent and always personal reasons. Information technologies mediated 
that inspiration, such that the revolutions followed each other by a few weeks 
and had notably similar patt erns. Certainly there were diff erent political out-
comes, but that does not diminish the important role of digital media in the 
Arab Spring. But even more important, this investigation has illustrated that 
countries that do not have a civil society equipped with digital scaff olding are 
much less likely to experience popular movements for democracy than are 
countries with such an infrastructure—an observation we are able to make 
only by accounting for the constellation of causal variables that existed  before 
the street protests began, not simply the short-term uses of digital technol-
ogies during the brief period of political upheaval. 
 Perhaps some of the best evidence that digital media altered the system of 
political communication in several countries is in the way political candidates 
have recently campaigned for offi  ce, emboldened by successful digital tactics, 
and have continued to use information technologies in running for offi  ce. In 
both Egypt and Tunisia, the initial rounds of elections were notable for the 
way candidates wooed voters with social media strategies. Interacting with 
voters face to face was most important for reaching the many new voters who 
were not online and had litt le experience with campaign politics (Saleh 
 2011 ). But competitive candidates also took to the internet, and independent 
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candidates not allied with Islamist parties, such as Mohammed El Baradei in 
Egypt, also relied heavily on Facebook to activate networks of supporters. 
Digital media have had a crucial causal role in the formation, enunciation, and 
activation of coordinated opposition in several countries in North Arica and 
the Middle East. Now there is more evidence to suggest that this information 
infrastructure continues to be important aft er the dictators have fallen— 
further supporting the need to develop our theories to go beyond seeking 
linear relationships and to look for parsimonious recipes grounded in limited 
but real case contexts. 
 Th is chapter off ers a transportable framework that may describe the staging 
of contemporary, digitally mediated social change. Digital media ignited pop-
ular uprising for democracy across the region, but digital media had for several 
years served as the scaff olding over which civil society had grown. Th ese 
media were tools for social protest, but tools that shaped the character of social 
protest, the contemporary organizational form of civic unrest, and the 
changing opportunity structure for public dissent. Digital and social media 
allowed more people in the region to be involved in the production and con-
sumption of international news, to solidify their own social networks using 
digital applications, to entrench online civil society groups that nurtured new 
political publics and involved women and minority ethnic communities in 
new forms of political communication. Several international news agencies 
delivered political news and information that authoritarian regimes could 
only clumsily block. 
 We also offered a six-stage model of protest mobilization: a capacity- 
building phase that involves the diff usion and entrenchment of digital media 
over many years in local and diasporic communities; a preparation phase that 
involves activists learning to use digital media in creative ways to fi nd each 
other, build solidarity around shared grievances, and identify collective polit-
ical goals; an ignition phase that involves some inciting incident, usually 
ignored by mainstream, state-controlled media, that enrages the public and is 
leveraged by civil society groups; a phase of street protests that are coordi-
nated digitally; a phase of international buy-in, during which digital media are 
used to draw in international governments, global diasporas, and overseas 
news agencies; a climax phase in which the state either cracks down, protesters 
and elites reach a stalemate, or public demands are met; and then a fi nal de-
nouement of a post-protest information war between winners and losers in 
social change. Th e countries with the lowest rates of technology diff usion, or a 
fragmented civil society with few technology resources, had less successful 
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uprisings. But in every single case, the inciting incidents of the Arab Spring 
were digitally mediated. In this way, mobile phones, personal computers, and 
social media are part of the causal story we must tell about this period. Cer-
tainly there were diff erent political outcomes, but that does not diminish the 
important role of digital media in the Arab Spring. 
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 Chapter 3 
  1.  Demographic data from the CIA World Factbook and World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database. Technology use data from the International 
Telecommunications Union. 
  2.  Th e data for Twitt er and blog trends were collected by the Project on Informa-
tion Technology and Political Islam. Th is project is among the fi rst to  analyze 
the fl ow of text messages about the potential and strategy of democratization 
movements among multiple countries. In addition, we fi gured out how to dis-
tinguish between domestic, regional, and international contributors to the 
growing online consciousness about political crisis. Demonstrating Twitt er’s 
impact on regional conversations is an important contribution but was tech-
nically challenging. We processed more than 3 million tweets for their use of 
hashtags about events in North Africa and the Middle East. We purchased 
cloud computing time from Amazon to speed up the text analysis, and wrote 
automated scripts for identifying the relevant tweets. A signifi cant number of 
the tweets provide longitude and latitude information, and that information 
was automatically converted into country location. Finally, we hired a translator 
to help with texts and location information that is in Arabic, French, Hebrew, 
and Turkish. 
 Th is dataset was created using the Twitt er archiving service TwapperKeeper 
( htt p://twapperkeeper.com/ ) to capture the fl ow of tweets from the Twitt er 
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Search API for Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Yemen. Th e hashtags 
 analyzed, in order, were “#algeria,” “#egypt,” “#feb14,” “#morocco,” “#sidibouz-
id,” and “#yemen.” Since these archives were initiated by diff erent users at diff er-
ent times, they do not all cover the same time period. Th e earliest, #sidibouzid, 
begins on January 14, 2011, and the last tweets (in multiple hashtags) occur 
on March 24, 2011. TwapperKeeper experienced system overloading at several 
times during this period, resulting in coverage gaps within some of the archives. 
But even for archives with no gaps, it is highly unlikely that TwapperKeeper’s 
archive captured all relevant tweets due to limitations imposed by Twitt er. 
All six archives combined contain a total of 3,142,621 tweets, some of which 
 undoubtedly overlap because each tweet could contain multiple hashtags. More 
than 75 percent of these (2,363,139) are from #egypt. Th is method omits some 
unknown number of in-region tweeters due to blank location fi elds,  deleted 
accounts, and garbled information in the fi elds. 
 Twitt er changed its terms of service on March 20, 2011, to disallow public 
sharing of tweets. Th e archives analyzed in this report were queued for down-
loading from TwapperKeeper on March 19, 2011, but due to the backlog of 
similar requests from other users, the downloads did not become available until 
several days later (which is why some of them include tweets added aft er March 
20). Th e archive dates for specifi c hashtags vary, and the earliest data points 
come from #egypt on January 5, 2011. All tracking ends March 20, 2011, due 
to Twitt er’s terms of service change. TwapperKeeper, the service used to track 
hashtags, was crippled (See  www.readwriteweb.com/archives/how_recent_
changes_to_twitt ers_terms_of_service_mi.php ). 
 Th e hashtag archives included a wide array of metadata along with each 
tweet, including the author’s name, the GMT it was posted, and the applica-
tion used to send it, among other information. However, authors’ self-reported 
location fi eld was not included. To gather this, a list of unique users from each 
hashtag was created via a custom hypertext preprocessor (PHP) script. Each list 
was then used as an input into a second PHP script which automatically saved 
each user’s location fi eld from the Twitt er REST API (representational state 
transfer application programming interface). Due to restrictions on the number 
of requests that can be sent to Twitt er’s REST API per hour, the user locations 
had to be collected one archive at a time. Location collection for the largest 
hashtags took longer than a day, with the exact amount of time depending on 
the number of unique users that contributed to it. Ultimately,  between 25 per-
cent and 40 percent of the unique users in each archive lacked any  location data. 
Reasons for this included simply leaving the fi eld blank, deleting one’s account, 
or having it suspended due to misuse. 
 Once this script had fi nished collecting the location fi elds for all unique 
users from each hashtag archive, each data fi le was subjected to a word fi lter 
that att empted to automatically classify each user-provided location into one 
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of four categories: (1) within the hashtag country; (2) within the broader Ara-
bic  region; (3) outside both the country and the Arabic region; and (4) no 
provided location. Th e fi rst two fi lters consisted of a simple string-matching 
search patt ern that sought the English name of each country along with the 
names of the top fi ve cities by population in each country. Th e sole exception to 
this was for countries with less than 5 percent internet penetration, for which 
only the capital city was used in addition to the country name. Because many 
user-provided locations came in the form of latitude-longitude coordinates 
or were writt en in other languages, we decided to convert these into English 
before applying the fi lter. Google’s reverse geocoding service was used for the 
former and Google Translate was used for locations writt en in Arabic script. 
Manually reading the translated locations, we were able to identify additional 
city names within the Arabic region that recurred oft en, so we added these to 
the word fi lter. 
 Th e procedure described here resulted in a dataset for each archive that 
consisted of each unique username and its category ID as determined by the 
word fi lter. To combine the category IDs with the full tweet data, each pair of 
archive fi les (consisting of one full tweet set and one list of unique names and 
category IDs) was loaded into a MySQL database hosted on a virtual Linux 
computer hosted by Amazon’s commercial cloud. Custom structured query 
language (SQL) queries were used to automatically graft  each unique user’s 
 location to each appearance of that user within the archive. Another SQL query 
tallied the number of tweets in each full archive classifi ed as coming from a user 
in the hashtag country, in the broader Arabic region, outside of the country and 
region, and with no location. Th ese summaries were aggregated by date and 
used to create time-series charts showing the posting dynamics of each location 
category. 
  3.  The data for  Figure  3.1 come from our analysis of the Tunisian blogosphere. 
This dataset was created using the eCairn Conversation archiving and analysis 
service. The tool was used to capture the flow of information through blog 
posts from Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds for Tunisia’s key blogs. The 
captured data-streams begin on November 20, 2011, and end on May 15, 
2011. A total of 475 key Tunisian blogs contributed a total of 26,000 posts 
during this period. A number of languages are represented in the Tunisian 
blogosphere, including Arabic, French, and English. We were able to analyze 
blog centrality through eCairn Conversation, and 17 of 475 blogs were identi-
fied as the main information gateways for the Tunisian blogosphere. In order 
of centrality, they are Tunisie Blogs; Wallada; Extravaganza; Tn-Bloggers; 
 Boukornine; وراميلاك ةنودم; Venus et Moi; Barbach; Tuniblogs; Notes; Carpe 
Diem; L’universe de Narwas; نــــــيدايم; Desenchantee; اسرـــــــــــيب دــلو; Mon 
Massir; and Blogger. These 17 blogs (3.6 percent of the Tunisian national 
blogosphere) were linked to the remaining sphere of 475 blogs, of which 76 
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(16 percent) were located in a medium level of network centrality, 262 (55.1 
percent) were in low network centrality; and 120 (25.2 percent) were network 
outliers and did not link to or share much dialogue with the rest of the Tunisian 
blogosphere. 
 Almost all of the 17 core blogs in the Tunisian blogosphere have been hosted 
within Tunisia. According to IP addresses, the cities of Tunis and al-Hammah 
have had the most prominent bloggers. Th e most central blogs in Tunis were El 
Fan,  Tuniscope, and Tekino (all had medium network centrality in the larger 
Tunisian blogosphere). Th e most central blogs in al-Hammah were Tunisie 
Blogs, Tn-Bloggers, and Barbach (all had high network centrality in the larger 
Tunisian blogosphere). Interestingly, al-Hammah was a more critical location 
for the Tunisian blogosphere than Tunis. In addition, there have been several 
prominent Tunisian blogs maintained by people in the Tunisian diaspora. For 
example, the blogs Stupeur, Houblog, Arabasta, and Chroniques Absurdes 
were located in Montreal or Paris, belonged mostly to Tunisian expatriates, and 
were key mid-level blogs in the Tunisian national blogosphere. 
 Th e keywords identifi ed for the analysis were determined using eCairn’s con-
versation analyzer. Th e application used text search and identifi cation algorithms 
to  assess word frequencies and proximate phrases. Th is allowed us to specify Ben 
Ali, Bouazizi, Economie, Islam, Revolution, and Liberty as important conver-
sation items in the Tunisian national blogosphere. Aft er identifying important 
keywords, we reverse-analyzed their presence through time-series analysis. Th e 
discussion of Bouazizi and Liberty was consistently less frequent than other 
keywords, so were dropped from  Figure  3.1 . By sub-selecting the portions of 
the blogosphere that frequently mentioned diff erent key words, we were able 
to investigate their particular network-structures. For example, the keywords 
appearing less frequently (e.g., Islam) had less network heterogeneity and were 
composed of less and mostly low-infl uence blogs. In contrast, blogs mentioning 
popular keywords (e.g., Revolution) had more network heterogeneity and were 
composed of larger, more diverse, and more high-level infl uence blogs driving 
those conversations. Put more simply, the networks of blogs within the Tuni-
sian national blogosphere that were more diverse, cross-linked with others, and 
were key information gates were able to drive diff erent topics of conversation 
more successfully than smaller and more homogeneous blog networks. 
  4.  A comprehensive list of Egypt’s political party and political pressure group 
data was built using both the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook, 
Wikipedia, and some specialized Egyptian political blogs anticipating that this 
combination of “offi  cial” and “unoffi  cial” data could bring major and minor, 
new and established parties to the list. Several search engines and media data-
bases were consulted to confi rm the URLs for parties that had websites. In the 
pre-uprising dataset, a total of 1,332 external links were found across 10 active 
websites, of which 1,225 were unique and 102 were linked to by more than 
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one site. In the post-Mubarak dataset, a total of 927 external links were found 
across 9 active websites, of which, 828 were unique and 99 were linked to by 
more than one site. We searched for party websites in Arabic, in English trans-
literations of Arabic party names, and for the offi  cial English names of parties. 
To analyze the structure, the Web Data Extractor crawled each political party’s 
URLs and extracted all external-facing URLs on the entire directory. All links 
from the fi rst dataset were collected by the Web Data Extractor from November 
11 to November 13, 2010, and all links from the second dataset were collected 
between May 3 and May 6, 2011. An XML based add-in for Microsoft  Excel 
2007 called NodeXL, developed by a team funded by Microsoft  Research, was 
used to create network maps with the data like that pulled from the Web Data 
Extractor. NodeXL generated the Network Linkage Map between Political 
Parties in Egypt in  Figures  3.3 and  3.4 . An arrangement of nodes and clusters, 
the map is based on the Harel-Koren algorithm, which groups the nodes (indi-
vidual sites as dots) based on common external links. 
 Conclusion 
  1.  Th e full dataset of all variables in the causal recipes described in this investiga-
tion is available at  www.pITPI.org , as are the technical scripts for secondary 
solution sets not described here and the calibration points for specifi c member-
ship sets. 
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